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3Abstract
The introduction of the first computers together with the emergence of the Internet
was the trigger for a technological revolution that is still evolving. This revolution
began with households gaining access to personal computers, capable of commu-
nicating with other computers anywhere in the world. As a result, web platforms
grew very rapidly reaching homes worldwide and providing information to its users
through a network.
Furthermore, continual efforts to increase the computing power while reducing
the physical size of microprocessors allowed them to be produced at lower costs,
and aided the advancement of digital communications as they could be built into
almost any device or object used in our everyday lives. This is how the concept of
Ubiquitous Computing was born (also called Pervasive Computing), whereby the
objects around us can have an embedded computer and establish communications
with each other, in order to provide personalized services to assist with our tasks,
while at the same time they are connected to the Internet and so can share that
data with other devices around the world in real time.
Since this has become possible, scientists and technology companies worldwide
have focused their efforts on developing this concept further, using the computer
to understand speech, recognize facial expressions and interact with humans in an
intelligent way, making our lives easier, particularly for the elderly and disabled.
However, because it is possible to have computers almost anywhere and within
any object, environments become active, and this has opened up new discussions on
issues such as privacy and security, particularly when it comes to devices capable
of self-localization where the location of their users is known all the time. An
Active Environment can be any space with this technology (e.g. a shop, a room,
a kitchen, etc.) that has the ability to interact with the user. This technology is
expanding so rapidly. Smart cities are starting to emerge, because the entire city is
connected and therefore is considered as an active environment. When we combine
Ubiquitous Computing with Active Environments we get the basis of what is now
known as Ambient Intelligence. This dissertation focuses on the privacy and security
issues introduced by Active Environments and Ubiquitous Computing from a global
perspective.
Privacy has been the subject of numerous publications in recent years, consid-
ered from many different views, such as the legal, social, economic and technolog-
ical development perspectives, all taking an increasingly significant importance in
today’s world. Many devices like smartphones, tablets, smart watches, and even
TVs, store information about the users and their activities. Misuse of this data,
whether intentional or unintentional, has led to scandals worldwide, such as big
companies disclosing personal data by mistake; big brands obtaining the location
of users against their will; and governments accessing the data of unknowing users’
personal computers and phones. This abundance of data and its potential misuse
makes the protection of privacy a very important issue in the development of future
technologies.
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4In this dissertation, we firstly present some of the main privacy issues in mobile
systems, such as Location Based Services (LBS), and we introduce the concept of
W 3-Privacy, the three dimensions of user privacy, and how we can achieve this with
a simple protocol. We propose four protocols to protect users’ privacy, thereby
preserving the proper functioning of the service. And we propose a system based on
collaboration among users to achieve privacy in LBS, with no need to rely on other
users.
Finally, we expose the dangers of some of the current tracking systems for people
suffering from mild cognitive impairments, which manipulate very sensitive data (i.e.
health status or diseases), and we propose a private system based on role access to
the information. After that, we show some of the privacy issues related to Smart
Cities, and we introduce the five dimensions model of privacy for citizens, built
applying some of the current private models.
Acknowledgements
Foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Dr. Agusti
Solanas for believing in me, for the continuous support of my Ph.D study and
research, for his patience, motivation, enthusiasm, and immense knowledge. His
guidance helped me in all the time of research and writing of this thesis. I will never
forget our long days in Rome and Padova working so hard to make it possible.
My sincere thanks also go to Dr. Roberto di Pietro and Dr. Mauro Conti, for
offering me opportunities in their research group and guiding me working on diverse
exciting projects.
I am very grateful to my other collaborator and friend, Toni Martínez-Ballesté,
joint work with whom appears in this thesis. I have learned so much from working
together with you, and am grateful for the ideas and energy you have given me.
I thank my classmate and friend Albert Fernández Mir, for the stimulating
discussions, for the sleepless nights we were working together before deadlines, and
for all the fun we have had during our studies. Also I thank my friend Iñigo Goiri,
employee at Microsoft company, for his help during the first years of career.
I really appreciate the effort of Teresa, Johanna, James, Ellie and Samuel for
their support to correct this dissertation few days before submitting it. I am glad
to work with people like them.
Last but not least, I would like to thank my family: my parents Antonio and Ana,
for believing in me, even when nobody else did it, for supporting me throughout my
life and for their huge efforts to give me all I needed, my sister and brother Anabel
and Antonio, for making me proud to have both of you as siblings, and my girlfriend
Sara, for her huge support and encouragement, and for not letting me give up when
I was tired, I could not have done it without her support.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIVACY PROTECTION FOR UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 
Pablo A. Pérez-Martínez 
Dipòsit Legal: T 64-2015
Contents
1 Introduction 15
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.2 Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.3 Organisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2 Background and Related Work 21
2.1 Location Based Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.1.1 Exact location schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.1.2 Approximate location schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.2 Radio Frequency Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.2.1 Basic scheme of RFID systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.2.2 Security, Privacy and Scalability in RFID systems . . . . . . 32
2.3 Distributed Sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.3.1 Privacy as a product . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3.2 The Raykova-Vo-Bellovin-Malkin scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3.3 m-Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.3.4 Body sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.4 Smart Cities and Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.4.1 Smart Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.4.2 mHealth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
I Privacy in Location-Based Services 45
3 Anonymity and Pseudonymity: A Distributed approach 47
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2 Our distributed approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.3 Brief privacy discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.4 Extended Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.4.1 Protection against number of hops modification . . . . . . . . 51
3.4.2 Unresponsive and non-collaborative users . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.5 Social Server List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.5.1 Link Weight Meassurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.5.2 User Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.5.3 Attacker Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4 Query Privacy: Prime numbers and Homomorphic Cryptography 61
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.2 Basic Concepts of Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.3 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIVACY PROTECTION FOR UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 
Pablo A. Pérez-Martínez 
Dipòsit Legal: T 64-2015
6 Contents
4.3.1 Case 1: Centralised Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.3.2 Case 2: Distributed Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.3.3 Study of k-anonymity and keywords dictionary . . . . . . . . 68
4.3.4 Cluster Heads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.3.5 Factorising cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.3.6 Privacy Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5 W 3-Privacy: A holistic view 73
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.2 W3-Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.3 Our proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.3.1 WHO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.3.2 WHAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.3.3 WHERE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.3.4 Privacy protection on LBS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
II Privacy in RFID and distributed sensors 79
6 Smart Public Parkings 81
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
6.2 Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
6.2.1 Smart Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
6.2.2 Public Parking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
6.3 Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6.3.1 Anonymous Payment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6.3.2 Protocol Operation in a Smart City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
6.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
7 Cloud and Body Sensors 91
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
7.2 A private health center in the cloud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
7.2.1 Main actors and desiderata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
7.2.2 Managing and trading the data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
7.2.3 Viability of the business model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
7.2.4 Fair play . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
7.3 Application scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
7.3.1 General people . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
7.3.2 Professional athletes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
III Smart Cities and Applications 103
8 Privacy-Aware within a Smart City 105
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIVACY PROTECTION FOR UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 
Pablo A. Pérez-Martínez 
Dipòsit Legal: T 64-2015
Contents 7
8.2 Privacy Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
8.2.1 The 3D Conceptual Framework for Database Privacy . . . . . 107
8.2.2 W 3-Privacy for Location-Based Services . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
8.3 Privacy Enhancing Techniques for Citizens Privacy . . . . . . . . . . 109
8.3.1 Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
8.3.2 Private Information Retrieval (PIR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
8.3.3 Privacy-Preserving Data Mining (PPDM) . . . . . . . . . . . 110
8.3.4 Location Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
8.3.5 Anonymity and Pseudonyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
8.3.6 Privacy in RFID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
8.3.7 Privacy in Video Surveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
8.4 A 5D Model for Privacy in Smart Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
8.4.1 Identity Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
8.4.2 Query Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
8.4.3 Location Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
8.4.4 Footprint Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
8.4.5 Owner Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
8.4.6 Towards Smart Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
9 Private Monitoring of Elderly 117
9.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
9.1.1 e-Health concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
9.2 The m-Carer architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
9.2.1 Rationale, concept and desiderata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
9.2.2 Running example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
9.2.3 Structure, actors and roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
9.3 m-Carer operation and alarm states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
9.3.1 Registration of patients and unofficial users . . . . . . . . . . 125
9.3.2 State of No Alarm (NA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
9.3.3 State of Non-Critical Alarm (NCA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
9.3.4 State of Critical Alarm (CA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
9.3.5 Obtaining information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
9.4 Real implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
IV Conclusions and summary 131
10 Summary of main contribution 133
10.1 Thesis Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
10.2 Location-based Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
10.3 RFID and distributed sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
10.3.1 Radio Frequency Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
10.3.2 Distributed Sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
10.4 Smart Cities and Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIVACY PROTECTION FOR UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 
Pablo A. Pérez-Martínez 
Dipòsit Legal: T 64-2015
8 Contents
10.4.1 Smart Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
10.4.2 mHealth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
10.4.3 Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Bibliography 139
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIVACY PROTECTION FOR UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 
Pablo A. Pérez-Martínez 
Dipòsit Legal: T 64-2015
List of Figures
2.1 Simplest form of communication between user and service provider. . . . . . . 22
2.2 Classification of location privacy methods according to the way they manage
locations [93]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3 Policy-based scheme, where the provider adheres to a set of privacy policies. . . 24
2.4 Pseudonymiser mediates between users and providers. Users send the queries to
the pseudonymiser, which is responsible for submiting these queries to the server
provider. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.5 PIR-based scheme where the provider has an encrypted database. . . . . . . . 26
2.6 k-Anonymisers are able to compute a region where k are located. . . . . . . . . 27
2.7 Obfuscation-based scheme, where the TTP adds noise to the user’s location. . . 28
2.8 In collaboration-based schemes, users collaborate among them in order to submit
a query to the service provider. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.9 Basic components of an RFID system. From left to right: a back-
end, RFID readers, and RFID tags. The back-end uses databases
to store identification information. RFID readers are used to query
RFID tags (which can take a variety of embodiments), retrieve their
information, and forward it to the back-end through a wireless or
wired channel. Note that in this simplest scheme, RFID readers are
used as relays and are not connected amongst themselves [112]. . . . 30
2.10 Improved Randomized Hash-locks Protocol [112]. . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.11 Intuitive location of several identification protocols in the privacy-
scalability plane. The top-right quadrant is where private and scal-
able protocols lay [114]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.12 Raykova-Vo-Bellovin-Malkin scheme (taken from [88]). . . . . . . . . 39
2.13 Timetable with important innovations on body sensors during the
last century. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.14 Brief overview of body sensors able to connect with a mobile device. 41
3.1 Communications example in the proposed scheme [93] . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2 Users send the message to two next random users, doing so a user can check the
validity of a received message. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3 When a user receives a message, he asks for a new random user and submits again
the message. If after a while the next user does not respond, he asks for a new
random user and repets the steps until get a response. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4 The collaboration variable (Ci, where i is the user at position i) decre-
ments when users do not receive an answer from the next user. It can
be due to another non-collaborative user in the chain of users, but
all users are affected. Although, after some iterations, the last user
(non-collaborative) will be alone, with no links, and other users will
recover their links. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIVACY PROTECTION FOR UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 
Pablo A. Pérez-Martínez 
Dipòsit Legal: T 64-2015
10 List of Figures
3.5 Fitness Proportionate Selection, where the sample B is chosen before
applying the random function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.1 Query process in the centralised model, where all users forming the
group send their encrypted queries to the root user, who is responsible
for building the query consisting on the product of all queries. . . . . 64
4.2 Answer process in the centralised model, where server builds an an-
swer message with the answers of all the queries, sends it back to UR,
and he broadcasts the message to the whole group. . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.3 Distributed model with a double loop, where U0 starts the query
process with the message m0, which is modified for each user until
arriving at U3 who sends the message m′3 to P . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.4 Query process in the distributed model with a single loop, where the
user who creates the query is the responsible for sending it to the
server. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.5 Answer process in the distributed model with a single loop . . . . . . 68
4.6 The chart shows the amount of keywords the system can handle
according to the k-anonymity that we want to achieve. As higher
is the k-anonymity, lower is the amount of words contained in the
dictionary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.7 Time in milliseconds for factorising messages. The chart shows how
the time to factorise grows almost linearly with respect to the number
of queries to factorise. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.1 (left) Chicago’s density map and user located on it. (right) Radius
of uncertainty around the user and candidate points [91]. . . . . . . . 76
6.1 User asking to the bank for e-cash [92]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6.2 Graphic scheme of the payment and validation procedure [92]. . . . . 86
6.3 Payment by means of e-cash and a mobile phone [92]. . . . . . . . . 86
6.4 Secure communication between a vehicle and an RFID reader using
IRHL [92]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
7.1 Simple model for cloud storage of data collected by body sensors. The data are
shared with entities for primary and secondary use, and the cloud service provider
could make revenue from this data sharing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
7.2 The trading protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
7.3 The proposed scheme for PaaP using body sensors and a Cloud Service Provider. 96
7.4 Some of the most common body sensors currently used by athletes. . . . . . . 100
8.1 Conceptual scheme of the privacy models. In the picture we distin-
guish (i) a user (at the bottom) that contacts a location-based service
provider, (ii) two social networks (on the right) to which the user be-
longs, and (iii) a data warehousing facility (at the top) [73]. . . . . . 107
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIVACY PROTECTION FOR UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 
Pablo A. Pérez-Martínez 
Dipòsit Legal: T 64-2015
List of Figures 11
8.2 Our example of smart city: (1) Smart parking service (2) Electric car
recharging (3) Smart building with control of presence (4) User query-
ing an LBS provider (5) Camera for video surveillance (6) Smart bus
that changes the route upon users needs (7) Smart garbage containers
(8) Control of energy consumption in homes (9) Medical center (10)
Interactive information pole (11) Network infrastructure of the smart
city [73]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
9.1 Illustration of our running example. In the figure, the main actors of
the systems are depicted along with their relations [106]. . . . . . . . 121
9.2 General scheme of the m-Carer system with all the actors (i.e. the
m-Carer, the patient, the official and unofficial users, the servers
and the emergency services), and their relation under different alarm
states [106]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
9.3 Left: Illustration of the area surrounding The Golden Yard in our
running example. Right: Areas defined by patients or users (in this
case Mr. Oldsmith and his daughter Ellie). Green areas indicate
allowed zones without risk, yellow areas indicate non-allowed zones
(possibly risky), and red areas indicate dangerous zones that must be
avoided [106]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
9.4 Route followed by Mr. Oldsmith in our example. Circled numbers
indicate different moments in the promenade of Mr. Oldsmith that
are used to illustrate different alarm states [106]. . . . . . . . . . . . 127
9.5 Screenshot of the website used by users to define their preferences [106].130
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIVACY PROTECTION FOR UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 
Pablo A. Pérez-Martínez 
Dipòsit Legal: T 64-2015
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIVACY PROTECTION FOR UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 
Pablo A. Pérez-Martínez 
Dipòsit Legal: T 64-2015
List of Tables
4.1 Advantages of each model: The distributed model provides more pri-
vacy, but can easily suffer a DoS attack. The centralised model is
more robust against these kinds of attacks, but the privacy level is
lowest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.2 Generated messages, wheremi is the message generated by user i, and
contains the query , EPKP and ESKP are the encryption/decryption
functions keys of P , qi is the query of user i, A is the message which
contains the answer and ai is the answer to the query i. . . . . . . . 64
4.3 Generated messages, where mi is the message generated by user i,
and contains the real query with the false one, m′i is the final query
without the false query of i, EPKP is the encryption with the public
key of P , qi is the query of user i, A is the message which contains
the answer and ai is the answer to the query i. . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.4 Values of the k-anonymity and keywords dictionary study with 1024
bits messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.1 Brief comparison of private LBS methods with regard toW 3-privacy [91] 75
8.1 Summary of our 5D proposal for modeling the privacy aspects in
smart city services [73]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIVACY PROTECTION FOR UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 
Pablo A. Pérez-Martínez 
Dipòsit Legal: T 64-2015
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIVACY PROTECTION FOR UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 
Pablo A. Pérez-Martínez 
Dipòsit Legal: T 64-2015
Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter introduces the issues we are facing in this dissertation. In addition, it
briefly describes the solutions we propose to tackle those issues. Finally, the structure
and organisation of the present thesis are outlined.
Contents
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1.1 Motivation
Ubiquitous computing has received both academic and commercial interest. In [24]
a detailed description of the challenges for ubiquitous computing is presented from
different perspectives, but we mainly focus on privacy concerns.
Definition 1. A location-based service (LBS) is a software application for a IP-
capable mobile device that requires knowledge about where the mobile device is located.
Due to the improvements and the quick evolution of the technology, more and
more systems make use of the location, thanks to the capabilities of self-localisation,
by means of Global Positioning System (GPS), Global Navigation Satellite Systems
(GLONASS) or Galileo (the European positioning satellite). For instance, thirty
years ago the first mobile phone appeared, and in few years they have been evolved
until they became devices with almost the same capabilities and computational
power as a personal computer. This has meant that the location-based services
have grown exponentially in recent years.
Location-based services offer many opportunities for the mobile users, as for
example:
• Requesting the nearer service or business, such as a pharmacy or a restaurant.
• Receiving alerts, such as notification of sale on gas or information about the
transit.
• Finding friends or people with cognitive impairments.
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LBS providers need the private information of the users in order to give the best
service possible. In the case of a service that shows the weather information, the
location sent to the provider could be just a city, or a big area where the user is
located and it would be enough to get the service, but if the user needs to know
where is the nearest pharmacy, he should share his exact location in order to get
a proper result. Even more so, in case of a person suffering from mild cognitive
impairments (MCI), the system constantly needs the exact location of the user, the
heart rate, blood glucose level, etc., because the life of the user could depend on the
proper functioning of the service.
But this raises questions related to privacy. Why should we share our private
data? Can we trust all the service providers that ask for our data? What if the
service provider makes a dishonest use of our data? Or, even if the it is honest,
what if an attacker gets these data? The private data of users should be private
even for the service provider to prevent a dishonest use, specially in cases where the
information about the health of the user is shared.
These privacy concerns not only affect to mobile devices. New radio identifi-
cation systems such as RFIDs which are able to identify objects with no need of
contact.
Definition 2. Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a technology that uses elec-
tronic tags placed on objects, people, or animals to relay identifying information to
an electronic reader by means of radio waves [65].
RFID is aimed at efficiently identifying products without the need for visual
contact that has greatly influenced the manufacturing businesses in recent years.
This technology has been called to replace bar codes and to improve the manage-
ment of products. Although the RFID technology has been widely accepted by the
manufacturing and retailing sectors, there are still many issues regarding its scal-
ability, security and privacy. Also related to privacy, the sharing of identification
information amongst multiple parties is an issue (specially after the massive out-
sourcing that is taking place in our global market). Securely and efficiently sharing
identification information with multiple parties is a tough problem that must be
considered so as to avert the undesired disclosure of confidential information.
As the authors described in [62], RFIDs have two main privacy concerns for
users: clandestine tracking and inventorying. RFID tags react to reader interroga-
tion without the owners’ knowledge. Thus, if a reader is close enough, clandestine
scanning of tags is a realistic threat. Most RFID tags reply with unique identifiers,
even tags that protect data with cryptographic algorithms. In consequence, some-
body carrying an RFID tag broadcasts its serial number to nearby readers, allowing
for clandestine physical tracking.
When the identifier of a tag is combined with some kind of personal information,
the threat to privacy grows. For example, when a consumer makes a purchase with
a credit card, the shop can link his identity with the serial number of the credit
card’s tag. Marketers can then identify and profile the consumer using networks of
RFID readers.
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In addition to their identifiers, some tags carry information about the items to
which they are attached. These tags include a field for the “General Manager”,
typically the manufacturer of the object, and an “object class”, typically a product
code, known formally as a stock-keeping unit (SKU). Thus, somebody carrying an
RFID tag is subject to clandestine inventorying. A reader can silently determine
what objects a person is carrying, and show personal information like the types of
medications he is carrying and, therefore, what illnesses he may suffer from; the
RFID-enabled loyalty cards he carries and, therefore, where he shops; his cloth-
ing sizes and accessory preferences, etc. This problem of inventorying is largely
particular to RFID.
This technology is already adopted in several scenarios; we show some of the
most common uses:
• Toll-payment transponders: Automated toll payment transponders consist on
small plaques positioned in windshield corners, this technology is commonplace
worldwide.
• Libraries: Some libraries have implemented RFID systems to facilitate book
checkout and inventory control and to reduce repetitive stress injuries in li-
brarians.
• Passports and IDs: An international organization known as the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has promulgated guidelines for RFID-
enabled passports and other identifier documents.
• Human implantation: Few other RFID systems have inflamed the passions
of privacy advocates like the VeriChip system [3]. VeriChip is a human-
implantable RFID tag, much like the variety for house pets. One intended
application is medical-record indexing; by scanning a patient’s tag, a hospital
can locate her medical record.
• Credit, public transportation, and some other cards: Most of the current cards
carry an RFID tag in order to pay remotely, in a shop, bus, metro or wherever
they have implanted the system.
In the context of mobile-phones, it is becoming more common to have a smart-
phone, and it is pretty hard to find somebody who does not have one. The use
of smartphones also allows people to connect a body sensor in order to store and
analyse their vital signs and track their improvements. Electronic health (e-health)
and more recently mobile health (m-health) are focussing the attention of the public
and private healthcare sectors. Their main aim is to help reducing economic costs
whilst maintaining or even increasing the assistance quality that patients receive.
Body sensors are the linchpin of e-health and m-health since they play a fun-
damental role in gathering biomedical information that is essential for the proper
remote supervision of patients. Notwithstanding, body sensors can no longer be un-
derstood as individual sensors that locally collect data, but as cooperative sensors
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organised in networks (BSN) that share biomedical information in complex infras-
tructures based on advanced information and communication technologies (ICT).
The new paradigms of cloud storage and cloud computing open the door to the
migration of body sensor networks from local infrastructures to more powerful and
globally accessible cloud services. However, due to the fact that the data collected
by BSN are very sensitive, cryptographic mechanisms should be provided in order
to assure the protection of patients privacy.
Moreover, most of these systems are not capable of self located, but RFID readers
can be deployed in a restricted area, so each reader is located in a determined
location, and it can identify RFID tags in order to know their location. If a set of
RFID readers are deployed in a city, the system could track the citizens and perform
a profile of each of them, in order to use this information for spam, to sell it to use it
in order to deny an insurance to somebody, etc., and this could suppose a huge risk
for the privacy of the users. A city where hundreds or thousands of RFID readers
are deployed and citizens use RFID tags for different services could seem a futuristic
situation, but in the last years the concept of “Smart City” is being expanded among
the biggest cities of the world, with the aim of improving the quality of life of its
citizens. In these cities, they already have enough RFID readers deployed in order
to offer services to their citizens.
Countries are making great efforts to be competitive, attract investments and
talent, reduce debt and be more sustainable. Both countries and cities struggle
for competitiveness, which are competing at an international level for investments,
talent and quality of life, and they realise that the most promising path to success
is the use of technology. Specifically, information and communication technologies
(ICT) allow local governments and companies to develop ubiquitous innovative so-
lutions that improve city operations in a variety of areas, such as transportation,
energy, sustainability, e-governance, economy and communications.
In big cities, factors related to economies of scale help to reduce operational costs.
However, managing big cities is challenging because the number of inhabitants grows
steadily and the infrastructures and operational procedures have to be adapted to
a growing and very demanding population.
In this context, local administrations have the need for smart procedures to
improve the quality of life and the management of resources in cities. As a result of
these needs, the concept of Smart City was adopted, but in many cases the meaning
given to this term changes from person to person. Moreover, the term has gained
a kind of marketing value that local governments want to benefit from. Thus, the
definition of the term is frequently modified so as to adapt to the needs of the people
using it in a particular situation. As a consequence, a number of different definitions
and conceptual ideas regarding Smart Cities can be found in the literature.
Furthermore, the concerns are even bigger when we are talking about the welfare
of people. Age-related diseases are becoming more prominent due to life expectancy
increase in developed countries. Mild cognitive impairment and several types of
dementia like Alzheimer’s disease are gaining importance both socially and econom-
ically. Patients suffering from these diseases have different degrees of autonomy and,
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thus, different needs. Often, relatives or friends take care of those patients. However,
during the first stages of the disease, they still have a high degree of autonomy and
frown on the supervision of others. Despite their autonomy, patients could get lost
and disoriented. Rapidly determining the location of a lost patient is paramount to
reduce the risk of suffering serious injuries. Current solutions to this problem are
based on the continuous monitoring of the patient. Such continuous control might
be seen by most people as a privacy invasion, and it may discourage patients from
using these solutions.
1.2 Contribution
Location-based services are becoming more and more popular among the mobile app
developers. Most people have a smartphone with self-location and data connection.
These capabilities allow users to make use of LBS in order to find a nearby service
or place, interact with other users or simply check information. This technology can
be very useful, but it entails several privacy risks.
Also the RFID technology can help to improve our processes by simplifying
paperwork, speeding up the cataloguing of products and reducing costs. However,
the massive use of this technology implies the management of billions of tags (which
is a challenge) and might suppose a thread in terms of security and, also, in terms
of privacy.
In this dissertation, we concentrate on these issues (i.e. Security, privacy and
scalability in LBS, RFID, sensor networks and smart cities). Specifically, our con-
tributions are the following:
• We organise, classify, and analyse the main privacy protection protocols in
location-based services.
• We propose different systems able to guarantee user’s privacy. In one hand we
present a couple of them based on collaboration, where the users collaborate
among them to achieve privacy. In the other hand, we also propose two more
non-collaborative protocols.
• We introduce the concept of W 3-Privacy, which defines the three dimensions
of user privacy (Where, What, Who).
• We propose an intelligent and private public parking system for smart cities.
• With the aim to avert privacy and security risks and simultaneously gain
the full advantages of body sensors networks (BSN) in the cloud, we propose
a complete cryptographic framework that grants users/patients full control
over their data whilst, at the same time, allowing the controlled sharing of
information. Our solution is based on the concept of Privacy as a Product
(PaaP) and the Raikova-Vo-Bellovin-Malkin (RVBM) scheme.
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• We recognise the growing importance of body sensor networks and we show
that their use is paramount for the proper evolution of our modern society
towards a better and more accessible health system. However, BSN can no
longer be seen as isolated systems that send information to authorised parties
only. On the contrary, they are sharing their collected data with cloud services
so as to take advantage of cloud storage and computational benefits. As a
result, if the proper cryptographic measures are not taken, BSN connected to
the cloud could represent a privacy and security threat for their users.
Finally, due to the proliferation of the concept of “Smart City”, we define the
Citizens Privacy concept, which defines the five dimensions model for smart cities.
1.3 Organisation
Chapter 1 introduces the concept of privacy in ubiquitous computing, starting with
the motivation that has led to this dissertation and the contributions to avoid the
privacy concerns. The rest of this dissertation is organised as follows:
Chapter 2 shows the current privacy protection techniques in location-based
systems, RFIDs, body sensors and smart cities. Then, chapter 3 and 4 present
protocols to protect privacy in LBS through the collaboration of users.
Concluding with location-based services. In chapter 5 we present the concept
W3-Privacy, which includes the three dimensions of privacy in LBS to be met to
ensure privacy.
In the second part, in chapter 6, we apply a scalable method for RFID identifica-
tion to a smart city, allowing the smart and private use of public parkings. Chapter 7
presents a framework that enables private sharing of information obtained by body
sensors, allowing users to share and sell the information.
Chapter 8 introduces the concept “Citizen Privacy” which includes the 5 di-
mensions of privacy that must be met in a smart city to guarantee the privacy of
its citizens and chapter 9 presents the “mobile carer”, an intelligent, private and
autonomous system for mobile phones able to help a person with mild cognitive
impairments (MIC) in case of emergency. Finally, this thesis ends with conclusions
and the most important contributions.
Chapters on Parts I, II and III start with a brief summary of the chapter’s con-
tent, then an introduction to the current chapter followed by the proposed protocol
and finally some results and conclusions.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
This chapter starts by describing the current state-of-the-art privacy protection in
Location Based Services. We organise, classify and analyse the most common proto-
cols. We then present the RFID technology and some of the main privacy-preserving
techniques. The chapter finally shows the concept of Privacy-as-a-product and the
most relevant contributions of privacy-preserving in the Cloud and body sensors.
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2.1 Location Based Services
In the simplest form of communication between an LBS user and an LBS provider
(Figure 2.1), the former sends her location (x, y) to the latter along with an iden-
tifier (ID) and a request for information (e.g. [x, y, ID, “Where is the closest bus
station?”]). Then, the provider answers the user with the required information.
If the data is sent as plain text, an attacker listening to the communication
channel would get all the transmitted data, but lets suppose that the server provider
adds some minor protection techniques to the service and works under an encrypted
channel, so an attacker, by means of a man in the middle attack, would not see
the data. Even with encrypted communication, the system can not guarantee the
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privacy of the user from the provider because the latter knows the real location of
the former. Thus, in this scheme users must trust providers.
Figure 2.1: Simplest form of communication between user and service provider.
To give an example, imagine a user using Google Maps [52] from his smart phone.
The user is looking for a pharmacy and asks the application for the nearest one.
Google Maps needs the location of the former, so this user sends private data to
Google [51], which will use the data to profile the user and profit. Then, when the
same user accesses Google web search, spam about medicines, health care centres,
pharmacies, among others, can appear.
In an attempt to protect users’ privacy in location-based services, policies that
would defend the rights of users were created, although they do not prevent third
parties from accessing the private data that users do no want to share. Thereby,
research on this topic has motivated the creation of a huge number of protocols to
confront this problem.
The most obvious system to face this problem is to replace the identifier of
users with a pseudonym, but this assumes that the same user always has the same
identifier and can be thus identified. In an attempt to solve this problem, Beresford
and Stajano [14] propose that the pseudonym should change in order to prevent
the server from linking pseudonyms with the real identities of users, but Bettini et
al. [15] show that with a sequence of locations they can be linked quite easily.
The most extended privacy system is Spatial Cloaking, in which the user’s lo-
cation is replaced by geographical areas that can contain more users, but there are
also systems based on cryptography and obfuscation of locations.
Most of the Spatial Cloaking methods are based on a Trusted Third Party (TTP),
[41], [42], [15] which is responsible for managing the private data of users in order
to create an area containing a set of users. This area can be used by the user in order
to submit queries to the provider, so the provider does not know the real location of
the user within the area. Another option is to allow the TTP to submit the queries
and then send the answers to the users, but these kinds of protocols also have the
typical drawbacks of a centralised system (bottlenecks, single points of attack, etc.),
so they can jeopardize the integrity of the system and the users’ privacy. Moreover,
these protocols do not achieve privacy protection since users must trust the TTP
and share their private data with it.
There are different proposals to compute the area in Spatial Cloaking methods,
some of which are based on the k-anonymity property [53], a concept introduced by
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Gruteser and Grunwald [53] and defined as following:
Definition 1. Let RT(A1, . . . , An) be a table and QIRT be the quasi-identifier as-
sociated with it. RT is said to satisfy k-anonymity if and only if each sequence of
values in RT["QIRT ] appears with at least k occurrences in RT[QIRT ].
On the other hand, there are proposals based on obfuscation [36] (see Definition
2), in which the degradation of users’ location reduces the risks of privacy loss.
Definition 2. Obfuscation is the process of degrading the quality of information
about a person’s location, with the aim of protecting that person’s location privacy.
Duckham and Kulik [36] introduced the concept with two parameters, innacu-
racy, which implies giving a fake location instead of a real one, and imprecision,
which implies giving plurality of possible locations. In [53] the authors added to
the idea of temporal obfuscation the concept of temporal cloaking, where a user can
specify the parameters of delay, although this protocol forces the users of the same
area to have the same requirements of privacy. In [42], Clique Cloak allows the users
of a same area to have different requirements of privacy, but the algorithm is not
scalable for big groups.
Since centralised systems are vulnerable, new systems with no need for TTP have
been proposed. Some of them make use of the collaboration between users through
ad-hoc networks [109], [47], [50], [16]. In these systems, users communicate amongst
them in order to produce obfuscation areas with different algorithms. In [109], users
use privacy homomorphisms in order to hide their locations but are able to create
areas including all participating users. In [93], a decentralised system is proposed
where users collaborate with no need for trusting other users, since private data is
hidden from collaborative users, thanks to public key cryptography. In this system,
users perform a chain of h users (number of hops of the message) through the
Internet, whereby the message hops until it reaches the last user. The last user is
then responsible for submitting the query to the provider. Because no users know
the owner of the query, the provider will not link the query with an identity, even
in the case of collusion between users and the provider.
Other kinds of proposals that do not need either TTP or collaboration of users
are PIR protocols (Private Information Retrieval). These protocols are very compli-
cated systems studied by the database and cryptography communities, which require
an encrypted database. The aim of PIR is to allow a user to get the record i from a
database without revealing i. In [48, 67], the authors use this concept for LBS, yet
the biggest drawback of these protocols is the huge computational complexity and
the overhead that they add in comparison with traditional methods.
As we stated before, a huge number of methods have been proposed. For the sake
of clarity, we have classified those methods depending on the way they manage the
location of users. First, we consider the methods that do not distort locations, and
then we move to the ones that use approximations. See Figure 2.2 for a graphical
representation of this classification.
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Figure 2.2: Classification of location privacy methods according to the way they manage loca-
tions [93].
2.1.1 Exact location schemes
We classify all the methods that do not distort the location of LBS users to pro-
tect their privacy under exact location schemes category. These methods are very
common because most of them are conceptually simple. In addition, as they do
not modify the location of users, the obtained results are optimal. Apart from the
basic/simple scheme described above, we consider three non-disruptive schemes: (i)
Policy-based schemes; (ii) Pseudonymizers; and (iii) Private Information Retrieval
(PIR)-based schemes.
Policy-based schemes: The architecture of these schemes is like the simple
scheme with a single user and a provider.
In this scheme (Figure 2.3), the communication protocol is not modified, so
the communication between the user and the provider is exactly the same as in a
simple communication. However, in this case the provider adheres to a set of privacy
policies [104]. Consequently, the user has the right to ask for a compensation if the
provider does not fulfill his duties. The Geopriv (Geographic Location/Privacy)
Charter of the IETF supports the use of policies [101].
Figure 2.3: Policy-based scheme, where the provider adheres to a set of privacy policies.
In an environment where a number of policies need to coexist, several policies
can be in conflict, either because of a specification error or because of application-
specific constraints. It is therefore important to provide the means of detecting
conflicts in the policy specification [71, 79]. According to [55], by considering the
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different conflict types, it is possible to define rules that can be used to recognise
conflicting situations in the policy specification. We can find some examples in
the current literature about how these rules can be used as part of a detection
process in [25, 26]. Another issue regarding policy-based systems is whether the
policies should apply to all users and how their preferences are respected. In [19],
the authors consider cases where no absolute control from an authority is accepted,
while in [18], a “promise theory” attempts to provide “political autonomy” to entities
and decentralize policy management.
Policy-based schemes are widespread among the main LBS applications, and
offer some protection to the user’s privacy against the service provider, but it does
not prevent her against an external attack, or even the provider, which can make a
mistake and share the private data of its users. For instance, in 2006 AOL [1] released
detailed search logs of a large number of its users. The release was intentional and
intended for research purposes; however, the public release implied that all the
Internet users could see the results, rather than a select number of academics. AOL
did not redact any information, thus causing privacy concerns since users could be
potentially identified by their searches.
Pseudonymizers: These schemes add a trusted third party (a pseudonymizer)
to the basic model. The pseudonymizer, shown in Figure 2.4, mediates between
users and providers. Users send their queries to the pseudonymizer, which re-
places the real identity of the users (e.g. their IP addresses) with a pseudonym.
In this way, providers cannot identify users because they become hidden behind the
pseudonymizer.
Figure 2.4: Pseudonymiser mediates between users and providers. Users send the queries to the
pseudonymiser, which is responsible for submiting these queries to the server provider.
In [99], the authors suggest user-generated random pseudonyms. The user pro-
vides his location data together with a timestamp and the associated pseudonym
to the location service. The use of pseudonyms as identifiers allows for anonymity
in identity management. An essential factor for effectiveness of pseudonyms is the
unlinkability between the pseudonym and its holder and whether pseudonyms can
be linked between each other. Notwithstanding, users must trust pseudonymizers
because they have full access to their real locations and identities. Also, if users
send several queries from the same location (e.g. from their residence), providers
can determine their real identities by using e.g. a public telephone directory or just
observing who is in that location. These attacks are known as Restricted Space
Identification (RSI) and Observation Identification (OI) [53].
PIR-based schemes: Private information retrieval (PIR) is a difficult problem
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mainly studied by the database and cryptography communities. The goal of PIR is
to allow a user to obtain a record (i) from a database without revealing i.
The PIR problem was first formulated and studied in [27], where the solutions as-
sumed multiple databases and were aimed at information-theoretical security. How-
ever, the assumption that multiple databases would not communicate with one
another is considered unrealistic in practical applications. Later in [28, 46, 120],
PIR schemes with a single database were proposed. These solutions were based on
computational complexity assumptions, such as the difficulty of factoring n = pq.
Unfortunately, the computational costs of these solutions are very large due to their
bit-by-bit processing nature. They require O(N) multiplications (mod. a 1024-bit
number) for retrieving just one bit, where N is the total number of bits in the
database [12].
Figure 2.5: PIR-based scheme where the provider has an encrypted database.
Most PIR schemes (Figure 2.5) based on the computational complexity assump-
tion aim at reducing the cost of communications. The scheme in [21] can achieve
a communication cost of polylog(N) while those cited previously have exponential
communications. Mathematically, these schemes are very beautiful. But from the
implementation point of view, they are completely impractical since they all have
computation complexity of at least O(N) to retrieve just 1 information bit. A prac-
tical scheme should process messages file-by-file instead of bit-by-bit.
In [49, 67], the authors use the concept of PIR in LBS. The main problem of
these methods is their high computational complexity. In addition, the LBS provider
must implement very sophisticated protocols to exchange information with users.
Nowadays, these proposals seem impractical.
2.1.2 Approximate location schemes
The methods that distort the real locations of users assume that the modification of
the locations prevents the provider from learning the private information of users,
sacrificing accuracy in the response. We consider three main categories: (i) k-
Anonymizers; (ii) Obfuscation; and (iii) Obfuscation by collaboration (Collaboration
for short).
k-Anonymizers: As we can see in Figure 2.6, there are TTPs to which users
send their queries. After collecting some queries, k-anonymizers build groups of k
users and compute a fake location (e.g. a centroid) that represents all the members
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of the same group. Then, the real locations are replaced by the centroid of the
group and the provider cannot distinguish which user in the group sent the query.
Although the k-anonymity property is very interesting and increases the privacy
level of users, this approach has all the problems of the TTP-based approaches and,
in addition, the obtained results are not accurate.
Figure 2.6: k-Anonymisers are able to compute a region where k are located.
According to [14], anonymity can be seen as “a state of being not identifiable
within a set of subjects, the anonymity set”. Initially, k-anonymity was proposed
by Samarati in [100] to protect microdata. The main idea of k-anonymity applied
to LBS is to hide a user amongst k − 1 other users.
In [41, 53], the authors adopt the k-anonymity model and proposed a quad-tree
based cloaking algorithm. They assume a static anonymity requirement kmin for
all users. To achieve k-anonymity, the algorithm recursively subdivides the area
around a user’s location into four quadrants until the number of users in the area
falls below kmin, and then returns the previous quadrant as the cloaking region.
This technique does not differentiate the privacy requirements of different users.
Moreover, no restriction is imposed on the cloaking region size. Thus, a cloaking
region can be very large, which may lead to an inaccurate query result and poor
service quality.
Gedik and Liu [42] proposed the technique of supporting personalized privacy
requirements, thus capturing the privacy and QoS requirements on a per-user basis.
The authors presented a cloaking algorithm called Clique Cloak, which constructs
an undirected graph for all the requests that have not been anonymised yet. Every
time the server receives a new request, it attempts to identify a clique involving the
new request and some existing requests, and cloak them together with the same
region. However, this method has several drawbacks:
• the effectiveness of this method is limited to users with small k values,
• the cost of searching a clique in a graph is high, and
• some requests that cannot be anonymised will be dropped when their lifetimes
expire.
These drawbacks affect the user’s experience of the service.
There are other proposals in the literature, as for example Casper, proposed
in [81]. Casper employed a grid-based pyramid structure to index all user locations.
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Besides the anonymity level k, a user can specify Amin, indicating that the user
wants to hide his location information within an area of at least Amin. But this
model presents some concerns, such as the similar functionality of k and Amin (the
higher the value of k is, the larger the cloaking area is). And the cloaking region may
expand to be arbitrarily large if k is set to a large value and few users are present
nearby. To address this problem, Casper uses a privacy-aware query processor to
return a list of candidate query results to the anonymizing proxy, which has to
locally refine the actual result from the candidate list. This approach incurs a high
query processing cost, a high communication cost, and a high local computation
cost.
Obfuscation-based schemes: As the authors described in [9], location ob-
fuscation is complementary to anonymity. In particular, rather than anonymizing
user’s identities, obfuscation-based solutions assume the identification of users and
introduce perturbations into collected locations to decrease their accuracy.
Figure 2.7: Obfuscation-based scheme, where the TTP adds noise to the user’s location.
These methods are generally run by a single user and no TTPs are required,
and the main idea behind them is to reduce the accuracy of the location. For
example, instead of sending the real location, users send a squared area. By doing
so, providers just know that a given user is located inside that area but they do not
know exactly where. By means of increasing the size of the area, location privacy is
also increased but results become worse [9,121]. In Figure 2.7, we can see a graphical
example of how TTP collects the location data of users and computes an obfuscated
area, where all the users are located.
Current obfuscation-based solutions have some shortcomings:
• They do not provide a quantitative estimation of the actual privacy level,
which makes them highly dependent on application contexts and difficult to
integrate into a full fledged location-based application scenario.
• Just a single obfuscation technique is usually implemented.
Collaboration-based schemes: In these kinds of methods, the goal is the same
as in obfuscation methods and k-anonymizers, that is, to obfuscate the location of a
user among other users. However, as we see in Figure 3.4, the strategy is different.
Users collaborate to exchange location information that they use to disguise their
real location. By collaborating, users avoid TTPs and improve the results of single-
user obfuscation methods [29,105].
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Figure 2.8: In collaboration-based schemes, users collaborate among them in order to submit a
query to the service provider.
In [105], the authors present a new free-TTP scheme for privacy protection
in LBS. Here, users share their location distorted with Gaussian noise in order to
compute a centroid, which will be used to send queries to the service provider.
2.2 Radio Frequency Identification
Radio-Frequency IDentification (RFID) devices have an important presence in our
daily life. Even when we do not know it, there are RFID tags in our clothes, mobile
devices, etc., and they will become ubiquitous in the near future. The spectacular
market push of RFID technology is due to the interest by large retailers, important
manufacturers and governments. As a result, almost every object is liable to carry
an RFID tag. RFID devices can be seen as a proper substitute to codes that
need to be visualized, like bar codes or QR, since they are mainly used to identify
objects. Unlike bar codes, RFID devices allow objects to be identified across larger
distances, with no need for visual contact, and they help to improve and automate
many processes. This is possible due to the ability of RFID tags to be read remotely,
fast and in parallel.
2.2.1 Basic scheme of RFID systems
Regardless of their operational frequency, materials or embodiments, RFID systems
consist of three main components, namely tags, readers and back-ends:
• RFID tags are small devices that can take a variety of possible shapes and
embodiments (from stickers to small grains embedded in documents). The
most basic RFID tags consist of a microchip and a metal coil. The microchip
stores information, and is able to compute some simple operations; the metal
coil acts as an antenna that receives information from and sends information
to readers. Optionally, RFID tags can carry batteries. In this case they are
called active tags. Otherwise, they are called passive tags. Passive tags are far
more common than active tags because they are cheaper (e.g. a passive tag
costs about $0.05, whilst an active tag might cost about $50 or more). Due
to the fact that passive tags do not carry batteries, they harvest energy from
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Figure 2.9: Basic components of an RFID system. From left to right: a back-end,
RFID readers, and RFID tags. The back-end uses databases to store identification
information. RFID readers are used to query RFID tags (which can take a variety
of embodiments), retrieve their information, and forward it to the back-end through
a wireless or wired channel. Note that in this simplest scheme, RFID readers are
used as relays and are not connected amongst themselves [112].
the signal they receive from readers and, consequently, they have very limited
storage and computational power.
• RFID readers are devices utilized to retrieve information stored in RFID
tags. In their simplest operation, readers emit a radio wave so that all tags
in their cover range can power up and answer by broadcasting their embed-
ded information (i.e. a set of bits1). After collecting the information, the
readers forward it to a centralized computer (or back-end) along with their
identification number and a timestamp.
• Back-ends are a set of databases connected to computers that receive, decrypt
(if necessary), and manage the information collected by RFID readers about
RFID tags. Back-ends store all the information required to identify RFID tags.
Also, they can have extra information about the products/items to which tags
are attached.
In [62], we can find the following classification of RFID tags, which is based on
range distances:
1In general, these bits represent the electronic product code (EPC) of the item to which RFID
tag is attached.
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• Nominal read range: This is the range indicated by RFID standards and
product specifications. It is the maximum distance from which a tag can be
read by a reader.
• Rogue scanning range: This is the maximum range, beyond legal limits, at
which a reader can power and read a tag.
• Tag-to-reader eavesdropping range: When a reader powers a tag, a more sensi-
tive receiver can eavesdrop the emissions of a tag without emitting any signal.
Thus, the eavesdropping range can be equal to or higher than the rogue scan-
ning range.
• Reader-to-tag eavesdropping range: This range is even higher than the previous
one because the signal power of the reader is greater than that of the tag.
• Detection range: This is the range at which tags or readers can be detected.
Note that it does not necessarily mean that readers and tags can send or
receive information. Thus, this range is the highest.
Although a variety of RFID classifications can be found in the literature, in
[8] the authors classify RFID tags based on the computational power of the tags,
because it is the most interesting from the privacy and security point of view. They
introduce the following classification:
1. Elemental or basic tags, which are not capable of performing cryptographic
operations such as generating random values or computing hashes.
2. Symmetric key tags, which are capable of dealing with symmetric key cryp-
tography protocols. They are more expensive than the basic ones.
3. Public key tags, which are capable of managing public key cryptography pro-
tocols.
As RFID tags can be read by any reader in their cover ranges, some security and
privacy issues must be taken into account. In fact, an eavesdropper could collect lots
of information from citizens e.g. the brand and model of their clothes, the number of
credit cards they have in their wallets, their mobile phones, the use of prosthesis or
medicines, etc. Moreover, by making use of several readers strategically deployed in
an area, it could be possible to track the locations of people. So, if proper solutions
are not taken into account, people could be profiled and tracked.
The problems related to privacy can cause concern because a huge deployment
of RFID technology could pave the way for a Big Brother effect, and there are more
RFID tags in our environment than we would imagine. Hence, if no solutions are
proposed, an attacker could attempt against our privacy. To give an example of an
opposition to RFID deployment, in 2003, Benetton was boycotted when they tried
to introduce RFID tags in their clothes [2]. After this, in the same year, several
private organisations signed an agreement on how to use RFID technology in their
products [5].
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2.2.2 Security, Privacy and Scalability in RFID systems
The main advantage of RFID systems is that tags can be read without the need for
visual contact. However, this advantage might also be a problem due to the fact that
unauthorised people with the right equipment might be able to interrogate tags and
obtain their information without being detected. This kind of unauthorised access
might lead to the disclosure of confidential information.
With the aim to solve this problem, a wide variety of methods and protocols
have been proposed. Designing private and secure, yet scalable, RFID identifica-
tion protocols has been a big issue in recent years. The constrained computational
resources on the tag’s side makes this task very challenging. We have classified the
current solutions as follows:
Killing : Electronic product code (EPC) tags address consumer privacy with
a simple operation, which consists of tag killing. When an EPC tag receives a
“kill” command from a reader, it renders itself permanently inoperative. To prevent
wanton deactivation of tags, this kill command is PIN protected. To kill a tag, a
reader must also transmit a tag-specific PIN (32 bits long in the EPC Class-1 Gen-2
standard). As “dead tags tell no tales”, killing is a highly effective privacy measure.
It is envisioned that once RFID tags become prevalent on retail items, point-of-sale
devices will kill the RFID tags on purchased items to protect consumer privacy. For
example, after you rolling supermarket cart through an automated checkout kiosk
and paying the resulting total, all of the associated RFID tags will be killed on
the spot. However, killing or discarding tags enforces consumer privacy effectively,
but it eliminates all of the post-purchase benefits of RFID for the consumer. The
receipt-less item returns, smart appliances, aids for the elderly, and other beneficial
systems described earlier in this chapter will not work with deactivated tags. And in
some cases, such as libraries and rental shops, RFID tags cannot be killed because
they must survive over the lifetime of the objects they track. For these reasons,
it is imperative to look beyond killing for more balanced approaches to consumer
privacy.
Pseudo-identifiers: Even if the identifier emitted by an RFID tag has no
intrinsic meaning, it can still enable tracking. For this reason, merely encrypting
a tag identifier does not solve the problem of privacy. An encrypted identifier is
itself just a meta-identifier. It is static, and therefore, subject to tracking like
any other serial number. To prevent RFID-tag tracking, it is necessary that tag
identifiers are suppressed, or that they change over time. Effacement of unique
identifier neither eliminates the threat of clandestine inventorying, nor eliminates
the threat of tracking. Even if tags emit only product-type information, they may
still be uniquely identifiable in constellations, i.e., fixed groups. Use of random
identifiers in place of product codes addresses the problem of inventorying, but does
not address the problem of tracking.
Public-key encryption: Some of the solutions proposed try to encrypt the
identifiers by means of public-key cryptography but, in fact, protocols based on
public key cryptography, which are widely accepted in electronic commerce, banking,
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or access control, are an unrealistic option for low-cost RFID tags due to their limited
computational power.
Distance Measurement: In [39], the authors demonstrate that the signal-to-
noise ratio of the reader signal in an RFID system provides a rough metric of the
distance between a reader and a tag. They postulate that with some additional,
low-cost circuitry, a tag might achieve rough measurement of the distance of an
interrogating reader. They propose that this distance serves as a metric for trust.
A tag might, for example, release general information when scanned at a distance,
but release more specific information, like its unique identifier, only at close range.
[63] proposes a privacy-protecting scheme that is called blocking. The scheme
depends on the incorporation of a modifiable bit called a privacy bit into tags. A “0”
privacy bit marks a tag as subject to unrestricted public scanning; a “1” bit marks a
tag as private. It refers to the space of identifiers with leading “1” bits as a privacy
zone. A blocker tag is a special RFID tag that prevents unwanted scanning of tags
mapped into the privacy zone.
However, the blocker concept has limitations. Given the unreliable transmission
of RFID tags, even well-positioned blocker tags might fail. Readers might evolve
and exploit characteristics like signal strength to filter blocker signals [98].
Trusted Computing: The authors of [82] described an alternative approach
to enforcement of privacy policies, such as those that rely on “privacy bits”. They
describe how readers equipped with trusted platform modules (TPMs) can enforce
tag privacy policies internally. Such readers can generate externally verifiable attes-
tations as to their configuration in accordance with these policies. This approach
does not address the problem of rogue readers, but it can facilitate or complement
other forms of privacy protection.
Therefore, almost all efforts have been focused on RFID identification protocols
based on symmetric key cryptography. Amongst all symmetric key identification
protocols, the Improved Randomize Hash-locks (IRHL) protocol [64] is the most ac-
cepted due to its strong privacy and security properties, and its low computational
requirements in the tag’s side (i.e. it only needs a pseudo-random number generator
and a one-way hash function). In the IRHL protocol, for every tag’s interrogation,
the reader generates a random number (nonce) r1 and sends it to the tag. Upon
reception, the tag generates another random number r2 and computes the answer
a = h(r1||r2||ID), where ID is the secret identifier of the tag, (·||·) is the concatena-
tion operator, and h(·) is a one-way hash function. Finally, the reader receives the
answer (a) and the nonce (r2) from the tag. With this information, the reader (or
the back-end) determines the ID of the tag by performing an exhaustive search in
its database looking for an identifier IDi such that a = h(r1||r2||IDi). When that
happens the tag is identified as IDi. Figure 2.10 shows a graphical description of
this protocol.
Although the IRHL scheme is a private and secure RFID authentication protocol,
it cannot be used when the system contains a large number of tags (e.g. like in
manufacturing processes) because for every tag identification there is the need for
an exhaustive search in the database. As a result of this lack of scalability, several
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Reader (R) Tag (T)
generates r1
r1−−−−−−−→ generates r2
looks for IDi s.t.
(a,r2)←−−−−−−− a = h(r1||r2||ID)
a = h(r1||r2||IDi))
Figure 2.10: Improved Randomized Hash-locks Protocol [112].
protocols have been designed to reduce the linear complexity in the identification
process of the IRHL protocol.
Tree-based protocols, such as the proposed by Molnar and Wagner (MW) [83],
may be considered an alternative to IRHL in terms of scalability. The MW protocol
achieves a time complexity in the identification process of O(d× logNd ), where N is
the number of tags in the system and d is the branching factor of the tree that is used
to store the tag’s identifiers. When tree-based protocols are used, each tag stores a
set of keys that uniquely identify it and, also, it must share, at least, one key with
every other tag in the system. This sharing of private identification information
might lead to undesired privacy leaks if a given number of tags are compromised2.
The larger the number of compromised tags, the greater the risks for privacy [11].
Similarly to tree-based protocols, group-based protocols, such as the one de-
scribed in [10], try to reduce the computational cost related to the secure identifica-
tion of tags. In this case, tags are randomly assigned to groups. Consequently, each
tag stores its own ID and the ID of the group to which it belongs. During the iden-
tification process, tags first send the group ID and then their own ID. In this way,
the identification of tags is simplified because each tag has to be identified within its
group instead of amongst all possible tags. However, group-based protocols could
perform even better than tree-based protocols [10]. If a tag is compromised, the
whole group to which the tag belongs is compromised too. Thus, from the scalabil-
ity perspective, group-based protocols are very efficient, but with regard to privacy,
they are not a good choice.
In the above protocols, the use of a single reader is assumed3. However, in 2007,
Solanas et al. [108] introduced the idea of using multiple collaborative readers to
make the identification process scalable whilst maintaining the high level of privacy
of the IRHL scheme. Their proposal is aimed at efficiently identifying tags in ap-
plications where each tag must be continuously monitored whilst it remains in the
system. This implies that readers must cover the whole system. Under this assump-
tion, tags are constrained to move along neighbour readers4 and therefore, neighbour
readers therefore collaborate in order to guarantee efficiency during the identifica-
2Even a single compromised tag might lead to a privacy leak
3This reader be connected to a back-end that is responsible for the computation of the identifica-
tion operations. Note that, readers are generally considered simple relays that forward identification
information to back-ends.
4Two readers are said to be neighbours if their cover areas are not disjoint.
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tion process. Efficiency is achieved by means of the so-called reader’s cache, which
is defined as a storage device in which a reader saves tags’ identification data5. The
protocol reduces the size of the readers’ cache by considering that only the closest
reader to some tag and its neighbours must store the identification information of
this tag. By reducing the size of the cache, the identification procedure becomes
more efficient. Despite the benefits in terms of computational cost provided by this
protocol, assuming that readers are able to compute their accurate distance to tags
is a bit unrealistic.
With the aim to solve the practical problems of [108], a novel protocol was
proposed in [113], which aimed at identifying RFID tags efficiently without requiring
special skills to readers (e.g. readers-tag distance computation). This protocol is
based on the Solanas et al. protocol [108] but it has significant differences. A
parameter p ∈ [0, 1] is used to reduce the size of the readers’ cache. The lower p
the smaller the cache. Theoretically, when p = 1, the size of the readers’ cache
roughly equals the Solanas et al. protocol, whilst when p = 0, the minimum size is
reached (at the cost of increasing the number of messages sent between neighbour
readers). The idea is that p may be tuned up according to the application needs so
as to favour the reduction of computations or bandwidth usage. Also, the protocol
does not impose any constraint on the cover areas of the readers, neither on their
communication architecture.
In the context of using multiple readers (connected to a centralised back-end),
Fouladgar and Afifi [40] point out that, in many applications, tags are usually queried
by the same set of readers. Therefore, they propose to cluster tags according to the
readers that identify them more often. This idea improves the group-based proposals
in the sense that tags are not randomly assigned to groups, but intelligently clustered
according to the spacial location of the readers that identify them. By doing so,
when a reader receives a tag’s response, it first performs a search on the group of tags
that it usually identifies. If it does not succeed, an exhaustive search is performed
over the whole set of tags’ identifiers. The problem of this proposal is that tags
may have a long life-cycle and move through a wide variety of readers. In this
scenario, the protocol could scale as bad as previous protocols based on symmetric
key cryptography [64].
Recently, a new protocol based on collaborative readers was proposed by Trujillo
and Solanas [114]. Similarly to previous protocols [108, 113], tags’ data are stored
on the cache of the readers that contain these tags in their cover area. However, this
proposal is able to perform at least 50% better than the Solanas et. al. [108] and the
Fouladgar and Afifi [40] proposals in terms of computational cost. The improvement
is due to the use of a heuristic that allows readers to estimate the most probable
previous location of tags. By doing so, once a reader could not identify a tag using
its own cache, it asks for the information to another reader that is able to identify
it with a given confidence. In addition to the reduction of the computational cost,
5This cache can be either an external database securely connected to the reader or a database
internally managed by the reader itself.
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Figure 2.11: Intuitive location of several identification protocols in the privacy-
scalability plane. The top-right quadrant is where private and scalable protocols
lay [114].
the proposal has significant improvements in terms of flexibility and usability with
respect to other proposals like [113]. It is remarkable that readers do not need either
to cover the whole system nor they have to rely on a neighbourhood relationship.
Some protocols are able to achieve good scalability and privacy by periodically
“refreshing” the identification information stored in tags. These protocols add an
“update” phase to the identification phase. Thus, the protocols assume that tags are
able to change the information they store and recompute all necessary parameters
of the protocol. Currently, this assumption is unrealistic for low-cost passive tags.
Hence, we focus on the previously explained protocols and propose a new predic-
tive protocol that improves the scalability of the aforementioned protocols whilst
guaranteeing the same level of privacy of the IRHL scheme. Figure 2.11 depicts
an intuitive distribution of the aforementioned protocols in the privacy-scalability
plane6.
2.3 Distributed Sensors
This section describes some fundamental concepts and ideas in which we found some
of our proposals.
6This Figure is not intended for an exact evaluation but for an intuitive/approximative yet illus-
trative description of the relation between privacy and scalability of the aforementioned protocols.
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2.3.1 Privacy as a product
Eric Houghes in [58] defines privacy in opposition to secrecy, as follows:
Definition 1. Privacy is not secrecy. A private matter is something one doesn’t
want the whole world to know, but a secret matter is something one doesn’t want
anybody to know. Privacy is the power to selectively reveal oneself to the world.
This intuitive definition and the very concept of privacy have received several
interpretations in the course of human history. In the beginning, when the social
interaction was basically analogical (i.e. prior to the digital age), as well as the
assets and the available mechanisms, humans were trying to protect their privacy,
either by trying to cover some asset, or hiding it. Privacy has been defined as a right
quite recently. Its significant role as a human right became so important that due
to the use of technological advancements from totalitarian regimes, it was included
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The huge growth of the Internet, along with the vast amount of information that
is becoming available to everyone, have created a new market. Systems that offer
privacy to their users are becoming usual, and privacy is seen as a service for which
users might pay.
The next steps in the evolution of the concept of privacy are the result of the
current, wide use of Social Networks and Cloud services. Users can trade their
privacy in exchange for free services. As a result, privacy is seen as a product or a
good with which people can trade.
In this context, in [88], the concept of Privacy as Product (PaaP) was in-
troduced by Patsakis and Solanas. The main contribution of that work was that
it provided a new framework and a novel viable business model, in which people
regain the control of their information and so that they are the only ones that can
“selectively reveal themselves to the world”, without any other further disclosures.
Users may choose to receive money or another service in exchange for their infor-
mation. Therefore, the paradigm of PaaP acknowledges the current situation that
major social networks, search engines and cloud service providers have adopted, but
tries to re-arrange the environment, returning a part of the revenues to their source
– the users.
2.3.2 The Raykova-Vo-Bellovin-Malkin scheme
Private information retrieval (PIR) schemes allow users to export information stored
in databases to an untrusted server, and allow to issue queries to the database
without revealing the actual queries to the server, which does not neither know the
records that have been returned as a result of the query. Even though the first
two articles [27, 68] on PIR were very promising, as they showed that we can have
solutions to this problem without having to replicate the whole database, up to
today, we do not have any practical implementation, as the time and computational
cost are prohibitive.
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On a different line, fully-homomorphic cryptography, an encryption mechanism
that was proved to exist quite recently [44], which could provide encrypted queries,
proves to be inefficient for practical applications as well.
In the quest for efficient solutions to such problems, an interesting scheme, the
Raykova, Vo, Bellovin and Malkin (RVBM) scheme [97], provides a feasible solu-
tion with small overhead [87] to an interesting and closely related problem to PIR
schemes.
The RVBM scheme allows users/clients to anonymously perform queries to a
server, without revealing any information about the query or the results, neither to
the owner of the database nor to the server that hosts it. More interestingly, the
server does not have access to the contents of the database, as all the contents are
encrypted by keys selected by the users/clients.
The scheme has four main entities: the User, who supplies the data, the Querier,
who queries the database, an Index Server (IS) which hosts the encrypted database,
and the Query Router (QR), which performs as a proxy routing the queries from
the Queriers to the Index Server, thus, providing anonymity to the queriers. In
order to enable the aforementioned feature, the entities follow the procedure below,
illustrated in Figure 2.12:
1. The user sends to the IS his/her encrypted data and a set of Bloom filters [16]
that are used to manage keywords that he/she has in a dictionary.
2. The user sends a key to the Querier.
3. The querier encrypts his/her query with the key (received from the user) and
sends the result to the QR.
4. The QR re-encrypts the query and forwards it to the IS.
5. The IS performs the search on the Bloom Filters and sends the results (en-
crypted) to the QR.
6. The QR replies to the Querier with the re-encrypted results.
These steps allow the Querier to identify which records in the database contain a
certain keyword, without revealing any information to the IS. Moreover, the scheme
can be further extended to provide aggregation queries instead of just keyword
searches.
2.3.3 m-Health
With recent advances in wireless sensor networks and embedded computing tech-
nologies, miniaturised pervasive health monitoring devices have become practically
feasible. The m-Health field has emerged as a sub-segment of e-Health (i.e. the use
of information and communication technology (ICT) for health services and infor-
mation) and it could be considered as a new way to access to healthcare services
with specific capabilities of delivering real time information on demand.
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Figure 2.12: Raykova-Vo-Bellovin-Malkin scheme (taken from [88]).
m-Health applications include the use of body sensors connected with a mobile
device that collects biometric or biomedical data; delivers the information to practi-
tioners, researchers, and patients; monitors vital signs of patients in real-time; and
provides direct care [45].
According to [106], m-Health redefines the healthcare services in three main
aspects:
• m-Health allows the easy access to healthcare services and knowledge. Thanks
to the inherent ubiquity of mobile devices, services may be accessed every-
where, anytime. In addition, data could be collected more easily regardless of
the location of patients.
• m-Health is user-oriented. Users play a key role in an m-health service. Ser-
vices should be where the users are.
• m-Health is personalised. Users receive customised services, that fit their
personal needs.
The number of available healthcare applications for mobile devices has been
growing during the last years. Many efforts are being devoted to improve the current
m-Health technology in order to find new ways to offer a high quality of life to
individuals as well as saving costs within the health systems, by providing proactive
medical care.
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The amount of data, along with the need for backups and synchronization among
different devices, coupled with the rise of Cloud services, indicates that these devices
will use cloud storage services to store this type of information in the near future.
However, since there are many issues related to privacy in the Cloud, storing such
sensitive and private information may expose user’s privacy.
2.3.4 Body sensors
Body sensors are a mature technology, which has been evolving substantially for
more than a century (cf. Figure 2.13). One of the major influences in the past years
is the growing pressure from the medical sector to reduce costs whilst maintaining
or even improving the quality of care. A potential solution to this problem is real
time and/or remote patient monitoring by using mobile devices connected to body
sensors of body sensor networks.
Renewed interest in body sensors has grown in order to support new applications
in athletics, healthcare, emergency response, and consumer entertainment. The
emergence and widespread deployment of low-power wireless radios and low-power
circuitry have made sensors smaller, more energy efficient, and connectible to other
devices and networks.
Figure 2.13: Timetable with important innovations on body sensors during the last
century.
Currently, smartphones can efficiently make blood tests with hand-held biosen-
sors 7 with minimal cost. Sensors embedded in baby socks enable parents to monitor
their baby’s heartbeat and breathing rates 8. Other devices9 enable users to dis-
cretely track their heartbeat rate through bluetooth devices. Moreover, users are
able to count their calories consumption10.
7http://www.uri.edu/news/releases/?id=6369
8http://www.gizmodo.com.au/2012/11/these-heart-rate-monitoring-smart-socks-will-comfort_
nervous-parents/
9http://www.polaraustralia.com.au/au-en/products/accessories/H7_heart_rate_sensor
10http://www.bodymedia.com/
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Figure 2.14: Brief overview of body sensors able to connect with a mobile device.
Since these sensors can be easily connected to smartphones (cf. Figure 2.14), it
is very easy to get patients health data at the time when those data are gathered
by the sensors. As a result, applications for healthcare are gaining interest among
researchers (e.g. Research project: Optimized athlete body sensor networks for
simulation-based performance analysis 11).
In [106], the authors present a new concept called mCarer, a smartphone appli-
cation and infrastructure able to monitor the movements of patients with different
levels of cognitive impairments. mCarer can detect different states of alarm (previ-
ously defined by caregivers), based on the user’s current location and the information
about his/her health (e.g. if the user’s heartbeat rate is anomalous, or the user is
in a restricted area). This information is encrypted and stored in order to be anal-
ysed in case of emergency. Thanks to the roll access control used in mCarer, family
members or carers are able to access the user’s private information only under alarm
conditions.
There are several examples of sensor integration within mobile devices. Trying
to embed as many body sensors as possible in a mobile phone, LifeWatch 12 was
developed and it includes sensors to monitor heartbeat rate, SpO2, glucose and even
to perform an electrocardiogram (ECG).
Generally, body sensors are increasingly becoming network devices specially
wireless, thus leading us to what we now call Wireless Body Sensor Networks (WBSN
or just BSN). So multiple sensors are worn on the body, and each is capable of
11http://www.southampton.ac.uk/healthsciences/research/projects/optimized_athlete_body_
sensor.page
12http://www.lifewatch.com/
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sampling, processing and communicating wirelessly one or more physiological mea-
surements or environmental parameters [86]. This can provide invaluable real-time
data for analysis, diagnosis of health problems or even trigger security alerts.
The use of such networks may expose the security of their users in several ways
[84]. However, we focus on the privacy. We can find more about BSN and their
applications, mainly in healthcare, in [7,56,102,118]. The typical uses are one-way,
meaning that the user which is the source of the data, sends his data to the network
and loses them. Of course he may select in many cases who has access to them,
however they become an asset of the receivers, or to receive a service.
2.4 Smart Cities and Applications
2.4.1 Smart Cities
Due to the concept of “Smart City” is pretty new, as far as we know, there is
no privacy protection systems to guarantee the privacy of citizens in the current
literature, but some of the existing protocols applied in other environments can be
adopted for an “Smart City”, including some of the new protocols we present in this
dissertation.
2.4.2 mHealth
Creative use of new mobile and wearable health information and sensing technologies
(mHealth) has the potential to reduce the cost of health care and improve well-being
in numerous ways. These applications are being developed in a variety of domains,
but rigorous research is needed to examine the potential, as well as the challenges,
of utilizing mobile technologies to improve health outcomes.
When patients suffering from a cognitive disease wander away and get lost, they
may have serious or even fatal accidents. This usual behaviour, known as wandering,
is a common problem related to people with dementia, from which over 40% get lost
outside their homes. To avert this situation carers supervise patients and keep
them safe. However, this often requires to lock doors or preventing the patient from
leaving in other ways such as constant surveillance or putting them on drugs [75] [59].
Unfortunately, these methods limit the sense of freedom of patients and could have
negative effects on their well-being. To mitigate these undesired effects, imaginative
solutions, like installing a fake bus stop [20] have been proposed. However, these
solutions are only applicable to very specific situations and patients.
With the aim to provide patients with more freedom and autonomy, Miskelly
proposed in [78] the use of mobile phones equipped with GPS to continuously track
patients, so that it was possible to locate and assist them if necessary. Before
using the system, each patient gave written informed consent. However, the main
problem encountered by the researchers was user compliance. The system proposed
by Miskelly introduces the promising idea of using mobile technology but the lack of
privacy related to the “Big Brother” effect [66] prevents this proposal from being fully
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accepted. Nevertheless, some commercial applications like the Columba bracelet [76]
use this idea.
Instead of tracking patients constantly, Casas et al. [23] suggested the idea of
using “alarms”. A system of alarms only informs about the location of patients when
something goes wrong. The alarm can be raised by patients (active alarm) or by
wearable light devices when certain conditions are met (passive alarm). These con-
ditions can be based on the location of patients (i.e. the alarm is triggered when
a patient leaves a predefined perimeter, is near a dangerous area or is moving too
fast) or based on the data of sensors, namely accelerometers [72], thermometers or
heartbeat detectors [17]. Several commercial applications based on tracking and
alarms are Urgentys [76], Simap [110] and GPS trackers [90]. These proposals, use
both alarms and constant tracking. Note that although they use security and pri-
vacy methods such as deleting information, using Transport Layer Security (TLS),
encrypting databases or using pseudonyms, none of them guarantee the privacy of
the patients because users can ask for their location anytime, thus, deliberately
invading their privacy.
In the current literature we can find solutions based on collaboration in order to
face the “big brother effect” raised by these systems. Collaboration is paramount for
many architectures that involve human beings. In [96], Ray et al. introduced the
concept of awareness level as a measure of cooperation in the context of cooperative
management and m-health, but there are other interesting examples of collaboration
in the context of location-based services and tracking in [105], [108], [113] and [112].
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Part I
Privacy in Location-Based
Services
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Chapter 3
Anonymity and Pseudonymity: A
Distributed approach
In this chapter we propose a new location privacy preserving method — a distributed
pseudonymizer. Our method is based on users’ collaboration and solves most of the
drawbacks of classic centralized pseudonymizers.
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3.1 Introduction
Mobile devices having the capacity to locate themselves have gained importance
in recent years. In the past, very few people had the chance to use those devices,
but now, due to their relatively low cost, smart-phones and PDAs have become very
popular. In addition, the launch of the iPhone, and all the clones that followed, have
fostered the appearance of a large number of diverse location-based services (LBS)
that allow the real-time follow-up of disabled or vulnerable people to guarantee
their safety, help us find the closest restaurant or the cheapest gas station in our
surroundings, and guide us along the best route to a given location. The great
success of these services will promote the appearance of location-based providers that
will be able to gather and analyse their users’ location information. If the proper
measures are not taken, the right of individuals to privacy could be endangered. As
a result, the deployment of LBS could be significantly slowed down.
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3.2 Our distributed approach
As we showed in the introduction chapter, TTPs are not a feasible solution, since
they know all the information about the user. The privacy concerns in TTP-based
schemes are exactly the same as in a direct connection between user and provider,
because instead of trusting the provider we must trust the TTP, who can also be
dishonest or it can lose the private data, due to an attack or just in an oversight.
Our aim is to design a new method that has the advantages of exact location
methods such as pseudonymizers (i.e. simplicity and accuracy), and avoids their dis-
advantages (i.e. poor scalability and lack of privacy). Our idea is to replace the clas-
sic concept of pseudonymizer, understood as a TTP, by a distributed pseudonymizer
consisting of a set of collaborative users. Our solution is based on the assumption
that mobile devices are able to access the Internet1 (i.e. they can use GPRS, UMTS,
LTE, EVDO or WLAN), so that they can inexpensively exchange information. The
communications between users are assumed to use the TCP protocol, so that we
consider that messages properly reach each user. Also, we assume that we have
a public key infrastructure (PKI), so that each LBS provider has a public and a
private key.
In our model, we define three main actors:
• A set of users U = {u1, u2, . . . , un} that cooperate to query a provider pri-
vately. Users are equipped with an IP enabled device.
• A server SL that is responsible for the maintenance of a list (L) of IP addresses
of collaborative users. Note that this is not a TTP because users do not share
private information with it.
• A service provider P that answers queries from LBS users. P has a public key
PKP and a private (secret) key SKP , which are used to encrypt and decrypt
sensitive information exchanged between the users and the provider.
Our scheme works as follows (cf. Fig. 3.1 for a graphical example):
Initially, a user u1 that wants to obtain information from an LBS provider P
has to obtain the list L from the server SL2. Once u1 has the updated list L, she
generates a packet with the following information:
Sour. Dest. Query Hops
IPu1 IPu2 EPKP (xu1 , yu1 , Q, k) R
Where IPu1 and IPu2 are the IP addresses of u1 and u2 respectively, (xu1 , yu1)
is the location of u1, Q is the query, k is a random symmetric key and R is the
number of hops (i.e. users) that will take part in the protocol. Note that the query
1Note that this is a realistic assumption because most if the time Internet connections are
available from smart-phones.
2We assume there is some caching and updating technique for SL whose description is out of
scope of this paper.
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Figure 3.1: Communications example in the proposed scheme [93]
is encrypted with the public key of P . Moreover, u2 is chosen randomly from L
regardless of her location, which is unknown to u1. Also, R is randomly chosen
by u1 so that u2 cannot know whether u1 is the source of the message or simply a
collaborative user in the chain. After generating the packet, u1 sends it to u2.
When u2 receives the packet, she retrieves L, decrements the number of remain-
ing hops, and generates a new packet as follows:
Sour. Dest. Query Hops
IPu2 IPu3 EPKP (xu1 , yu1 , Q, k) R− 1
Like in the previous case, u3 is randomly chosen from L.
This procedure continues until the number of remaining hops is 0 (i.e. R = 0).
In that case, the last user uR sends EPKP (xu1 , yu1 , Q, k) to P. Then P decrypts
the data by using his private key SKP and builds a response packet containing the
answer A to the query Q as follows
Source Dest. Encrypted answer
IPP IPuR Ek(A‖H(A))
where H is a hash function, || is the concatenation operator, and Ek is a symmetric
encryption function with a shared key k.
The message from P is sent back to u1 through the chain of users. Each user
has to store the IP addresses of the users that are next to him in the chain of users,
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so that, she can forward the packets to the right users. The stored information can
be organized in a resolution table:
Resolution
table of u1
Prev. Next
∅ IPu2
Resolution
table of u2
Prev. Next
IPu1 IPu3
. . .
Resolution
table of uR
Prev. Next
IPuR−1 IPP
When u1 receives the answer, she decrypts it by using the key k and a decryp-
tion function Dk. The answer to the query is authenticated using H(A), taking
into account that k was sent to P encrypted with PKP . In addition, the location
(xu1 , yu1) that P sees does not belong to uR, thus, P cannot profile uR accurately
nor effectively (i.e., the information he collects from uR is useless), and at the same
time u1 receives a proper answer and her privacy is protected.
In order to make it clearer, let’s consider a realistic case, based on Figure 3.1.
Lets suppose a user called Alice who is in Barcelona (Catalonia, Spain) wants to
submit a query to the LBS provider but she wants to protect her privacy by means
of the distributed pseudonymiser proposed above. What she firstly does is to select
a random user, called Bob, who is located in Canada. Note that Alice does not
know the location neither the identity of Bob, and vice versa. Then Alice sends
her query together with the location data, encrypted with the public key of the
provider, to Bob. Due to the fact that the Bob’s received message is encrypted, Bob
is not able to read the content, so Alice does no require any kind of trust. Once
Bob has received the message, he choose a new user, called Charles, in Brazil, and
so on until the last user who is located in South Korea. When the last user receives
the message he submits it to the provider, which is the only one able to decrypt the
message and read the content, note that nobody in the chain knows the real source,
even the provider is not able to infer if the message was submitted by a user located
in South Korea, while Alice, the source of the message, is located in Spain. Once
the provider answer the query, the response message is sent back to Alice through
the chain of users.
3.3 Brief privacy discussion
Pseudonymizers are a very simple and clean solution to the privacy problem related
to LBS. However, until now, they were based on intermediate entities that do not
scale properly, are single-points of attack, are bottlenecks, and must be trusted by
the users. Our solution distributes the task of the classic pseudonymizer amongst
a set of users. Consequently, our approach scales better, is more difficult to be
attacked because it is not centralized, it does not create bottlenecks, and no trust
is required.
Privacy. Thanks to the use of public key cryptography, users can encrypt
their locations and queries, so that only the provider can decrypt them. As a result,
users do not need to trust each other — they just collaborate to propagate encrypted
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information. Even in the case in which several users collude with the service provider
(i.e. by sharing the secret key SKP of P), they cannot be sure about who is the
real owner of the location information because the number of hops R is randomly
chosen and it is only known by the source of the query.
Authenticity and integrity. The provider P encrypts the answer using k,
which can only be retrieved by those having SKP . Hence, the strength depends on
the length of k. A unidirectional hash function H has been used to ensure integrity.
Although we have overcome some of the shortcomings of pseudonymizers, our
method and the former are vulnerable to the RSI and OI attacks [54].
3.4 Extended Protocol
As we have shown in the previous section, from a privacy point of view, the dis-
tributed pseudonymiser guarantees the privacy of the users, but some concerns about
the network strength remain. An attacker is not able to infer the private data of
the users, but he could cause a denial of service.
We detect two different DoS attacks, one of them consists on modifying the
number of hops and the other appears when a user become non-collaborative.
3.4.1 Protection against number of hops modification
The number of hops that the query will make by the network before being sent to
the LBS provider is selected randomly by the source user and only known to him.
The random number will be chosen between a user defined margin, allowing the user
to control the privacy level and speed of the answer:
• 0 hops, if the user does not want to protect his privacy, so that the response
will be faster, or
• hops> 0, if the user wants to conceal his identity and query, note that a larger
number of hops generates a greater delay of the query.
Since the number of hops travelled is accessible in the packet, this could be a
point of attack. A user who wants to deny the service could change the number
of hops of the packet causing the packet to travel endlessly through the network
without reaching its final destination. In this section we will propose a solution to
this problem.
Our solution works as follow: Initially, a user u1 that wants to obtain information
from an LBS provider P has to obtain the list L from the server SL 3.
If the user already has L, the latter is simply updated.
Once u1 has the updated list L, he generates a packet with the following infor-
mation:
3We assume there is some caching and updating technique for SL whose description is out of
scope of this work.
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Figure 3.2: Users send the message to two next random users, doing so a user can check the
validity of a received message.
Sour. Dest. I Dest. II Query Hops
IPu1 IPu2 IPu3 EPKP (xu1 , yu1 , Q, k) R
where IPu1 , IPu2 and IPu3 are the IP addresses of u1, u2 and u3 respectively,
(xu1 , yu1) is the location of u1, Q is the query, k is a random symmetric key and
R is the number of hops (i.e. users) that will take part in the protocol. Note that
the query is encrypted with the public key of P . Moreover, u2 and u3 are chosen
randomly, from the users with the same reputation 4 as him, from the section of
the list L sent by SL regardless of her location, which is unknown to u1. Also, R is
randomly chosen by u1 so that u2 and u3 cannot know whether u1 is the source of
the message or simply a collaborative user in the chain. After generating the packet,
u1 checks that u2 and u3 are online and he sends the packet to u2 and u3.
When u2 receives the packet, he retrieves L, decrements the number of remaining
hops, and generates a new packet as follows:
Sour. Dest. I Dest. II Query Hops
IPu2 IPu3 IPu4 EPKP (xu1 , yu1 , Q, k) R− 1
Like in the previous case, u4 is randomly chosen from L.
u3 knows that he is the second destination, so he only needs to verify that previous
user has not changed the package and takes appropriate action. If the previous user
is not acting properly, he informs u1 and SL that the user is dishonest. So the
dishonest user will not be sent again by SL to users, and u1 will send again the
request to a new user.
4We understand reputation as a value obtained from the use of the system by a user, taking into
account several parameters as contacts, time using the system, proper behaviour and os on.These
parameters may vary according to the system.
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This procedure continues until the number of remaining hops is 0 (i.e. R = 0).
In that case, the last user uR sends EPKP (xu1 , yu1 , Q, k) to P. Take into account
that uR−1 doesn’t need to send a copy of the packet to the next user after uR,
because there isn’t a next user, he is the LBS. Then P decrypts the data by using
his private key SKP and builds a response packet containing the answer A to the
query Q as follows
Source Dest. Encrypted answer
IPP IPuR Ek(A‖H(A))
where H is a hash function, || is the concatenation operator, and Ek is a symmetric
encryption function with a shared key k.
As we can see in Figure 3.2, the source user of the query u1 must create a fake
user uf before submitting the query, in order to send the query of the source user
to u2. Once submitted, u1 will create his packet, and he will send it to u2, so that
u2 can not deduce which is the origin.
Sour. Dest. I Dest. II Query Hops
IPuFake IPu1 IPu2 EPKP (xu1 , yu1 , Q, k) R + 1
3.4.2 Unresponsive and non-collaborative users
With the previously proposed protocol we prevent a dishonest user from changing
the number of hops R in order to cause a packet to travel through the network
indefinitely, but the system is not protected from falls or non-collaborative users.
What happens if a user of the chain loses network connectivity? In this case the
components of the chain of messages would be left waiting for a response.
In order to prevent a user from waiting for a query indefinitely, we propose to use
a time limit for each response, so once the time limit is finished, the user discards
the expected response and he resubmits the message to a new random user.
Figure 3.3 shows how each user, after contacting the following user in the chain,
waits a limit or Time To Live (TTL) until he receives the response message. If after
that time the user does not get the response of the following user, he starts again the
forwarding procedure. Doing so, we prevent a user from breaking the user’s chain.
In order to keep the list of users free from non-collaborative users, we can add a
reputation list, where non-collaborative users are banned. Each time a user requests
a list of users to act as intermediaries, these users will be rewarded as participatory
active users. If a user is detected as non-collaborative, it will be notified to SL and
he will be penalised. Moreover, if a user repeats a misuse several times he can be
banned from the service. On the other hand, it is possible that a honest user is not
able to send back the response due some technical problem, then SL will be notified
about the non-collaboration of this user, so he will be penalised but, statistically, if
a user is honest he will have a positive reputation.
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Figure 3.3: When a user receives a message, he asks for a new random user and submits again
the message. If after a while the next user does not respond, he asks for a new random user and
repets the steps until get a response.
3.5 Social Server List
We propose a server list which interacts with a Social Network for mutual benefit,
where users have links with other users, and they can interact with the Social Net-
work, as for example chatting or visiting profiles, to increase their reputation. In
our proposal we do not need to create a new Social Network, since it can be applied
over any existing Social Network (i.e. Facebook, Linked-In, Google+, etc.). Our
protocol uses the structure of a graph for selecting the most appropriate candidate
to send a message. To define the union among users in the graph, we need three
main variables:
• Common Friends: Users can have relations between common friends, and
this is the most frequent way to generate the union link in Social Networks, and
it defines the weight of the links, in most cases positively, but in our scheme
this is penalised because we want to send the messages as far as possible from
our near contacts.
• Interaction: In most Social Networks users can interact with other users as
for example visiting profiles, adding comments, chatting, etc., these actions
will be used as a kind of union among them, in the same way as we do with
the common friends, but in this case the interaction is considered a positive
variable for the weight of the links. This is because using people with a high
level of interaction we prevent the choice of unknown people that you added.
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• Collaboration: Users can choose if they want to collaborate in the process of
submitting a query to the location provider, so it is important to measure the
collaboration of the users, to prevent that selfish users from benefiting from
the server with no collaboration. The collaboration is the most important
variable in our protocol, it is set as a positive value to increment the link
between users in order to always choose collaborative users to submit queries.
By doing so, non-collaborative users will tend to be left alone.
So, the weight of the links between users will be defined by the previous variables,
in a way to discard non-collaborative users and prevent to send message to very near
users 5, but encouraging users to use the Social Network to get stronger links.
In the next subsection we will discuss how to measure the different variables in
order to generate the links between users.
3.5.1 Link Weight Meassurement
In order to combine the main variables to generate the links between users in the
Social Network it is necessary to define the variables.
We normalise the values of Common Friends as follows:
CF =

CFmax−CF
CFmax−CFmin , if CFmax − CFmin 6= 0
1, else
(3.1)
CF =

CF−CFmin
CFmax−CFmin , if CFmax − CFmin 6= 0
1, else
(3.2)
The negative values are normalised following the equation 3.1 and the positives
with the equation 3.2.
This value will decrease the weight of the links, so users will tend to use contacts
with a low level of friends in common. By doing so, the queries have more probability
of going far away from the net of friends of the former than choosing a close friend,
who would send the message to another close friend, so finally the message would
be sent by a close friend of the former.
The Interaction between users is measured with the numbers of events between
users. Events can be defined by the Social Network, depending on the type of
network, for instance, Facebook could use as events the fact of visiting profiles of
other users or chat with them. We can normalise the Interaction value of users
similarly to Common Friends values:
I =

Imax−I
Imax−Imin , if Imax − Imin 6= 0
1, else
(3.3)
5Two users are called “near users” when they share a huge number of contacts.
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I =

I−Imin
Imax−Imin , if Imax − Imin 6= 0
1, else
(3.4)
Negatives values of the interaction are normalised following equation 3.3 and the
positives with equation 3.4.
When a user of the Social Network adds a new contact, the Collaboration vari-
able is defined as “neutral”, with a value of a 50%. This value will oscillate between
0% (minimun) and 100% (maximum) deppending on the degree of collaboration of
users.
If a user U0 sends a message to a user U1, but U0 does not receive any answer
after a defined time T , because U1 is a non-collaborative user, then U0 decrements
the variable of Collaboration (C) of user U1, and sends again the message to a
new user, otherwise if U1 answers correctly, the variable is increased. In the case of
U1 was collaborative, but he did not answer due to U2 did not answer him because
he is the non-collaborative user, then U1 also decrements the collaborative variable
with U2 and, statistically, after some iterations the weight of the link between U0
and U1 will become strong again, and U2 will be marginalised for users.
Once we have all these data, we can define the Link Weight between users. We
define this measure as:
WeightLink = [(1− CF) + I] ∗ C (3.5)
Figure 3.4: The collaboration variable (Ci, where i is the user at position i) decre-
ments when users do not receive an answer from the next user. It can be due to
another non-collaborative user in the chain of users, but all users are affected. Al-
though, after some iterations, the last user (non-collaborative) will be alone, with
no links, and other users will recover their links.
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3.5.2 User Selection
A user can apply the Fitness Proportionate Selection over his graph of connections.
This protocol is a genetic operator used in genetic algorithms for selecting potentially
useful solutions for recombination. In Figure 3.5 we provide an example of the
selected sample after following the next steps:
1. Sort the weights,
2. Compute the cumulative weights,
3. Pick a random number in [0, 1] ∗ TotalWeight,
4. Find the interval in which this number falls into,
5. Select the elements with the corresponding interval,
6. Repeat k times.
Figure 3.5: Fitness Proportionate Selection, where the sample B is chosen before
applying the random function.
where N is the number of users linked to U and f(i) the link’s weight of the user i,
the probability of being chosen is defined in equation 3.6.
pi =
f(i)∑N−1
j=0 fj
(3.6)
This selection allows the users with a higher weight link to be selected with a
high probability, but also it allows the worst users to be selected.
Similarly, when a user receives a query from a contact, he can execute the same
function, but increasing the probability (eq. 3.6), to decide to collaborate or not. By
doing so, non-collaborative users will not receive the collaboration of other users.
pi = 2
f(i)∑N−1
j=0 fj
(3.7)
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If a single user receives multiple queries at the same time, the queries will be
sent forward taking into account the weight of links with the users who send him
the query, from highest to lowest. So, if the user who send a query does not receive
an answer, before restarting the process sending the message to a new user, he will
wait a time interval Ti defined as follows:
Ti = 2[t∆(h− i)] (3.8)
where i is the user in the index i, and t is defined in equation 3.9.
t = DelayNetwork + DelayComputation (3.9)
So, finally the total time of a query submission is:
T =
h−1∑
i=0
2[t∆(h− i)] (3.10)
3.5.3 Attacker Model
We identify the following attackers and their dishonest intentions in our protocol:
• The service provider wants to obtain the maximum information possible about
the users to perform a profile of them, but due to the fact that the query is
submitted by a user who did not generate the message, the service provider is
not able to link the query with the identity of the user who submitted it.
• A selfish user is a user of the system who wants to get a service but he is
non-collaborative. This kind of user will tend to lose their links with other
users, so they will not receive the service if they do not collaborate.
• A dishonest user tries to infer the queries of other users in order to track or
profile them. In this case, dishonest users are not able to see the content of
the queries, due to the fact that the content is encrypted with the public key
of the provider, so only the provider can decrypt it.
• The server provider colluded with a dishonest user could be able to see the
content of a message sent by a user, but the attackers can not know if the user
who sent the message is the source or just a “bridge” user in the chain, since
the number of hops is chosen randomly and only known by the source.
• A user who changes the content of the queries could perform a DoS attack on
the service, but thanks to the use of cryptography, both the users and service
provider are able to detect some modification in the content of the message,
so users can decrease the weight of the link with the attacker. Also, this kind
of attackers are difficult to find, since the contacts in the Social Network are
known people by his contacts, and the reputation system proposed previously
prevents the choice of an unknown or non-interactive contact.
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• A man in the middle sniffing the data transmission of a single user, could be
able to guess if a user is the source of a query, because he can see if a user sends
a query when he did not receive any other query before. This kind of attacks
may be prevented by using a secure channel (ie. https) through the Social
Network, so the attacker could not differentiate the regular data transmitted
by the Social Network and the user’s query.
• The Social Network, it makes no sense for the Social Network to attack the
system, because it already knows the private data of registered users, and it
benefits from the proper functioning of the system.
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Chapter 4
Query Privacy: Prime numbers
and Homomorphic Cryptography
In this chapter we present a new protocol, which utilises some of the properties of
public key cryptography and prime numbers, in order to achieve query privacy. This
protocol can be easily adopted alongside some of the existing protocols as an extra
privacy layer.
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4.1 Introduction
Most of the privacy protection systems in LBS focus on hiding the users’ identity, or
obfuscating the users’ location in some way, and only a few systems focus on hiding
the query in order to prevent the users from being profiled. Therefore, we consider
location services as a web search engine, that tries to learn about the queries of
users.
Lets suppose a user wants to protect his privacy through basic public key cryp-
tography. By encrypting his query with the public key of the provider, he can avoid
an external party from inferring the query. However the user can also obfuscate the
query in order to prevent the provider from profiling him. To do this, the user en-
crypts the real and fake queries in the same packet (instead of sending k encrypted
messages):
EPKp(q0, q1, ..., qk−1) (4.1)
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where PKP is the public key of the provider, qi are the queries, and k is an integer
positive number. If we assume a public key of 1024 bits, the user may achieve k-
anonymity sending 1024 bits queries (including the k − 1 fake queries plus the real
one in a single message). Now let’s assume n users are trying to submit one query
each. They can achieve k-anonymity as in the previous example, that makes the
protocol require a total of 1024 · n bits. This cost may be assumable by the users,
as they are just sending a single query, but the server receives k ·n messages of 1024
bits each. This procedure results in data traffic n times higher than using a single
query containing all queries from all users, plus n decryption operations, as queries
are encrypted.
In this section we propose a new system able to guarantee the query privacy,
even in the case of collusion among users and provider, with the same cost of sending
single queries to the provider.
4.2 Basic Concepts of Cryptography
Before going further with the proposed protocol, it is necessary to know some of the
primitives that we will use.
In the ElGamal [38] cryptosystem, in a group G, if the public key is (G, q, g, h),
where h = gx, and x is the secret key, then the encryption of a message m is
E(m) = (gr,m ·hr), for some random r ∈ {0, . . . , q−1}. The homomorphic property
is then
E(x1) · E(x2) = (gr1 , x1 · hr1)(gr2 , x2 · hr2) = (gr1+r2 , (x1 · x2)hr1+r2) = E(x1 · x2)
Therefore, the product of two public key encryptions with ElGamal is equivalent
to the encryption of the product of two messages.
4.3 System Model
Our system consists of:
• Service provider P , which has a public key PKP and a secre key SKP ;
• A set of users U = [U0, U1, ..., Uk−1] where k is a positive integer;
• A dictionary D consisting of a set of keywords keywords. Each keyword is
linked with a point of interest (POI), previously defined, and known by the
users. The keywords are a set of prime numbers;
In order to generate U , it is possible to make use of different systems, for example:
• Social networks: Most of the current social networks make use of the user’s
location in order to act as third parties and maintain communication among
users. In our system, it is possible to make use of this feature in order to
let the social network be the entity that provides us the set of users U in a
specified space;
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• Public WiFi access point: Many cities have developed free WiFi access points
for their citizens. This connection can be used as a communication channel
among the users of our service. The Wifi service provider would be able to
generate a set of users connected to the same network, which would be a set
of users sharing a location (i.e. the city or the Wifi antenna range);
• Ad-hoc networks (WiFi, bluetooth, etc): Most current smart-phones have
internet capabilities, allowing for connections between users. By using this
WiFi connection users may detect near users, inside the limits of their WiFi
signals, and use them to generate U . Similarly, it is possible to make use of
the bluetooth connection. In the newest version of bluetooth (bluetooth 3.0),
connections can be established in a rang of 90 meters, equivalent to the range
of WiFi, with speeds up 480 Mbps.
In our protocol, when k users want to send a query to P , queries are keywords
linked with a prime number value. Each query is encrypted with PKP and can be
understood as EPKp(message), where message is a prime number (i.e. 11: “hos-
pital”). So, if we take the queries of the k users we have k encrypted queries, and
by means of multiplicative homomorphism we convert the set of queries to a single
encrypted query, where the message is the product of all queries encrypted with the
public key of P . For example:
U0: EPKp(3) (3: hospital)
U1: EPKp(7) (7: pharmacy)
U2: EPKp(11) (11: hotel)
P receives Q: EPKp(3 ·7 ·11) = EPKp(231), and by means of SKP it can decrypt
the message and retrieve “231”. Due to the fact that the number is the product of
prime numbers, P can factorise it and retrieve the prime numbers which compose
the message m : 231 = 3 · 7 · 11 (hospital, pharmacy, hotel). Once factorised the
message in its prime numbers, P can generate an answer for each query with just a
single operation of encryption, A = ESKp(ahospital, apharmacy, ahotel).
Our model offers a solution to the problem that appears in traditional methods;
it reaches k-anonymity in the query with no need for false queries. So, we prevent
the unnecessary computational cost that the server has to perform, and we allow
users to make use of a paid service without extra charges from sending extra data.
Some current protocols try to achieve anonymity using fake queries [119], how-
ever, there are studies proving that in methods where the user generates fake queries,
there exists a high probability to detect the false queries, by means of the study of
user’s patterns [89]. Since our method does not send false queries to the server, it
avoids a point of attack, which most of the traditional methods do not prevent.
Our system is not limited to a single model, in this paper we propose two fully
functional different models, with different advantages depending on the needs of user
privacy (Table 4.1). The first model works as a distributed system, where the users
collaborate among them in order to achieve a higher privacy. The second model is a
centralised model, where a root user is responsible of the group’s privacy, this model
is most robust against errors.
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More private More secure
Distributed Centralised
Table 4.1: Advantages of each model: The distributed model provides more privacy,
but can easily suffer a DoS attack. The centralised model is more robust against
these kinds of attacks, but the privacy level is lowest
In the next sections we will describe the two proposed models, and we discuss
the cost and privacy for each of them.
4.3.1 Case 1: Centralised Model
In Figure 4.1 we see a centralised model, consisting of a group of users U = [U0, U1,
. . . , Uk−1], where k is a positive integer and one of the users is the responsible for
building the query by means of the product of all queries.
Figure 4.1: Query process in the centralised model, where all users forming the
group send their encrypted queries to the root user, who is responsible for building
the query consisting on the product of all queries.
m0 EPKP (q0)
m1 EPKP (q1)
m2 EPKP (q2)
m3 EPKP (q3)
mR EPKP (q0,1,2,3)
Answer ESKP (a0,1,2,3,R)
Table 4.2: Generated messages, where mi is the message generated by user i, and
contains the query , EPKP and ESKP are the encryption/decryption functions keys
of P , qi is the query of user i, A is the message which contains the answer and ai is
the answer to the query i.
We assume that the service provider P has a pair of keys (PKP y SKP ) and
the system uses a known method to generate the obfuscation area, as for example in
the proposed system in [109], in which a set of users collaborate among themselves
to generate a centroid by means of privacy homomorphism and Gaussian noise in
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the locations, in order to prevent the users to see the location of other collaborative
users.
In the centralised model, all users forming the k-anonymity send their queries
encrypted with the public key of P to UR. Once all the queries are received, UR
computes the homomorphic product with all of them, including his own query, so
that UR retrieves EPKP (q0,1,...,k−1) and sends it to P .
EPKP (qi)→ P
Then, P , by means of its secret key SKP , decrypts the message and it gets (q0,
q1, . . . , qk−1) after factorising it. Due to each qi representing a keyword, P is able
to build and sign an answer A = ESKP (a0, a1, . . . , ak−1) for each query, where
ai is the answer to the query i. Once the answer is built, P sends it to UR, who
broadcasts (A−AR) to all users of the group.
Thus, none user (except UR) knows the existence of other users in the protocol,
so they are not able to link the answers received with identities. They just know
the existence of UR, but due to the fact that AR is not included in the answer, they
cannot link UR with an answer.
Figure 4.2: Answer process in the centralised model, where server builds an answer
message with the answers of all the queries, sends it back to UR, and he broadcasts
the message to the whole group.
4.3.2 Case 2: Distributed Model
On the other hand, as we can see in Figure 4.3, our model is a distributed system
consisting of a set of users U = [U0, U1, . . . , Uk−1], where k is an integer positive
number and the generated messages for each user are reflected in Table 4.3. This
method is proposed with the aim of avoiding the central user, of the previous system,
to collude with the service provider.
As in the previous model, we assume that the centroid is done with existing
protocols.
When a user U0 wants to perform a query, he generates a first encrypted message
with the public key PKP of P . This messagem0 = EPKP (qf0,0) contains the product
of his real query q0 together with a false query qf0 chosen randomly from D.
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Figure 4.3: Distributed model with a double loop, where U0 starts the query process
with the message m0, which is modified for each user until arriving at U3 who sends
the message m′3 to P .
Once m0 is generated, it is sent to a nearby user U1 together with the desired
k-anonymity. U1 cannot see the content of m0, but he can perform a product over
the message without the need for decryption by means of public key homomorphism.
By using this property, U1 is able to add new queries into the message, generating
the message m1 = EPKP (qf0,0,f1,1) that will be sent to a new user, and so on until
it is received by the last user in the chain of users Uk−1, who will generate mk−1 =
EPKP (qf0,0,f1,1,...,fk−1,k−1).
m0 EPKP (qf0,0)
m1 EPKP (qf0,0,f1,1)
m2 EPKP (qf0,0,f1,1,f2,2)
m3 EPKP (qf0,0,f1,1,f2,2,f3,3)
m′0 EPKP (q0,f1,1,f2,2,f3,3)
m′1 EPKP (q0,1,f2,2,f3,3)
m′2 EPKP (q0,1,2,f3,3)
m′3 EPKP (q0,1,2,3)
A ESKP (a0,1,2,3)
Table 4.3: Generated messages, where mi is the message generated by user i, and
contains the real query with the false one, m′i is the final query without the false
query of i, EPKP is the encryption with the public key of P , qi is the query of user
i, A is the message which contains the answer and ai is the answer to the query i.
In the case that a user wants a higher level of privacy than others and wants
to prevent some type of collusion, it is possible to add k′ = maxk−anonymity/k
false queries qf[0,k−1] instead of just adding one, until the desired level of privacy is
achieved. In this way, the total privacy of the user will be the lower between the
both k-anonymities min(k, k′).
Uk−1, because he is the last user of the chain, must sendmk−1 to the first user U0,
who started the protocol. In the same way you can apply a multiplicative operation
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over the content of the message, it is also possible to perform a division, so U0 is
able to remove qf0 from mk−1. Once the process is performed, the message is sent
again by the user in the same way as before, and each user removes his false queries.
Finally, when Uk−1 removes qfk−1 , the final message is m
′
k−1 = EPKP (q0,1,...,k−1),
that is the product of the real queries of each user, encrypted with the public key
of P , so that only P can decrypt it by means of its secret key SKP .
Once P has decrypted m′k−1, it factorises the message, getting the queries like
prime numbers (q0, q1, . . . , qk−1). Since each qi is represented as a keyword, P
could build the signed answer packet A = ESKP (a0, a1, . . . , ak−1), where ai is the
answer of the query qi.
Then, A is sent back to Uk−1 (the user who sent the messagem′k−1 to the server),
Uk−1 sends it to Uk−2 and so on through the chain of users until the user U0. In
this way, users see all the answers of the queries, but they only know the identity
of the previous user and the user next to them. Therefore, each user knows that
one of the k − 1 answers belongs to the previous or next users. So users achieve
(k − 1)-anonymity.
Figure 4.4: Query process in the distributed model with a single loop, where the
user who creates the query is the responsible for sending it to the server.
With the centralised protocol users achieve the desired level of privacy even with
the collusion of some users with the server, but in the case where users do not need
a high level of privacy and they prefer a fast service, we can modify the protocol by
having just a single loop in the chain of users. We can see a graphical example of
the modified protocol in Figure 4.4, where with a single loop they can generate the
same query, which means less time and bandwidth is required.
The modified version consists in a set of users, where the first user is the only one
who adds false queries with the real one m0 = EPKP (qf,0), the rest of the users just
add the real query in the message until reaches the last user Uk−1, who returnsmk−1
= EPKP (qf,0,...,k−1) to U0 in order to remove the false queries from the message and
then sent it to P . Therefore, P receives a set of queries but it only knows the identity
of U0 and it will not be able to link the query with the user with a probability higher
than k− 1. Finally, P builds the answer message, sends back to U0 and U0 sends it
to the other users, as we can see in Figure 4.5.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIVACY PROTECTION FOR UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 
Pablo A. Pérez-Martínez 
Dipòsit Legal: T 64-2015
68
Chapter 4. Query Privacy: Prime numbers and Homomorphic
Cryptography
Figure 4.5: Answer process in the distributed model with a single loop
4.3.3 Study of k-anonymity and keywords dictionary
In order to perform the study of the k-anonymity, we assume a key size of 1024 bits
(128 Bytes), big enough to guarantee privacy, but not too big to use it in a current
smart-phone.
Figure 4.6: The chart shows the amount of keywords the system can handle ac-
cording to the k-anonymity that we want to achieve. As higher is the k-anonymity,
lower is the amount of words contained in the dictionary.
In order to enforce our protocol to achieve the users’ privacy requirements, we
should find the balance between the k-anonymity and the quantity of keywords
forming the dictionary of the service. As we can see in Fig. 4.6, when the k decreases
a little the available number of bits to represent the keywords grows exponentially.
Given a list of 1,000.000 primer numbers (used to represent the keywords), we
obtain that the keywordi for i = 1, 000.000 is 16, 777.216, so:
16, 777.21642 ≤ 1024bits (4.2)
We can conclude that using a 1024 bits key, our service may be built with no
problems, forming a dictionary of 1 Million keywords and a anonymity k of 42 users,
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k-anonymity keywords
100 172
75 1028
60 12251
50 82025
42 > 1000000
Table 4.4: Values of the k-anonymity and keywords dictionary study with 1024 bits
messages
which is likely enough for any service.
4.3.4 Cluster Heads
In the case that the group of users cannot satisfy the privacy requirements, due to
there not being enough users to achieve k-anonymity, the system can make use of
clusters in order to achieve the required anonymity.
Each group of users (cluster) will have a root user UR (cluster head), who will
be responsible for the communication with other clusters. Thus, the other users of
the groups are completely unknown to the other groups, but they can exploit the
advantages that other users offer.
By means of the communication among cluster heads and the use of privacy
homomorphisms, it is possible to generate a centroid based on the location of the
clusters. This centroid could be used to send the query to the server.
In this scheme, we compute the product of the queries in order to obtain a
message containing the queries of all users in all clusters. Note that the maximum
number of users (k = 42 taking into account our study) is a fixed value and it cannot
be exceeded by the users of the clusters.
4.3.5 Factorising cost
For the simulations we have implemented a prototype of our proposal in Java, with
a set of 100,000 keywords (more than enough for an LBS) and running in a Mac OS
X (10.7.3), 1.7 GHz Intel Core i5 processor and 4 GB up 1333 MHz DDR3.
The first simulation consists of a set of users who receive an encrypted message
with the public key of the provider and they compute the multiplicative homomor-
phism with the received message and their own query, previously encrypted with the
same public key. The average time spent to perform the encryption of the query and
compute the product is around 10 milliseconds. We then simulate the behaviour of
the provider, who has to decrypt the received messages and factorise the content.
These simulations have been performed with a set of messages containing from 2
to 50 queries (note that each query belongs a different user, so we simulated from
2 to 50 users). Figure 4.7 shows the results of the simulations, with a exhaustive
search through the set of keywords to factorise. This factorisation can be improved
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Figure 4.7: Time in milliseconds for factorising messages. The chart shows how
the time to factorise grows almost linearly with respect to the number of queries to
factorise.
in many ways, such as for example, building a multi-thread algorithm or sorting the
keywords taking into account the probability of choosing each one.
4.3.6 Privacy Analysis
In this section we discuss how our system reacts against the types of attacks de-
scribed above. For this we should analyse both swap protocols and proposed.
4.3.6.1 Attacker definition
As it occurs in all systems, it is not enough to guarantee the proper functioning of
the system assuming only regular conditions, since it must also be robust against
possible attacks, from both users of the system and external users.
In our scheme we can define 3 attacker models:
• A user of the system Us: In this scenario the attacker is a user of the
system, and he tries to modify or remove the messages of other users in the
distributed model. These kinds of actions are known by DoS (Deny of service)
attack.
• The service provider Pa: Usually the service provider is trusted, but it
could be possible than a service provider can get private information from
users. In this case, the service provider is able from seeing the content of the
queries that users send to him.
• An external user Ue: Here, the attackers are not only the users of the
system, but also external attackers, who try to infer the users’ messages by
means of an sniffer.
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4.3.6.2 Privacy on centralised model
In the centralised model, except UR, any user knows the identity of the other users
that form the group. All the communication is done through UR, so we prevent the
attacks by users.
Instead, the system can be attacked by UR, since he can try to deduce the content
of a message by just encrypting all possible keywords with PKP and comparing the
messages. However thanks to the use of the ElGamal crypto-system, the same plain
text is encrypted twice and will give different outputs. Alternatively, the dishonest
user (UR) can collude with P, since UR knows the identity of each user, and can see
the content of each query with SKp, which they can obtain from P . Therefore we
recommend using some kind of system to select only trusted root users, like friends
or contacts of a social network.
The advantages of the centralised model is the robustness of the system against
DoS attacks. In this way, the centralised model works as an alternative for services
that require more robustness than privacy, but with a minimum level of privacy.
4.3.6.3 Privacy on distributed model
In the distributed model, in the case in where Ui colludes with P , they could see
qf0 , . . . , qfk−1 , q0, q1, . . . , qi−1, where k is the number of false queries of U0 and i
the number of users. Here, each user of the chain would have an anonymity of
(k+(i-1))-1 = k + i− 2.
If the colluding user was U0, they could see the same as the server can see when
it receives the queries, ie. the set of queries of all users m = q0, q1, . . . , qk−1. So,
users get (k − 2)-anonymity.
in the worst case, U1 colludes with P to try to see the query of a user. By doing
so, U1 receives a query from U0 and by means of the secret key of P that can see
the query of U0, but thanks to the use of false queries that U0 adds to the message,
U1 is not able to distinguish which is the real one with a higher probability of k+ 1,
where k is the number of false queries. So, U1 and P can see q0, qf0 , . . . , qfk−1 , but
they don’t know which is the real one.
A single user can also attack the system without the need of collusion. This
attack, as we previously defined, consists of encrypting all possible keywords of the
system in order to compare the results with the message received from some user.
We can avoid this kind of attacks with the use of the ElGamal crypto-system, since
it is a probabilistic encryption.
The distributed model of our protocol is able to guarantee the privacy with an
anonymity up to k − 2 even in the case of collusion between a user and the service
provider.
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Chapter 5
W 3-Privacy: A holistic view
In this chapter we describe the three dimensions of user privacy in LBS. We intro-
duce the concept of W 3-privacy, and we propose a new obfuscation method based on
population density, anonymous payments and query uncertainty.
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5.1 Introduction
As stated in 1, using LBS might be very beneficial but could lead to undesired
privacy risks. Most of the current methods focus their efforts on location privacy,
and they believe that protection that dimension is enough to guarantee user’s privacy
in location-based services. In fact, if the system does not protect all the dimensions
of the users, the user information cannot be considered private.
In this chapter, we describe the three dimensions of user privacy in LBS and
we coin the term W 3-privacy. Furthermore, we propose a method to obfuscate the
location of LBS users. We show that our proposal achieves W 3-privacy when it is
properly combined with anonymity and uncertainty methods.
Current methods consider that users are allowed to move freely, without restric-
tions, but in real live users cannot move freely over all space. They must use urban
roads or streets, since people are restricted to walking or movement by vehicle. To
achieve this balance, we have created a pattern of obfuscation based on high density
locations over a city map. The LBS will know in advance the points of interest along
the high level density locations, so users will be able to use one of these locations
instead of their real locations.
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5.2 W3-Privacy
If we consider the privacy of LBS users we can distinguish three main independent
dimensions, namely:
• Identity privacy (i.e. Who you are). Establishing a direct connection with
the service provider, the latter knows the IP address of the former, which can
be understood as a identifier.
• Location privacy (i.e. Where you are). This can be considered the main
dimension and the most studied among the researchers working on the topic
of privacy protection in location-based services, so that makes it the differential
factor to be considered a location-based service.
• Query privacy (i.e. What you want to know). Even if a user protects his
identity or location, the service provider, by means of OI or RSI attacks, can
infer the identity of a user who asks regularly for the same or similar services.
Doing so, it can profile and track the user.
We say that LBS is W 3-private if the service is given whilst the provider (i) does
not know who the user is, (ii) where the user is, and (iii) what the user is asking for.
Most proposals concentrate on solving the privacy problems in a single dimen-
sion. In Section 2.1, we saw a survey of current proposals to protect the user’s
privacy, and as we can see most of these methods concentrate their efforts on pro-
tecting just one dimension whilst the other two dimensions remain visible for the
service provider.
To address “identity privacy” most solutions rely on trusted third parties (TTP),
that mediate between users and providers to hide their real identities using, for
example, pseudonyms. Others try to hide users by means of onion routers [32]. In
the first case, “identity privacy” is not guaranteed because the intermediaries know
the real identities.
The most popular topic in LBS privacy is “location privacy”. Several methods
have been proposed to protect it, namely spatial and temporal cloaking (anonymisers
and psudonymisers), individual location obfuscation, collaborative location obfusca-
tion, etc. Most methods use TTP or collaboration to hide real locations, thus, they
obtain location privacy at the cost of identity privacy. Only individual obfuscation
methods guarantee location privacy without sacrificing identity privacy. “Query pri-
vacy” has captured the attention of the research community in the fields of Internet
search engines and privacy preserving data mining. Several techniques to achieve
query k-anonymity have been proposed and also private information retrieval (PIR)
techniques are used. However, both approaches have serious practical limitations
(mainly for computational reasons). Table 5.1 shows a brief summary of the privacy
features of several methods to protect privacy in LBS.
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Method Who Where What
Pseudonymiser (TTP)
√
Annonymiser (TTP)
√
Individual Obfuscation
√ √
Collaborative Obfuscation
√
PIR
√ √
Our proposal
√ √ √
Table 5.1: Brief comparison of private LBS methods with regard to W 3-privacy [91]
5.3 Our proposal
In this section we describe our proposal to achieve W 3-privacy in LBS that require
payment. First, we show how to guarantee “identity privacy”. Second, we describe
how “query privacy‘” is achieved, and finally present a new obfuscation method to
protect “location privacy”.
5.3.1 WHO
As we have previously introduced, a good way of protecting “identity privacy” is the
use of onion routers [32]. Notwithstanding, this is not enough when LBS providers
require the authentication of the subscribers. In these cases, an anonymous payment
protocol has to be used.
We suggest using the partially blind signature of Abe-Okamoto [4]. Before send-
ing queries to LBS provider, every user subscribes using the protocol described in [4],
by doing so, users can authenticate without revealing their identity and providers
can charge them for the service properly.
A partially blind signature scheme allows the signer to explicitly include com-
mon information in the blind signature under some agreement with the receiver.
For instance, the signer can attach the date of issue to his blind signatures as an
attribute. If the signer issues a huge number of signatures in a day, including the
date of issue will not violate anonymity. Accordingly, the attributes of the signa-
tures can be decided independently from those of the public key. We suggest the
reader to refer to [4] and [117] for a better understanding.
5.3.2 WHAT
With the aim to preserve “query privacy”, users generate a number k of different
queries {q1, q2, . . . , qk}. Thus, the provider is not able to determine which is the real
query. This idea resembles the concept of k-anonymity and has been widely used to
guarantee query privacy with Internet search engines [33].
5.3.3 WHERE
People living and moving in cities do not distribute uniformly. On the contrary, every
city has streets, avenues and squares having a greater population density. Thus, it
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Figure 5.1: (left) Chicago’s density map and user located on it. (right) Radius of
uncertainty around the user and candidate points [91].
is feasible to obtain a density map such as the one shown in Figure 5.1(left). We
assume that these maps are common to every LBS user and can be freely accessed.
They can be understood as a set of points in <3, (x, y, d), where x, y represent
longitude and latitude, and d is the density in those coordinates. By using this
information, users can determine the points/locations of maximum density, which
are excellent candidates to be used as fake locations because they make difficult the
object identification (OI) and restricted space identification (RSI) attacks.
To preserve their “location privacy” users define a series of uncertainty radius
R = {R1, R2, . . . , Rm} in which they try to find points with, at least, a minimum
density dmin. These points could be used as fake points.
First, users locate themselves (e.g. with a GPS). Then, they select the area
(defined by the radius) in which they want to find fake points. Finally, they use the
information of the density map to determine the points that have a density greater
than dmin that are within a range smaller than a given Ri. If no points fulfilling
the required conditions are found, the user should relax the constraints and restart
the procedure. Once the candidate points are found, users can select one of them
randomly (alternatively, users can select the point which is closer to them, thus,
reducing the error whilst maintaining the uncertainty).
5.3.4 Privacy protection on LBS
Privacy protection on location-based services is becoming a popular research topic,
but we need to properly understand all the possible risks for the privacy of the
users, as it may be violated, and that includes several factors to consider. The most
popular factor is the identity of the user. Most privacy-protection schemes just face
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that dimension, and we may think that is enough to guarantee the privacy of the
users, but actually it is not, as your interests or your location may be used to profile
you, even when your identity is unknown.
Since privacy protection is understood as the protection of the user from being
profiled by LBS, considering all the dimensions, a protocol that aims to guarantee the
privacy of their users must face and guarantee the protection of the three dimensions.
So, protocols that do not achieve this goal, should not be considered hundred percent
secure.
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Part II
Privacy in RFID and distributed
sensors
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Chapter 6
Smart Public Parkings
In this chapter we discuss how the ubiquitous use of information and communication
technologies within the context of a Smart City might lead to transparent gathering
of private data from citizens. We focus on transportation area and, more specifically,
on the parking problems that might arise in big cities. We propose a set of procedures,
based on privacy enhancing technologies, that allow the private, secure and efficient
management of parking in Smart Cities.
The main goal of this chapter is to foster discussion about the privacy issues that
might arise in a Smart City and to provide an example scenario (i.e. public parking)
to demonstrate some interesting ideas and show some open problems.
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6.1 Introduction
Countries are making great efforts to be competitive, attract investments and talent,
reduce debt and be more sustainable. The struggle of countries for competitiveness
has a smaller version in their cities, which are competing at an international level for
investments, talent and quality of life, and they realise that the most promising path
to success is the use of technology. Specifically, information and communication
technologies (ICT) allow local governments and companies to develop ubiquitous
innovative solutions that improve municipal operations in a variety of areas, such as
transportation, energy, sustainability, e-governance, economy and communications.
In big cities, factors related to economies of scale help to reduce operational costs.
However, managing big cities is challenging because the number of inhabitants grows
steadily and the infrastructures and operational procedures have to be adapted to
a growing and very demanding population.
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In this context, local administrations have the need for smart procedures to
improve the quality of life and the management of resources in cities. As a result of
these needs, the concept of Smart City appeared and, although the idea of Smart
City is pretty new, we can find several examples of cities that pursued this idea
applied to a variety of areas (e.g. Amsterdam [70], Vienna, Toronto, Paris, New
York, London, Tokyo, Copenhagen, Hong Kong or Barcelona [6]).
A very relevant area in every city is transportation. On the one hand, the
management of public transportation is a very important and difficult issue that
has been studied and companies, such as IBM, are proposing solutions to make
it smarter [61]. On the other hand, private transportation is a cornerstone for the
local government of any big city. The challenges related to private transportation are
diverse, namely traffic jam management, tax collection, parking lots management,
and so on.
In this chapter we enhance the definition of Smart City, which is a concept
that has not been fully defined. We show the great advantages of Smart Cities,
such as reduction of CO2 emissions, improvement of the relations between citizens
and administrations, increases in efficiency of public and private transportation,
etc. However, we note that the easy gathering of data that occurs in ICT-based
Smart Cities might open the door to privacy attacks from at least two sides: (i)
from the infrastructure and (ii) from external attackers. To exemplify this situation
we consider the special case of parking management within a Smart City and we
describe a protocol that allows the private and secure management of the information
required to control the payments in public parking lots.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: In Section 6.2 we provide some
background on Smart Cities, we propose an extended definition for Smart City and
we describe our case study. In Section 6.3 we describe our privacy-aware protocol for
our case study and, finally, in Section 6.4 we briefly summarise its main properties
from a privacy and security perspective..
6.2 Case Study
6.2.1 Smart Cities
In recent years many people have started to use the term “Smart City”, but in many
cases the meaning given to this term changes from person to person. Moreover, the
term has gained a kind of marketing value that local governments want to benefit
from. Thus, the definition of the term is frequently modified so as to adapt to the
needs of the people using it in a particular situation. As a consequence, a number
of different definitions and conceptual ideas regarding Smart Cities can be found in
the literature.
From a very general perspective we could say that Smart Cities are those in which
people can make their own choices and have a high quality of life combined with the
efficient use of resources and the reduction of emissions. More specifically, a smart
city considers six main areas/dimensions that are connected to the neoclassical
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theories of urban growth and development:
• Smart economy: Improve regional competitiveness and attract talent.
• Smart mobility: Improve the efficiency of public transportation and the man-
agement of private vehicles.
• Smart environment: Reduce the energy footprint and better use natural re-
sources.
• Smart people: Promote human and social capital.
• Smart living: Increase the quality of life of citizens.
• Smart governance: Foster the participation of society and the interaction of
the citizens with the administration.
According to Caragliu et al. [22] a city might be considered “smart” when it
invests in human and social capital and traditional transport and in modern (ICT)
communication infrastructures that fuel sustainable economic growth and a high
quality of life, with a wise management of natural resources, through participatory
governance.
We complement this definition by adding that a city, to be “smart”, should
guaranty the privacy and security of its citizens so as to foster their participation and
avert the Big Brother effect, which might raise concerns amongst privacy advocates.
To summarise, our definition of Smart City is as follows:
 Smart Cities are cities strongly founded on information and communication
technologies that invest in human and social capital to improve the quality of life of
their citizens by fostering economic growth, participatory governance, wise manage-
ment of resources, sustainability, and efficient mobility, whilst they guarantee the
privacy and security of the citizens. 
6.2.2 Public Parking
Parking a vehicle in a crowded city is a difficult task for several reasons. First, it is
complicated to find a place and people waste a lot of time looking for a parking lot,
and this time is translated to money due to the high cost of gasoline. Second, once
a parking place is found, in many cases, drivers are required to pay some money
depending on the length of time that the vehicle is parked. This payment poses
several problems:
• Need for change: If the payment method is based on parking meters, drivers
need to carry some change because, in general, credit cards are not supported.
If the payment method is based on pay and display machines drivers might
pay with money or credit cards, but they have to find the machine and then
go back to the car to leave the ticket obtained.
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• Have extra-costs: In some places prepaid RFID cards (wallet cards) can be
used to pay for the service but they are usually not re-usable and drivers pay
the extra-cost of the card every time they buy a new one [85].
• Pay again to move the vehicle to another area: In most cases, after
paying for parking in a place, if the driver moves to another place (located in
a different payment area of the city), he/she must pay again and cannot use
the ticket previously issued even if it has not expired.
• Renew the ticket: When pay and display machines are used, if the ticket
expires drivers must go back to the machine, buy a new ticket and leave it in
the car. This is a very inconvenient procedure, specially if the driver is far
from the parking place.
In the context of a Smart City we assume that a number of RFID readers
are deployed so as to identify vehicles and control their payment status. Thus, in
addition to the previously stated problems we identify some attacks against the
privacy of the users that can take place and should be avoided.
• Attacks from the infrastructure: Some of current parking systems use
contactless technology, but in most of cases users use an ID. If vehicles are
identified with a single ID (e.g. the licence plate, or the like), the infrastructure
can obtain a record of the locations that a given driver visits and can obtain
extra-information that might endanger the privacy of drivers, namely their
habits, their place of residence, their place of work, etc...
• Attacks from external attackers: If RFID technology is used inappropri-
ately, external attackers could obtain the identification of the vehicle and clone
it so as to avoid payment by stealing the identity of legitimate users.
In our case study we consider all these problems related to the payment and
identification of the vehicles. We do not consider the problem of finding a parking
place because it has been widely studied and several solutions already exist [69].
Thus, to address the aforementioned problems we need to design a procedure (or a
set of protocols) that guaranties the following properties.
• Anonymity: Payments should be anonymous so as to avoid the identification
of the user by the infrastructure and avoid undesired profiling. As we showed
in Part I, by sending their identifications, users can be profiled by the service
provider, as the service provider is collecting all the user’s information, and
thanks to the identifiers, it can link the information with an idendity.
• Remote payment: Payments might be done remotely without the need for
change and without the need for returning to the vehicle or the parking meters.
In a world where we can pay almost everything remotely, we should develop
a remote payment method for parking meter to be considered “smart”.
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• Transparent multi-area parking: If users have paid for a given parking
time and they change the location of their vehicle, they should be allowed to
use the remaining time that they have (if any) in the new parking place. It is
logical to believe that if you pay for parking in a city, you would be able to
park everywhere inside the city, however most current parking meters make
users pay again if they move their cars.
• Untraceability: External attackers and the infrastructure should not be able
to distinguish two different payments from the same user. Thus, they cannot
infer the habits or the places frequently visited by users.
6.3 Protocol
In this section we describe our protocol, which uses off-the-shelf privacy-enhancing
technologies to address the problems identified in the previous section. We assume
that users/drivers have an RFID card and a mobile phone that can communicate
with this card. First, we describe the procedure to anonymously pay by means of
e-cash. Then we describe how to use our protocol within the context of a Smart
City.
6.3.1 Anonymous Payment
With the aim to break the link between the identity of the user and the payment
he/she makes, we propose the use of anonymous e-cash. To obtain e-cash and
proceed with the payment, users operate as follows:
1. Get e-cash: A user U1 gets e-cash (electronic cash) from a bank. To do so,
one can use a lot of existing protocols, for example the system proposed in the
patent [103], in which a user asks the bank for a given amount of money in the
form of electronic cash, in Figure 6.1 we show an example with a user asking
for $50 in e-cash. To do that, the user sends a request for some quantity of e-
cash to the bank, and the bank sends back the e-cash with the requested value.
In this procedure the bank signs the money so as to guarantee its validity. By
using this procedure double spending is averted by the bank.
Figure 6.1: User asking to the bank for e-cash [92].
2. Pay for the service: When U1 parks a vehicle in a public parking area
that requires payment, he uses the previously obtained e-cash to pay for the
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service by using a mobile phone (cf. Figure 6.3). To proceed, the user sends
an activation message to the RFID tag located in the vehicle1. When the
tag receives the activation message it generates a pseudonym using a one-way
hash function h(ID1||r), where ID1 is the private identifier of the tag, r is a
random number generated by the tag, and (||) is the concatenation operator.
Then, the tag sends the pseudonym back to the driver, who will use it to make
the payment.
3. Verify the payment: Once the service provider receives the payment, it con-
tacts the bank to check the validity of the e-cash. If the e-cash received is valid,
the bank sends the money to the parking service provider (cf. Figure 6.2).
Figure 6.2: Graphic scheme of the payment and validation procedure [92].
4. Determine and store expiration time: The parking service provider con-
verts the e-cash received into “parking time” and determines the expiration
time for the user. Finally it saves this information in its database and informs
U1 about the expiration time.
Figure 6.3: Payment by means of e-cash and a mobile phone [92].
6.3.2 Protocol Operation in a Smart City
We assume that the smart city in which our protocol is applied has a number of
RFID readers deployed in public parking areas. Those RFID readers are able to
identify RFID tags.
1This communication can be performed in a variety of ways, but the use of NFC is becoming
popular and might be the standard in the near future.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIVACY PROTECTION FOR UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 
Pablo A. Pérez-Martínez 
Dipòsit Legal: T 64-2015
6.3. Protocol 87
• When a user U1 parks in a monitored parking place, an RFID reader detects
the tag in the vehicle and registers its current ID in its database DB. As
stated before the ID of the tag that the reader will obtain is a pseudonym like
h(ID1||r) that will be related to the payment issued by U1. For the commu-
nication between the RFID reader (R) and the RFID tag of the user’s vehicle
(T), we can use the improved randomised hash-locks (IRHL) protocol [64].
As athours describe in [112], IRHL are computationally cheap on the tags
side (they only need a pseudo-random number generator and a hash func-
tion). In the IRHL protocol, R generates a random number r1 and sends it
to T. Then, T generates another random number r2 and computes the answer
a = h(r1||r2||ID) where ID is the secret identifier of T, (||) is the concatena-
tion operator, and h() is a one-way hash function. Finally, when R receives the
answer (a) and the nonce (r2) it determines the ID of the tag by performing
an exhaustive search in its database looking for an identifier IDi such that
a = h(r1||r2||IDi). When that happens the tag is identified as IDi. Figure 6.4
shows a graphical description of this protocol.
• U1 proceeds to pay by means of his mobile phone, as we stated before (cf.
Figure 6.3).
• Once U1 has paid, the parking service provider updates the information about
the expiration time in the database.
By using this procedure, users can pay anonymously, they can move from one
area to another without paying again (because a centralised database contains all
the information), they can extend their parking time by using their mobile phone,
and they are not traceable thanks to the use of pseudonyms that can be changed
every time a user parks a vehicle in a new location.
Figure 6.4: Secure communication between a vehicle and an RFID reader using
IRHL [92].
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6.3.2.1 Model 2: Cities with no adoption of sensor networks
In cities where there are no sensors distributed along it, normally there are some
human reviewers who walk along the parking places verifying that all parked cars
have paid for the services. In our system the reviewers can read the RFID tags of
the parked cars through a RFID reader, so they can check if each car has a valid
payment.
In this model, unlike the previous one, the system does not instantly detect the
users when they are parking, so the delay for making the payment is not needed.
Lets see the procedure:
• When a user U1 parks in a place the system does not realise it until a human
reviewer checks the car. So U1 will pay before being identified by the service.
• Once U1 has paid, the service adds the information to its database, so it adds
ID1 and the end time paid end_time = current_time + paid_time.
6.4 Discussion
We have designed our protocol so as to provide anonymity, remote payment, trans-
parent multi-area parking and untraceability. Next we briefly discuss why our pro-
tocol achieves these goals and how its help to protect citizens’ privacy within the
scope of a Smart City.
• Anonymity: Thanks to the use of e-cash, the infrastructure cannot relate the
payments with the identity of the user. This would be only possible if the
infrastructure colludes with the bank. However, this does not seem to be a
realistic scenario.
• Remote payment: As the payment is no longer linked to a machine or a
parking meter, users are able to pay remotely using their e-cash through a
mobile phone.
• Transparent multi-area parking: Information about payments and identifiers
are stored in a centralised database. Thus, if users change the location of their
vehicles, they do not need new tickets.
• Untraceability: At any moment, the user might decide to send an activation
message to the RFID tag of the vehicle. By doing so, the user makes the tag
generate a new pseudonym that will be used to pay and to identify the vehicle.
Due to the fact that pseudonyms change, it is impossible for the infrastructure
to trace users by means of their ID.
From a security point of view, the use of the IRHL for the communication be-
tween vehicle tags and infrastructure readers guarantees that the pseudonyms gen-
erated by tags cannot be cloned. Thus, the security of the drivers is also guaranteed.
The down side of IRHL is its computational cost on the readers side, however, it
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has been shown that it is possible to obtain efficient identifications by using the
collaboration of multiple readers (which would be highly applicable in a Smart City
scenario) [112], [114], [113].
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Chapter 7
Cloud and Body Sensors
In this chapter we propose a privacy-aware protocol for body sensor network (BSN)
in the cloud that guarantees the right of patients to privacy with an economically
sound solution. The new twist that the proposed model provides is that a part of the
revenues is returned to the source of the information, the users. We leverage the
recently proposed concept of Privacy as a Product (PaaP) in combination with the
Raikova-Vo-Bellovin-Malkin (RVBM) protocol to develop our scheme and we show
that it guarantees privacy and it is viable from a technical and economical perspective.
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7.1 Introduction
Body sensors have been around for a long time. Since the invention of the clinical
thermometer in the 19th century, the evolution of body sensors has accelerated ex-
ponentially. The development of new materials, advances in miniaturisation, and
the use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) have elevated body
sensors to a new level in which they are naturally integrated with humans. Thanks
to the use of body sensors we can monitor a variety of body signals, namely tem-
perature, heartbeat rate, blood pressure, blood oxygen saturation, glucose, etc.
Although body sensors were initially designed as individual measurement devices
(see for example the thermometer), they can no longer be understood as isolated
gadgets. Instead, current body sensors aim at collecting data in a collaborative way,
since the data collected by all of them could be studied globally to obtain a more
accurate picture of the actual state of the people wearing them. In addition, body
sensors can create ad-hoc networks that allow them to communicate and exchange
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIVACY PROTECTION FOR UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 
Pablo A. Pérez-Martínez 
Dipòsit Legal: T 64-2015
92 Chapter 7. Cloud and Body Sensors
information amongst themselves and with other entities that might be used to collect
and analyse biomedical and biometric information.
As a result of the evolution of body sensors from individual entities to complex,
interconnected devices, concepts such as electronic health (e-health) and mobile
health (m-health) have gained momentum. Nowadays, it is possible to remotely
monitor the body signals of patients and introduce changes in their treatments or
urgently take action in case of emergency. Also, the biometric data collected by those
sensors could be crossed with other data such as location data, medication intake
information, or even medical health records. Consequently, all this information
can hardly be stored and analysed in locally managed systems. Instead, the cloud
paradigm in which storage and computational capacity are leveraged from a third
party appears as a very serious trend.
Figure 7.1 depicts a simple version of this paradigm shift: Users collect the data
of their body sensor networks in a static or mobile communications device. The col-
lected data is periodically sent to a cloud service provider (CSP) who is responsible
for storing them and (optionally) could apply some transformations on the data for
efficiency reasons such as compression or indexing. The cloud acts as a pool of data
that can be accessed by other entities like hospitals and research centres for primary
use. Those parties would have access to the data so as to monitor the health status
of patients, control the evolution of a given disease, or carry out research studies. In
addition, the CSP could achieve some revenues by selling sanitised (or raw) data to
third parties like pharmaceuticals, biosensors manufacturers or, sports equipment
retailers, which make secondary use of the data (i.e. they use the data not to provide
healthcare services to the users but to obtain information that could help them to
improve their products and increase their sales. Thus, they are ready to pay the
CSP in order to get access to this data).
The simple cloud-based model depicted in Figure 7.1 has many benefits for the
final user, some of them are the following:
• Availability: Cloud services are already a reality and can be easily accessed.
The storage of information in the cloud is pretty simple and the sharing of
this information in the cloud has become commonplace (see for example the
case of Dropbox).
• Reliability: Due to the fact the cloud infrastructures are largely redundant, it
can be said that a properly managed cloud is reliable. Thus, users can safely
store their information, since a number of backup units take care of the proper
storage of their data.
• Low-cost: As a result of economies of scale, CSPs can offer services at reason-
able costs. In fact, the public cloud paradigm, in which people share resources
such as CPU, memory, etc, is becoming very common and the cost for end
users is decreasing steadily.
It is evident that using the cloud has a lot of benefits. However, cloud users are
handing over their data to the cloud, and in some situations, sharing the raw data
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with the cloud could be seen as an important privacy risk. This is specially true in
the case of data coming from body sensor networks, which can be considered highly
sensitive personal data.
Figure 7.1: Simple model for cloud storage of data collected by body sensors. The data are
shared with entities for primary and secondary use, and the cloud service provider could make
revenue from this data sharing.
7.2 A private health center in the cloud
7.2.1 Main actors and desiderata
In this section we model our problem, state the requirements and provide the nec-
essary structures and mechanisms that will build our framework to allow sharing of
body sensor measurements with privacy in the cloud and to enable a novel business
model based on the concept of PaaP.
The proposed model comprises four entities: the user Alice, the Cloud Service
Provider (CSP), the Query Router and the Bidder. These entities could be mapped
to the RVBM roles of user, IS, Query Router and Querier respectively.
Our first goal is to keep the stored information away from the eyes of the CSP,
consequently, a user’s data should be encrypted using a key that chosen by him/her.
In order to make the provided solution efficient in terms of key management, we
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propose the use of a public key algorithm, which allows re-encryption, like El Gamal.
This selection might slow down performance. However, it makes data sharing easier
and more secure. Moreover, current smartphones and tablets can easily handle such
processing cost.
Our second goal is that users could share their data without having to disclose
any additional information to the server, nor to provide any additional key to the
sharers. Since the data will be encrypted, querying the information will be very
hard, therefore, we propose the use of Bloom filters, as in the RVBM protocol, but
with two additional filters. Depending on the information that is stored in the files,
we consider that the user might want to allow a reduced set of search operations
regarding on the type of querier. The user might choose to allow querying different
tags to the sharers and the queriers. Based on that, the user (Alice) creates three
keyword dictionaries and the corresponding Bloom filters. The Bloom filters will be
encrypted but with different keys in order to preserve their independence.
From the above, it becomes clear that Alice is in full control of her data, she
will be the one to chose who has access to her data, for how long and the role of the
CSP is just to host the information and allow the necessary tasks to be executed.
In our model, the Bidders have the chance to bid for subsets of the information
that the user is sharing and willing to trade. However, in order to do that the Bidder
must be able to certify that he is in fact a bidder. The certification of the bidders
is a task that is made by the Query Router (QR). The QR not only forwards the
queries anonymously, but acts as a certification authority for the Bidders, granting
them the appropriate credentials to place bids.
7.2.2 Managing and trading the data
Whenever Alice wants to upload a file, she picks a key and sends the encrypted file
to the CSP, along with a Bloom filter for her searches and one more if she wants
to allow sharing. All the filters that Alice creates are sent encrypted to CSP and
each of them with a different key, selected by her. To revoke the rights of a user, all
that Alice has to do is to send a re-encryption key to the CSP and the new list of
users that will have access to the selected file. The CSP will re-encrypt the file and
inform the appropriate users.
If Alice wants to allow bids for part of her information, then firstly she creates
the appropriate Bloom filters. Afterwards, she selects a subset of bidders from the
list of certified bidders, from whom she wants to receive bids. This list contains their
certificates, as in SSL, along with a public address in which they receive record IDs
and decryption keys. The use of these list can lead to fine-grained policies towards
accepting bids, depending on several constraints like reputation or location. So Alice
creates a message that contains the record ID along with the decryption keys for
the Bloom filters. Sending the keys for the decryption of Bloom filters allows her to
offer a preview of her profile and avoids disclosing her data.
Having the decryption keys for the Bloom filters of some records, the Bidder
sends his queries through the QR to the CSP, using the RVBM protocol. From the
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replies that the Bidder receives, he makes an estimation of whether he wants to
access this file, the subset of files or the user’s profile. This estimation is based on
the number of keyword hits that he has found. So the Bidder computes a bid value.
To place his bid, the Bidder uses the trading protocol described in [88] and receives
a key to decrypt the data, if the user agrees.
The steps of the trading protocol are the following: The Bidder initializes a
session with the CSP and the CSP creates a “ticket” for him with an “offerID” and
sends it to the Bidder. The Bidder uses this ticket to contact the User and negotiates
the encryption parameters. The User replies with the accepted parameters. The
Bidder now is able to place his bid, which consists of the hash of the requested
messages that he retrieved when he queried the CSP, the bid value or a key that
releases access to a service from time t1 till t2 or an amount of money and the
time for how long his offer will last. The user either accepts or rejects the offer
and signs her reply in either case. The Bidder acknowledges user’s response and if
it is positive, the user will send a decryption key for the requested information to
the Bidder. The Bidder can use this key to request the information from the CSP
and decrypt the content that he bought. Figure 7.2 illustrates the trading protocol,
while a graphical representation of the proposed scheme is shown in Figure 7.3.
A detailed analysis of the trading protocol, along with its security properties, is
available in [88].
Figure 7.2: The trading protocol.
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Figure 7.3: The proposed scheme for PaaP using body sensors and a Cloud Service Provider.
7.2.3 Viability of the business model
In order to prove the viability of the proposed business model, we will focus on
proving the following hypotheses:
1. All parties will gain from the partnership.
2. All parties will be “forced” to play fair, otherwise they will lose more than the
others.
3. The economic revenue is relevant enough to make several entities to adopt it.
From the proposed business model, all parties have something to gain:
• Users: The adoption of our scheme enables users to have full control over
their shared information, without any unwanted disclosures. Moreover, apart
from the free service, users can have additional revenues and services.
• CSP: The role of the CSP changes significantly from the classical model, as
it is not in control of the information and it is just hosting the encrypted
data. However, the CSP has other ways in order to obtain revenues. Firstly,
the privacy that users gain circumvents the major obstacle that prevents many
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users from using the cloud. Therefore, users will become more willing to accept
and try the cloud and would even consider buying subscriptions, for example,
for storage services. The CSP might not have access to the data, to trade
profiles with advertising companies (third parties), however, it is the one that
seals every deal and guarantees “safe product delivery”. Therefore, the CSP
plays a very relevant role and can claim a percentage of every deal between a
Bidder and a User, or charge the QR for every executed query.
• Query routers: The main source of income for QRs are the bidders. QRs
can charge Bidders for certification and for forwarding and anonymizing their
queries.
• Bidder: In opposition to our business model, the current one has many lim-
itations for the Bidders. The market is indoctrinated by the major CSPs,
which charge as much as they want for their services, as there are not many
alternatives. Our proposed business model manages to settle a new more solid
and fairer ground. The users come in direct contact with the Bidders, so the
Bidder plays a more important role in the market regulation and can minimize
the prices that he pays, or even offer more services, as he has access to the
source of information.
One might argue that the proposed model will work very well only if users decide to
trade information, but if they adopt a selfish behaviour, meaning that they decide
just to host the information and not to trade anything, then the model has nothing
to offer. While claim sounds valid, nonetheless, recent figures and facts disprove it.
According to a recent study [13], the users of Dropbox, one of the major CSPs
for individual users, showed this selfish behaviour. More than 95% of the users were
using the “free” option, which does not, in any sense, stop them from encrypting the
files, and deprives the CSP of any information. Nonetheless, Dropbox is increasing
its revenues and expanding its growth. Other CSPs like SpiderOak are offering
the free option for hosting information on their Cloud, providing the necessary
guaranties that they have no access to the hosted information. Their revenues are
only coming from paid subscriptions.
7.2.4 Fair play
The fact that each party has interest in following the protocol does not guarantee
that each party will not try to bypass it in order to gain more benefits. However,
next we prove that all parties have their interests towards keeping their given roles
and we show it for every possible scenario of malicious cooperation. Note that in our
analysis the cooperation has to do with key disclosure, since the trading protocol
which seals all the deals has already proven to be secure.
The scenario that we do not consider is the cooperation between the CSP and
the users, since in that case the model returns to its current form. For the same
reason, the Bidder will not cooperate and disclose the purchased decryption keys to
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either the QR or the CSP. The only possibility is that the Bidder is closing down his
business and trying to extract some last money, in every other case, he is giving back
power to the CSP, which is his major interest from this business model. We have to
note, however, that the CSP - QR cooperation is a calculated risk, since whenever
someone decides to disclose some information, he knows that this decision has the
risk of allowing third parties to access it, if the other entity is not so trustworthy.
The QR cannot cooperate with the users, so he chooses to cooperate with the
CSP, then the CSP becomes aware of what queries are being made and by whom, not
the results. In this case the CSP can contact other Bidders and receive the queries
straight away from them, circumventing the QR. Hence from such partnership the
QR only has to lose. The cooperation between the Bidders and the QRs cannot
have any valuable outcome, so it is not studied.
Finally, the Bidders may cooperate with the Users. Amongst all the scenarios,
this seems to be the most probable as they come in contact to exchange the decryp-
tion keys for the Bloom filters, they might as well trade the data, circumventing the
CSP’s part of the deal. However, it is obvious in that case the Bidder cannot be
sure that he will get the requested data. If he decides to prosecute the user, he will
have to publicly declare his malicious actions. It is quite clear that the same applies
vice-versa.
7.3 Application scenarios
There are different scenarios where users send their data to the cloud in order to
use applications and services. However, there are situations in which people want to
maintain their privacy, since the shared information is sensitive. In these scenarios
the scheme that we propose can be used.
A clear example of this scenario can be found in the healthcare sector, both
for the general public and for professional athletes, which want to be monitored to
improve their results. We analyse both cases in the next section:
7.3.1 General people
The medical records and tests that people are taking in order to monitor their
health provide only a snapshot. Therefore BSN can provide a continuous mapping of
patient’s health, with minor physical pervasion. Currently, devices able to measure
in real time the miles traveled by people, their heart rate, their movements, etc.,
for then analyse them on an external device and, sometimes, share them on social
networks are more and more fashionable and commonplace. These data are used by
the users for their own control, but they can be very valuable information to third
parties also (e.g. shoe companies who want to improve their products based on the
pressure exerted by the users of their shoes in their daily lives). To prevent the access
to this information without users’ consent, users must protect this information,
which in some cases can be as critical information (e.g., Health data). Millions
of people worldwide suffer from diseases that can be monitored by means of body
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sensors that send patients data to caregivers or a medical centres. Applications able
to control the vital signs of patients and then send them to the cloud for analysis are
widespread, but data can also be important for research, pharmaceutical or medical
centres, which need real data to study or target advertising to a specific audience.
So, it is very important that the users can protect this information and only allow
its use with their consent.
Let us suppose the following scenario in which an elder person, called Abe, uses
a monitoring system with body sensors and GPS. He has cognitive impairments
and he is often disoriented. On one of his daily walks he goes to an ATM to get
some money, but when he is coming back home he forgets that he went to the ATM
and he goes again, and so on a number of times. Due to the fact that these data
are stored in the cloud to be analysed, it could be intercepted by an attacker, who
can deduce that Abe was in an ATM several times and that he can be disoriented
and have money with him. This information could be used to perform a physical
attack/robbery on Abe.
With our proposal, users are able to encrypt and split their data in the cloud,
so they can use these data at same time that the data are protected. In addition,
if someone is interested in buying some of these data, PaaP allows the two parties
to interact in order to reach an agreement for the price of the data. To show a
use case scenario of the latter form, a user named Anne, who is receiving a special
medication, decides to share part of her health record, which displays how her
treatment is going. The medical company that is producing the specific drugs or
an competitor one want access to Anne’s medical information and is willing to pay
her for that in order to prove the superiority of their product, to track possible side
effects, or even to fine-tune Anne’s dosage to achieve better results and therefore
improve their product.
7.3.2 Professional athletes
Statistics in sports is about to hit a whole new level. Due to the small size and
wireless connectivity of current sensors, professional athletes can adopt these sensors
without posing them a burden while training or competing. As a result, a new
generation of wearable monitors that measure heartbeat rate, electrical activity in
the heart, lung capacity, metabolism, and other metrics are allowing scientists to
study athletes’ physiology as they play. In Figure 7.4 we depict some of most
common body sensors:
a) Tiny body sensors provide real-time athlete monitoring 1,
b) miCoach Speed Cell, collects speed, acceleration, distance and pace data 2,
c) Orpyx sensor embedded within the insole captures raw force data 3,
1http://www.gizmag.com/go/7979/
2http://micoach.adidas.com/
3http://orpyx.com/
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d) The Nike+ SportWatch GPS keeps track of a user’s location, pace, distance,
laps, and calories burned 4,
e) Nike+ FuelBand tracks a user’s daily activity including running, walking,
dancing and dozens of everyday activities 5,
f) The Zephyr HxM BT is a fitness-tracking device designed for use with most
smartphones. It combines Smart Fabric, heart rate sensor technology, move-
ment sensors, and Bluetooth connectivity on a chest strap for athletes 6,
g) Special fibres bonded onto ADIDAS tops, work in conjunction with Polar’s
Wear Link technology to eliminate the need for a separate chest strap to
monitor heart rate 7.
Figure 7.4: Some of the most common body sensors currently used by athletes.
All the data collected by these sensors have a clear potential to enhance athletes’
health, and to help trainers tailor workouts. Moreover, monitoring device makers
and the sports industry seems even more excited about the prospects for enter-
tainment. They are already working on ways to display the data during games, in
stadiums and on television, giving fans unprecedented insight into players game-play.
4http://nikeplus.nike.com/plus/products/sport_watch/
5http://www.nike.com/us/en_us/lp/nikeplus-fuelband
6http://www.zephyr-technology.com/solutions/psm-training-echo
7http://www.gizmag.com/go/4402/
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Real-time monitoring of the wellness of athletes, during their sporting activity
and training, is important in order to maximise performance during the sporting
event itself and during training, as well as being important for the health of the
sportsmen overall, specially for body builders, who do a lot of exercise, carrying
their bodies to the limits, and they take medical drugs in order to improve their
training results, but these drugs can cause serious health problems for them, so they
are interested in analysing their health through the use of body sensors that monitor
their data while they are training. These data are sent to the cloud to be analysed
by their physicians or coaches, but doing so, if proper measures are not taken, it
could endanger the athletes’ privacy. Advertising companies can use their data to
send them spam about new drugs, treatments, gyms, etc., without their consent.
We propose a new environment for athletic applications which, through PaaP,
allows athletes to get real-time recommendations from physicians or coaches. Body
builders may securely share their training results, so that they can be easily moni-
tored by specialists.
In our proposal for this scenario the athlete hosts his/her biometric data, like
heart rate, posture, acceleration, etc., on a Hosting Server (HS), splitting the data
into different groups, according to their nature/type. These data are very interesting
for companies in the sports sector (e.g. Nike, ADIDAS, Reebok, etc.), which could
further improve their products, through crowd-sourcing. Moreover, other athletes
and coaches are interested in these data, since they want to learn and be trained from
the best source – the bodies of professional athletes. Therefore, athletes could be
interested in selling this information, however, its sensitive nature demands a special
treatment, and the PaaP framework that was previously discussed can guaranty not
only privacy but a successful business model as well. Apart from sport industries,
which can easily come in contact with high ranked athletes, athletes and coaches
who want to perfect their skills might find this data very useful and request access
to this information for some price that they negotiate using PaaP provided by the
CSP.
More fine-grained privacy policies may include trajectory obfuscation and
anonymization for general access and raw trajectory data for special users, using
techniques as in [34,80,111].
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Smart Cities and Applications
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Chapter 8
Privacy-Aware within a Smart
City
In this chapter we identify a number of privacy breaches that can appear within the
context of smart cities and their services. We define the concept of Citizens Privacy
as a model with five dimensions, namely Identity Privacy, Query Privacy, Location
Privacy, Footprint Privacy and Owner Privacy. By means of several examples of
smart city services, we define each privacy dimension and we show how existing
Privacy Enhancing Technologies could be used to preserve Citizens Privacy.
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8.1 Introduction
Countries struggle to be competitive, attract investments and talent, reduce debt
and be globally sustainable. Due to factors related to economies of scale, many
services are more easily provided in highly populated areas. Hence, people are mov-
ing from the country to the cities and a urbanization trend starts to be apparent
throughout the world. As a result of this urbanization process, cities are gaining im-
portance and their role as economic engines is becoming more prominent nationally
and also at an international level.
The struggling of countries for competitiveness has a smaller counterpart in
the shape of their cities. Those cities are internationally competing for investments,
talent and even to increase tourism, and they realize that the most promising path to
success requires the use of technology. Thanks to Information and Communication
Technologies (ICT), local governments and private companies like Cisco and IBM
are developing and implementing innovative solutions to improve the management of
cities operations in a variety of areas, namely transportation, energy, sustainability,
e-governance, economy, communications, and so on.
Although the concept of smart city is pretty new, we can find several examples
of cities that have adopted it. For example, the city of Amsterdam [70] has defined
four areas (i.e. sustainable living, sustainable working, sustainable mobility, and
sustainable public space) around the idea of sustainability, in which smart projects
are conducted so as to improve the city and transform it into a real smart city in
the near future. In Amsterdam, they focus on the reduction of CO2 emissions but
there are other approaches focused on reducing the cost of public services and trans-
portation [61], improving the interaction of the society with the administration, or
simply improving the experience of tourists. Some other examples of cities working
towards the “smart” line are Vienna, Toronto, Paris, New York, London, Tokyo,
Copenhagen, Hong Kong and Barcelona [30].
The fundamental rights of citizens should be guaranteed anytime. In this re-
gard, for smart cities to be a successful reality, we emphasize the importance of the
preservation of privacy. Most of the services offered in smart cities are based on ICT.
Users interact with these services through a wealth of devices (e.g. smartphones,
information totems, public computers, etc.) that are connected using heterogeneous
networks and systems, which are the perfect target for attackers and eavesdroppers
willing to disclose sensitive information from individuals or even to impersonate
them. In addition, the huge amount of data collected and managed paves the way
to the Big Brother effect. As a result, citizens might be refrained from using the
smart city services to avert such problems.
Legislation is essential to guarantee the achievement of privacy within smart
cities. Individuals must be aware of the ability of smart cities to silently gathering a
variety of information about them. Hence, the wide adoption of legislation regarding
the collection and processing of personal data [31] within a smart city would be the
icing on the cake.
Last but not least, although technical solutions (e.g. encryption, digital signa-
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Figure 8.1: Conceptual scheme of the privacy models. In the picture we distinguish
(i) a user (at the bottom) that contacts a location-based service provider, (ii) two
social networks (on the right) to which the user belongs, and (iii) a data warehousing
facility (at the top) [73].
tures, server reliability, etc.) make smart city services feasible from a security point
of view, there is still a lot of work to be done so as to materialize the notion of
privacy in smart cities.
We present the concept of Citizens Privacy, which consists in the application of
the so-called Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET) in the smart city scenario. We
show that a combination of these techniques –currently used in privacy models for
databases and location-based services–, can be applied to build a model for Citizens
Privacy.
8.2 Privacy Models
In this section, we recall two privacy models that can be applied to achieve Citizens
Privacy: the 3-Dimension Conceptual Framework for Database Privacy [35] and the
W 3−(Where, Who, What) privacy model for location-based services (LBS) [91].
Figure 8.1 illustrates the theoretical privacy dimensions described in this section.
8.2.1 The 3D Conceptual Framework for Database Privacy
An astonishing amount of data from multiple sources is collected and stored in
databases belonging to multiple parties (i.e. governments, private companies, etc.).
The privacy of the data stored in these databases might be understood differently
depending on the context and the operations applied. Domingo-Ferrer [35] splits
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database privacy issues into three dimensions related to the main actors involved,
namely respondents, users and owners:
• Respondent privacy. It is focused on avoiding the re-identification of in-
dividuals (i.e. respondents) whose information is stored in a database. In
the example of Figure 8.1, the user queries an LBS provider and publishes
his activities in social networks. These data are stored in the databases of
the service providers and can be analyzed to obtain a variety of information.
Regarding respondent privacy, no sensitive or private information should be
leaked from these databases. They must be protected before being published
or released to third parties. Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC) is usually
used to do so.
• User privacy. This is about guaranteeing the privacy of the queries made
by a user to a database system (e.g. Internet search engines, LBS providers).
The point is to obtain the desired information without revealing the real query
to the database system. This is known as the Private Information Retrieval
(PIR) problem. In relation to our example, the queries made by the user to the
LBS provider should follow a protocol to prevent the provider from learning
them.
• Owner privacy. This privacy dimension refers to the owner of a database
queried by other users/entities. The owner might agree to share some of
his data but it should be controlled that only those data (and no more) are
gathered by the issuers of the queries. The Privacy Preserving Data Mining
(PPDM) discipline designs techniques to address this problem. In our example,
a third party (a data warehousing facility) pays an LBS provider and a social
network to mine their data. In this case protecting owner privacy means to
allow the third party to access the information he paid for but no more.
The aforementioned techniques (SDC, PIR and PPDM) are described in Section 8.3
below.
8.2.2 W 3-Privacy for Location-Based Services
As we stated in previous chapters, services related to the location of the user are
gaining importance and so do privacy issues related to them. In 5 we describe
the three dimensions of user privacy in LBS and define the concept of W 3-privacy.
Those dimensions can be inferred from the main parts of a typical location-based
query: “Someone is asking for something near somewhere”:
• Where. This is the privacy dimension related to the location of the user.
LBS providers might learn that location from the queries of the user. Thus,
users could be tracked. In our example, the user sends his current location
to the LBS provider to obtain an answer. Thus, the LBS provider may track
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him. Several techniques have been proposed to mitigate this problem (e.g.
collaborative location obfuscation, cloaking, etc.).
• What. In general, LBS providers inform users about something. The What
dimension of privacy in LBS refers to the privacy of the queries. Note that
this dimension is very similar to the User Privacy dimension in the databases
context. Hence, PIR techniques can also be used to approach it.
• Who. This problem is about identifying the user and relating him with a
bunch of queries. This might allow the provider to create user profiles. In order
to mitigate this privacy issue, most solutions rely on intermediate entities to
hide real identities using, for example, temporal pseudonyms.
In Chapter 5 we delved into the W 3-Privacy concept, where an LBS is W 3-
private if the service is given while the LBS provider cannot know: (i) who is the
user, (ii) where is the user, and (iii) what does the user ask for.
8.3 Privacy Enhancing Techniques for Citizens Privacy
In this section, we describe the techniques that can be used in our Citizens Pri-
vacy model, namely Statistical Disclosure Control, Private Information Retrieval,
Privacy-Preserving Data Mining, Location Privacy, Anonymity and Pseudonyms,
Privacy in RFID and Privacy in Video Surveillance. Their use will be illustrated in
the example addressed in Section 8.4.
8.3.1 Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC)
Private companies and statistical agencies collect data from people in a daily basis.
On the one hand it is necessary to guarantee the right of the society to informa-
tion but, on the other hand, the right to individual privacy should be preserved.
The field of Statistical Disclosure Control aims to protect the privacy of individ-
ual respondents while allowing the release of their data for secondary use. Many
techniques have been proposed to protect respondents privacy, namely noise addi-
tion, microaggregation, rank swapping, rounding, etc [60]. The main aim of these
techniques is to distort data so as to avoid the linkage of private information with
individual respondents. At the same time, the distortion introduced into the data
should be limited to preserve data utility. All in all, statistical disclosure control
techniques try to find the right balance between information loss and disclosure risk.
These topics are addressed and formalized under the methodologies of Differential
Privacy [37].
8.3.2 Private Information Retrieval (PIR)
Consider the problem in which a party A wants to obtain a piece of information
from a database belonging to another party B. A wants that information but it does
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not want B to know which it is. This problem is known as the Private Information
Retrieval problem and Chor, Goldreich, Kushilevitz and Sudan introduced it in
1995 [27]. The simplest solution for A to achieve its goal is to ask B for the whole
database. If B sends the database to A, it is impossible for B to know which is the
information that A is interested in. However, this trivial solution is not practical due
to communication costs. Since the problem was stated in 1995 a number of protocols
have been proposed to reduce the computational and communication costs [120].
However, in general PIR approaches are considered to be impractical in real scenarios
yet.
8.3.3 Privacy-Preserving Data Mining (PPDM)
Due to the ability of ICT for gathering unprecedented amounts of data, data mining
techniques gained much attention. The main goal of data mining is to develop
models representing aggregated data so as to discover non-obvious, valuable data.
More generally, we might say that data mining aims to obtain knowledge from data.
However, due to numerous privacy concerns, data mining was seen as a privacy
threat and the field of Privacy-Preserving Data Mining appeared to change data
mining for the better, providing all its benefits while maintaining privacy [115]. In
general the PPDM problem can be seen as a game between two parties that do not
trust each other. Both parties have some data and need to collaborate to obtain a
common result but they do not want to share their data. Many protocols have been
proposed to approach this problem from simple data perturbation techniques to the
more sophisticated multiparty computation.
8.3.4 Location Privacy
When users try to obtain information from an LBS provider, they send their location
and allow the LBS provider to track them. Several methods have been proposed to
protect location privacy. Their aim is to provide a distorted location that prevents
the provider from tracking users. In [43] the authors propose the use of a trusted
third party (TTP), which handles users locations to create cloaking regions. Users
send these regions to the LBS and, since several users are under the same cloaking
area, the server will not be able to correlate users and locations. Other proposals
that do not rely on TTP also exist but, require several protocol rounds and/or users
collaboration [105].
8.3.5 Anonymity and Pseudonyms
When users contact a service to obtain information, their identity is exposed to the
provider and it can link users with their queries (which might lead to profiling and
thus, invasion of privacy). To address this issue, most solutions rely on intermediate
entities to hide the real identities of the users (e.g. using pseudonyms). Also, TTP-
free versions based on collaboration among users have been proposed [94].
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Figure 8.2: Our example of smart city: (1) Smart parking service (2) Electric car
recharging (3) Smart building with control of presence (4) User querying an LBS
provider (5) Camera for video surveillance (6) Smart bus that changes the route
upon users needs (7) Smart garbage containers (8) Control of energy consumption
in homes (9) Medical center (10) Interactive information pole (11) Network infras-
tructure of the smart city [73].
8.3.6 Privacy in RFID
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) systems consist of tags and readers. Tags
contain identification information of products that can be accessed by readers with-
out the need for visual contact and cables. This is very convenient for the manu-
facturing sector but might be a privacy problem if unauthorized people could read
tags and obtain their confidential information (and by extension the information of
the user). With the aim to solve this problem many protocols have been proposed
and it could be said that privacy and security can be guaranteed. However, the
main problem is to achieve privacy and security in reasonable times (i.e. there are
scalability problems [108]).
8.3.7 Privacy in Video Surveillance
Pervasive video surveillance systems inherently endanger the privacy of people: iden-
tities and activities can be easily retrieved from pictures and videos. People accept
to be controlled for the sake of security, but most privacy advocates warn about the
Big Brother effect. In [74], the authors claim that video surveillance systems must
guarantee the private management of video data. To that end, they use real time
computer vision techniques to accurately detect regions of interest (i.e. faces, car
plates, etc.), that are then protected.
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8.4 A 5D Model for Privacy in Smart Cities
Researchers, practitioners and administrators must take into account the privacy
concerns that entail the pervasive nature of ICT in smart cities. To that end, we
propose the concept of Citizen Privacy: a 5-dimensional model for Citizens Privacy
in smart cities. The identified dimensions are: Identity privacy, Query privacy,
Location privacy, Footprint privacy, and Owner privacy.
Next, we define each dimension in the context of a smart city. For each di-
mension, we show examples of privacy concerns. Also, we point to the technologies
(introduced in Section 8.3) that could be used to address those concerns. The ex-
amples used throughout the section refer to Figure 8.2. The goal of the scenario
depicted in Figure 8.2 is to provide a non-exhaustive but illustrative set of real smart
city services. In the figure, we illustrate the following services:
1. Smart parking service. In this service, available parking spaces are controlled
by sensors. Drivers are guided to the nearest available parking space, and they
pay for the exact time that they use the parking space.
2. Electric car recharging. Complementing the parking service, electric cars can
use recharging sockets. Users pay for the energy they consume to charge their
cars.
3. Smart office building. This service controls who is in their office in order to
optimize the energy consumption related to illumination, air conditioning, etc.
4. Location-based service. This service allows the query of information based on
the location of the requester. In our example, a citizen is looking for a list of
nearby Italian restaurants.
5. Video surveillance system. For the sake of citizens safety, the city is covered
by a network of pervasive and interconnected cameras.
6. Smart bus service. This bus optimizes its route in real time according to the
number of users that request its service.
7. Smart garbage containers. These containers send an alarm when they are full
and need to be emptied. Moreover, only users living in the surrounding area
can use them.
8. Control of power consumption at homes. In order to improve the production
and distribution efficiency of energy, the consumption levels are collected via
a sensors network.
9. Medical center. The medical center collects data from patients. Moreover,
personnel in the medical center query other hospitals to retrieve information
about the patients they are in charge of.
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10. Interactive information pole. Users can access these devices to obtain infor-
mation about the city. In addition, citizens identify themselves and access
personalized services.
Our citizen privacy model, including examples and solutions, is summarized in
Table 8.1.
8.4.1 Identity Privacy
Definition. Identity privacy relates to disclosing the identity every time a user
accesses a smart city service. In that sense, it is mapped to the Who privacy of the
W 3-privacy model. If users specify their identity, service providers and other third
parties will be able to correlate users and their activities.
Examples. This is a common issue in many services. Users disclose their identity
when they access the smart parking service, or when they pay for the car energy
recharging service. Moreover, the detection of occupancy in the areas of the smart
building could also entail identification. Also, as we have pointed out previously,
the use of LBS generally entails identifying the user. Last but not least, the video
surveillance system clearly involves identity privacy concerns.
Solution. The use of pseudonymizers contributes to preserve identity privacy.
One could think of a single pseudonymizer service. However, if the service is attacked
or their administrators misbehave, the relation between identities and pseudonyms
can be disclosed. To avoid that situation, this service should be provided by a set
of geographically distributed pseudonymizers. Finally, with regard to video surveil-
lance, real-time, accurate protection of the regions of interest might be applied.
8.4.2 Query Privacy
Definition. Query privacy is related to preserving the privacy of the queries made by
users to services. Hence, it is mapped to both User and What privacy dimensions.
Upon collecting the queries made by users, service providers can profile users and
obtain information about their habits.
Example. The interactive pole and the LBS involve this privacy issue. Moreover,
services such as smart parking and smart bus may also entail query privacy, since
the queries made by users can be analyzed to extract information about habits.
Solution. In general, PIR-like techniques might be used to mitigate the query pri-
vacy issue: services should include PIR tools that users might apply before querying
the provider. Using TTP might also be an option. Whatever technique is applied,
the goal should be hampering the correlation of users and queries.
8.4.3 Location Privacy
Definition. Location privacy is about guaranteeing that the privacy of the physical
location of the user is preserved. This is the Where dimension of the W 3−privacy
model.
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Table 8.1: Summary of our 5D proposal for modeling the privacy aspects in smart
city services [73].
5D
Existing models
Examples of Existing
approach 3D
Database
W3
LBS
privacy concerns solutions
Identity Who Most of the exam-
ples entail identity
privacy concerns.
RFID and video-
surveillance are also
related to identity
issues.
Pseudonymizers,
RFID privacy
techniques,
privacy-
aware video
surveillance
Query User What Mainly location-
based services, inter-
active information
poles, etc.
Private In-
formation
Retrieval
techniques,
random
pseudonymizers.
Location Where Location-based ser-
vices, other services
involving location
(for example, smart
parking). Also video
surveillance entails
location privacy.
Collaboration
for location
masking,
cloaking,
pseudonymiza-
tion, privacy-
aware video
surveillance.
Footprint Respondent Microdata generated
from a variety of
sources (sensors,
RFID readers, med-
ical data, electronic
voting, etc.)
Anonymization,
Statistical
Disclosure
Control
Owner Owner Obtaining informa-
tion across databases
belonging to differ-
ent entities.
Privacy-
Preserving
Data Mining,
Statistical
Disclosure
Control
Example. Clearly, the LBS of our scenario entails location privacy issues. How-
ever, almost all the depicted services also entail them: using the smart parking
service, users disclose their location in order to be routed to the nearest parking
area; using the car recharging service, the location of user’s car is disclosed; the
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smart building is also aware of the location of individuals; etc.
Solution. In some cases in which the location is not constant, LBS users could
collaborate to mask their exact locations. Also, a cloaking service could be used to
protect real locations.
8.4.4 Footprint Privacy
Definition. Footprint privacy is related to the control of the information that can
be retrieved or inferred from microdata sets. Actually, the activities in a smart city
involve the acquisition, collection and storage of large amounts of microdata i.e.
the information at the level of respondents. In our definition of footprint privacy,
these microdata are obtained from a variety of sources, namely sensor networks,
RFID readers, etc. Hence, a service is related to a microdata set that records the
information about the use of the service (that is, the footprint of the users on the
service). The microdata sets can be published or released to third parties so the
latter can obtain a variety of information. The privacy of the individuals must be
preserved and, hence, the disclosure of sensitive information should not be possible
from the released data. Therefore, this dimension can be mapped to the Respondent
dimension that has been described for database privacy.
Example. All the services that involve the acquisition of information about their
utilization may suffer from footprint privacy issues.
Solution. The aforementioned SDC techniques must be applied over the data
sets before their release. Besides deleting the identification information (or at least
replacing them by pseudonyms), some procedures should be performed to control
the disclosure risk while restraining the information loss.
8.4.5 Owner Privacy
Definition. Owner privacy deals with the privacy-aware computation of queries
across the databases from different autonomous entities. This dimension is directly
borrowed from the Owner dimension described for database privacy.
Example. Let us focus on the energy consumption control in homes and assume
that the electricity company wants to correlate the use of electricity with the use
of other services such as telephony or gas. A naive solution would be that the
telecommunications and gas companies released their footprint databases to the
electricity company. Naturally, the knowledge extracted from these databases is
highly attractive for strategic and commercial decisions and, consequently, these
companies may refrain from releasing or sharing their data.
Solution. The owner privacy issues are the natural scenario for PPDM techniques
and even SDC. If they are applied to the queries across the databases, the amount
of information actually transferred to the entity that originates the query will be
controlled.
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8.4.6 Towards Smart Cities
Although economies of scale help to reduce costs, managing cities is difficult because
the number of inhabitants is growing steadily and the infrastructures and procedures
have to be adapted to a growing and very demanding population. Thus, local
administrations have the need for smart procedures to improve the quality of life
and the management of resources in their cities.
Many cities are starting to use technology to improve the quality of life of its
inhabitants. Examples of technology that they are using are: sensors to control
lighting when there are people around, location-based services, smart parking or
surveillance cameras. This technology helps to reduce costs while improving its
infrastructure to provide better quality of life. But creating these intelligent envi-
ronments introduces new risks to the citizens’ privacy and that raises some questions
as “Is it worth to scarify your privacy in exchange for a better quality of life?”.
Privacy protection should be considered as a real issue to face before deploying
new technologies in cities, as citizens rights must me over the interests of the cities
and governments. In order to face the dangers introduced by a Smart City we
first need to identify and understand them. In this chapter we have identified and
described some of the main privacy risks within a smart city and we have proposed
the deployment of existing protocols to face each of these risks. Thus, we want to
make people to understand that the introduction of new technologies in cities can
live in harmony with the privacy of its inhabitants, improving their quality of life
without scarifying their rights.
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Chapter 9
Private Monitoring of Elderly
In this chapter we present the concept of m-Carer as a smart mobile device able to
privately monitor the movements of patients having diverse degrees of mobility and
autonomy. After justifying the need for privacy-aware m-carers due to social and
economical reasons, we propose a complete architecture aimed at fulfilling the needs of
patients, relatives and healthcare services. Moreover, we show a real implementation
of our proposal so as to confirm that it is technically sound and feasible.
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9.1 Introduction
In the last decades the society of the so-called developed countries has changed
significantly. Whilst fertility rates are reaching unprecedented low figures, life ex-
pectancy grows steadily. As a result, we are witnessing the dawn of an aged society
that poses new social and economical challenges. This ageing of the population leads
to an increase in the cases of cognitive disorders related to age like Mild Cognitive
Impairment (MCI), Frontotemporal Dementia, Lewy Body Dementia, Parkinson’s
Disease and Alzheimer’s Disease (AD).
We are specially interested in MCI because it can be seen as a precursor of the
early stages of AD and other types of dementia that imply impaired memory function
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whilst the cognitive function is generally preserved [95]. People suffering from MCI
and early stages of different types of dementia might experience a decrease in their
cognitive capabilities but they still have considerably high degrees of autonomy (i.e.
they can live alone, walk, do exercise). The most apparent impairment is related to
their memory function: patients might become spatially and temporally disoriented,
and might have problems in finding their way home.1 Note that although patients
with MCI and early stages of dementia are the ones that motivated this research,
patients suffering from more advanced stages of dementia might benefit even more
than the formers because they tend to become spatially and temporally disoriented
more frequently.
With the promise of being helpful to address many medical situations, infor-
mation and communication technologies (ICT) have attracted the attention of the
medical community, from physicians and health scientists, to regulators and govern-
ments. In this regard, a collection of devices and complex systems such as computers,
sensors and databases are used in the so-called electronic health (e-health). ICT
might be used for a variety of health-related tasks, namely communication between
patients, doctors and carers (mobile health support), remote provision of care (mo-
bile telemedicine), remote support to diagnostic (mobile telediagnosis), electronic
medical records, smartcard-based prescriptions, etc.
The use of ICT in the healthcare sector has significantly contributed to reduction
of management costs and efficiency increase increase. In this line, e-health substan-
tially reduces the displacements of professionals and patients, globally brings down
the cost of medical resources, and makes treatments and health watchfulness more
comfortable to patients. All in all, e-health might be considered a revolution in this
area. However, the next and probably more important revolution is taking place due
to the use of mobile devices (e.g. smartphones) with unprecedented processing and
communication capabilities. These mobile devices have favoured the emergence of
mobile health (m-health), understood as the discipline founded on the use of mobile
communication devices in medicine, or more specifically the delivery of healthcare
services via mobile communication devices.
The use of mobile devices simplifies and makes many tasks more efficient. Spe-
cially the remote monitoring of patients and the communication between profession-
als, relatives and patients will highly benefit from the use of m-health. Moreover,
m-health allows rapid gathering of data from patients, thus, providing doctors and
scientists with a large amount of information that can be used for a variety of pur-
poses.
Certainly, m-health fosters innovation in the healthcare system of industrialised
countries. Nonetheless, it can be regarded as a way of providing quick and effective
access to health services to large populations without nearby hospitals or medical
centres. Hence, the rapid proliferation of affordable smartphones in rural areas or in
developing countries [116] might clearly improve the overall efficiency and coverage
1When the disease advances these patients may become wanderers and might require special
supervision.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIVACY PROTECTION FOR UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 
Pablo A. Pérez-Martínez 
Dipòsit Legal: T 64-2015
9.2. The m-Carer architecture 119
of their healthcare systems. Despite all the advantages of e-health and m-health
applications, they cannot be applied without considering fundamental issues like
the privacy and security of the users [77] (e.g. data access control, data disclosure,
data privacy, etc).
There is a real need for systems and methods allowing the private supervision
of patients, specially when, due to their disorders, they can easily get lost. Under
specified circumstances (e.g. when a fall is detected), these systems should permit
authorised users to locate patients. Notwithstanding, if no special events happen,
the system must prevent users from locating patients, thus, preserving their funda-
mental right to privacy.
9.1.1 e-Health concerns
e-Health has demonstrated to improve many healthcare-related procedures and we
believe that, thanks to the steady advances in mobile communications, m-health
will lead to the next revolution in the healthcare sector. In [107], authors introduce
the new concept of smart health, and they provide an overview of the main fields
of knowledge that are involved, which is the context-aware complement of mobile
health within smart cities.
In this chapter we propose the new concept of m-Carer, this is, an intelligent
application that runs on smartphones and allows the private monitoring of people’s
location. By using the proper cryptographic primitives, our proposal guarantees the
privacy of patients whilst, at the same time, they can be located if necessary (e.g.
if an emergency arises). Our proposal is easy to use and it does not require patients
to use annoying and indiscreet devices like necklaces or bracelets.
Although we focus on patients diagnosed with MCI and initial stages of demen-
tia, our solution could be easily extended to deal with the monitoring of children,
disabled people, etc. We realise that privacy is not always a priority, specially when
a patient’s well-being might depend on quick and easy access to information [57].
However, we deem confidentiality of information to be critical both to guarantee the
fundamental right of individuals to privacy and to avert hindrance to the monitoring
system.
With the m-Carer we do not aim at replacing human carers but to provide them
with a powerful tool able to simplify their job, improve their efficiency, reduce costs,
and keep the fundamental rights of patients fully guaranteed.
9.2 The m-Carer architecture
In this section we provide an overview of the concept of m-Carer and its fundamental
architecture. First, we justify the need for this kind of system and explain its main
functions in Section 9.2.1. Second, in Section 9.2.2 we present a running example
that is used throughout the chapter to support the explanation of different situations
and concepts. Finally, in Section 9.2.3 we describe the main actors of the system,
their roles, and their relations.
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9.2.1 Rationale, concept and desiderata
As we have previously stated in the introduction, we observe two very important
trends: (i) our society is getting older, thus increasing the number of cases of MCI
and dementia, and (ii) mobile communications are experiencing a massive develop-
ment that leads to the appearance of m-health.
m-Health redefines the healthcare services in three main aspects:
• m-Health allows easy access to an unprecedented number of services and
knowledge. Thanks to the inherent ubiquity of mobile devices, services may
be accessed everywhere, anytime. Moreover, data could be collected more
easily regardless of the location of the user.
• m-Health is user-oriented. Users play a key role in an m-health service.
Services should be where the user is.
• m-Health is personalised. Users receive customised services, that fit their
needs properly.
With all these main trends and features in mind, we can define an m-Carer as
follows:
A mobile carerm-Carer is a mobile device and an infrastructure that
provides patients/users with healthcare monitoring services in a private,
reliable, and personalised way.
An m-Carer (in the context of an ageing society) is aimed at improving the
quality of life of people suffering from MCI and early stages of dementia. To do so,
an m-Carer privately monitors the location of patients and allows their safe recovery
if they get lost or disoriented2. Also, the quality of life of their relatives and carers
might be improved. Note that patients with MCI and initial stages of dementia
have a significant degree of autonomy. In this regard, an m-Carer is designed as
a non-invasive tool aimed at helping relatives and human carers to supervise the
regular activities of patients whilst respecting their fundamental right to privacy.
An m-Carer should have the following features:
• 100% private: The supervision should be private to avert any hindrance
from the patient. Avoiding the “Big Brother” effect is paramount to guarantee
the acceptance of patients with a high degree of autonomy. If alarm conditions
are not met the location of patients should be kept secret.
• Intelligent and reactive: The m-Carer must be able to detect situations in
which the safety of the patient is in danger. Some examples of those situations
are the following:
2Note that patients with MCI and early stages of dementia are autonomous but might get lost,
thus endangering their safety.
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Figure 9.1: Illustration of our running example. In the figure, the main actors of
the systems are depicted along with their relations [106].
– The patient is approaching risky areas (e.g. highways, cliffs, rivers, etc).
– The patient is not in a usual place and he or she is probably lost.
– The patient has fallen and might be injured.
• Autonomous: Collaboration of the patient should not be required. The m-
Carer might respond by its own to the possible situations in which the safety
of the patient could be in danger. In those cases, the m-Carer should auto-
matically warn the patient, their relatives or carers, and even the emergency
services (if necessary).
• Easy-to-use and accessible: The m-Carer must be simple and easy to use
(even to those patients that are not familiar with information and commu-
nication technologies). Alarms and warnings should be easy to configure by
patients, relatives or human carers by means of off-the-shelf technology (e.g.
a regular website). Also, if there is an emergency, the location of the pa-
tient might be easily accessible (e.g. through SMS messages, or using a secure
website).
• Discreet: The embodiment of the m-Carer should be simple and usual. If so,
patients will have no reason to reject it. It should not be seen as something
strange nor intrusive.
9.2.2 Running example
Throughout the chapter we will refer to the following example so as to show the spe-
cific functioning of our proposal. The main aim of this fiction is to help us show that
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Figure 9.2: General scheme of the m-Carer system with all the actors (i.e. the
m-Carer, the patient, the official and unofficial users, the servers and the emergency
services), and their relation under different alarm states [106].
although the architecture is quite abstract it has a clear and direct application to
real life situations. Note that any resemblance to real people is purely coincidental.
John Oldsmith’ case: John Oldsmith (70) was diagnosed with Alzheimer dis-
ease a year ago. All began by forgetting simple things, such as the name of his
daughter Ellie or the name of the company in which he had worked for 35 years.
Being a widower for three years, Mr Oldsmith decided to retire in a renowned old
people’s house – The Golden Yard. He wanted to live his life autonomously, together
with some of his best friends who also had chosen to retire in The Golden Yard. Hav-
ing large promenades and enjoying interesting after-meal talks became his everyday
activities.
Mr. Oldsmith is aware that his cognitive capabilities are going to decrease with
each passing day. However, he feels strong and healthy enough to carry on with his
daily walks. Notwithstanding, Mrs. Andrews, the head of The Golden Yard carers,
asks John to carry a GPS-enabled necklace that allows her to know the location of
Mr. Oldsmith at any moment – “just in case”, she always says. Mr. Oldsmith feels
that his privacy is being invaded, and he has to choose between his promenades and
his privacy.
9.2.3 Structure, actors and roles
The m-Carer (an essential actor of the system) is an application that runs on a
smartphone able to locate itself by means of GPS, WiFi, or fixed antennas trilater-
ation. It is able to encrypt information and to send it to a server or a set of servers
that store it. The m-Carer uses the telecommunications infrastructure that already
exists and does not require any additional device (apart from the smartphone).
In addition to the smartphone (with the m-Carer) and the servers, the system
considers a number of human actors, namely patients, official users and unofficial
users. Figure 9.2 depicts a general scheme of the structure of the m-Carer system
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with all the actors and their relations.
Next, we describe those actors in detail and the role they play within the whole
logical structure of the m-Carer system.
Patients
Patients are people that are able to move autonomously (e.g. have a walk, go
shopping, etc.) that due to their cognitive impairments might get lost and require
assistance. In order to guarantee their fundamental right to privacy and to avert the
“Big Brother” effect, the m-Carer encrypts their information. Patients are equipped
with a GPS-enabled smartphone connected to the Internet. We refer to this device
as Patient’s Device in which the m-Carer application runs.
In our example John Oldsmith is the patient. Mr. Oldsmith owns a simple
smartphone, equipped with GPS and a 3G data connection. He has installed our
m-Carer application in his smartphone and he has signed in the system.
Users
Users are people ethically or legally responsible for the supervision of patients (e.g.
human carers, relatives, friends, etc). Although the privacy of the patients is one of
our main priorities, for the sake of safety, users are allowed to know the location of
patients in some specific situations3. Similarly to patients, users are equipped with
a smartphone running a User application. By using this device, users can interact
with the system and receive notifications. We distinguish two different types of
users:
• Official users are people that are legally responsible for the well-being and
safety of patients (e.g. civil servants such as social workers, doctors, nurses,
or public human carers).
In our example, Mrs. Andrews is the official user for all the patients living in
The Golden Yard.
• Unofficial users are other people related to the patient, namely relatives,
friends and private human carers. Those people might be in charge of patients
and would need to know where they are, specially if they tend to get lost.
In our example, Ellie (Mr. Oldsmith’s daughter), is the unofficial user respon-
sible for the safety of Mr. Oldsmith.
Emergency services
These are actors that ensure public safety by addressing emergencies (e.g. firemen
and rescue services, medical emergencies, etc.). In normal conditions, these emer-
gency services do not play an active role in the system (i.e. they do not directly
3In the next section we will discuss the details about the operation of the system and which
procedures the users have to follow in order to obtain the location of patients.
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Figure 9.3: Left: Illustration of the area surrounding The Golden Yard in our run-
ning example. Right: Areas defined by patients or users (in this case Mr. Oldsmith
and his daughter Ellie). Green areas indicate allowed zones without risk, yellow
areas indicate non-allowed zones (possibly risky), and red areas indicate dangerous
zones that must be avoided [106].
interact with the system). However, their help is required when an emergency sit-
uation arises. The m-Carer is responsible for informing emergency services and for
asking for their help when a critical emergency is detected. We give more details
about this procedure in the next section.
Servers of the system
In addition to the applications that run over smartphones (i.e. the m-Carer in the
patient’s device, and the User application in the device of the users), the system
comprises a set of servers that support its operation and provide additional func-
tions. Mobile applications interact with these servers by using the already present
infrastructure of the telephony company and the Internet service provider. We dis-
tinguish two different types of servers in the system:
• Servers of preferences, that allow the registration of patients and users
into the system. They are responsible for the generation of the cryptographic
keys to be used by the m-Carer and the User applications. Also, they allow
users and patients to tune several parameters of the system that controls its
behaviour. By doing so, users and patients can customise the service provided
by the m-Carer and make it to better suit their needs. Figure 9.3 shows
an illustration of the surroundings of The Golden Yard in our example and
the customised areas defined by Mr. Oldsmith and his daughter Ellie. The
information about these areas along with a number of other parameters are
stored in the Server of preferences.
• Location servers receive encrypted location information from the m-Carer of
the patients and store it. These servers could receive other data (e.g. heartbeat
rate, body temperature, etc.). Note that all this information is encrypted and
the server does not have access to the cryptographic keys to decrypt it. In this
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regard, location servers can be understood as log servers that store information
of the whole system. The frequency at which m-Carers send information to
the servers can be customised by the patients and the users of the system (e.g.
Usual values range from one to ten minutes).
9.3 m-Carer operation and alarm states
From an operational perspective we can distinguish two main kinds of tasks: (i)
administrative tasks, and (ii) monitoring tasks.
Administrative tasks are mainly related to the registration of users and patients
into the system, the management of cryptographic keys, and the disclosure of in-
formation that requires the intervention of multiple parties. On the other hand,
monitoring tasks are essentially focussed on the analysis of location information
(and possibly some additional variables) with the aim to detect situations that
could endanger the safety of the patients. In general, administrative tasks involve
several actors (patients, users, servers, etc.) whilst monitoring tasks are essentially
performed by the m-Carer running on the patients’ devices.
In this section we describe two fundamental administrative tasks: the registra-
tion of patients and unofficial users (Section 9.3.1), and the disclosure of information
(Section 9.3.5). Furthermore, we describe the three basic states of alarm (i.e. no
alarm in Section 9.3.2, non-critical alarm in Section 9.3.3, and critical alarm in
Section 9.3.4) and the operations performed to guarantee the privacy and safety of
patients in each state.
9.3.1 Registration of patients and unofficial users
To illustrate the registration operation of our system, let us suppose that an old
people’s home is offering the service (e.g. in our running example this is The Golden
Yard). A patient (e.g. Mr. Oldsmith) and an unofficial user (e.g. Ellie) agree with
an official user (e.g. Mrs Andrews) that the patient is going to be under surveillance.
Hence, the official user accesses the Server of preferences to register the new patient
as well as one or more unofficial users related to the patient. During this procedure,
the following actions take place:
1. The Server of preferences generates the cryptographic keys required by
the system’s protocols: a public/private key pair for the unofficial users
{PKuu, SKuu}, a public/private key pair for the m-Carer running in the Pa-
tient’s Device {PKpd, SKpd} and a random encryption key Kpd. We assume
that official users already have a public/private key pair {PKou, SKou}.
2. The initial conditions that lead to different alarm states are defined during
this procedure (note that these conditions can be modified by the patient or
the users at any time), as well as some other preferences. The following are
the most significant parameters:
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• Secure areas. As long as the patients remain in these secure/allowed
areas no alarm will be raised regarding the location of the patient.
• Non-allowed and dangerous areas. When the patients enter those areas,
the system raises an alarm. The type of alarm depends on the kind of
area and it is fully customisable by the users.
• Health parameters. A number of gadgets could be attached to the Pa-
tient’s Device (e.g. via Bluethooth) so as to measure, for instance, the
heartbeat frequency or the body temperature. Users might assign differ-
ent states of alarm for different values of these measures.
• Frequency of messages. This parameter defines how often a message
containing location information (an possibly other) is sent to the Location
server. Increasing this frequency benefits the resolution of the system at
the cost of bandwidth usage.
3. Keys {SKpd, PKuu, PKou,Kpd} and the m-Carer application are installed into
the patient’s device (e.g. the smartphone of Mr. Oldsmith).
4. Key PKpd is sent to the Location server and it is associated to the patient’s
device.
5. Keys SKuu and SKou are stored in the Server of preferences, protected by a
password that is known only by the owners of the keys. Key Kpd is also stored
in this server, and it is protected by a password known by all users related to
the patient.
9.3.2 State of No Alarm (NA)
If the m-Carer running in the patient’s device does not detect any of the alarm
conditions defined, it periodically sends encrypted data to the Location server :
1. First, these data are encrypted with the public key of the Unofficial user, and
the result is encrypted again this time with the public key of the Official user.
In addition to these doubly encrypted data, the message contains a message
authentication code (MAC):
{ENCPKou(ENCPKuu(data)),MACSKpd}
2. The Location server stores the encrypted data and acknowledges the reception.
In our example, consider the locations 1 and 2 of the route of Mr. Oldsmith shown
in Figure 9.4. In these points the m-Carer does not detect any alarm because Mr.
Oldsmith is located in an allowed area that does not mean any risk to his safety.
Hence, the m-Carer will take the current location of Mr. Oldsmith and will encrypt
it first with the public key of Ellie and the result will be encrypted again with the
public key of Mrs. Andrews. In this situation our system encrypts the location
by using the RSA public key cryptosystem. However any other algorithm with the
same security properties might be used.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIVACY PROTECTION FOR UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 
Pablo A. Pérez-Martínez 
Dipòsit Legal: T 64-2015
9.3. m-Carer operation and alarm states 127
Figure 9.4: Route followed by Mr. Oldsmith in our example. Circled numbers
indicate different moments in the promenade of Mr. Oldsmith that are used to
illustrate different alarm states [106].
9.3.3 State of Non-Critical Alarm (NCA)
If the m-Carer detects a Non-Critical alarm condition, it sends an encrypted alert
to the Location server :
1. The location along with other data are sent from the patient’s device to the
Location server using a Non-Critical Alarm message that contains the data
encrypted with a symmetric key Kpd. A MAC is also added to the message to
guarantee authenticity:
{ENCKpd(data),MACSKpd}
2. Upon reception, the Location server forwards the message to all users related
to the patient. Then, users can decrypt the message, since they know the
symmetric key Kpd.
In our example, consider the location 3 in the route of Mr. Oldsmith shown in
Figure 9.4. When the m-Carer analyses the location of Mr. Oldsmith at that point,
it detects that he is located in a non-allowed area (marked in yellow). These areas do
not represent a direct risk to the safety of the patient, but the fact that the patient is
there might indicate that he is lost. In this situation the m-Carer sends the message
described above to the Location server that forwards it to Ellie and Mrs. Andrews
(e.g. they receive a warning message in their mobile phones). They can decrypt
the message because they know the secret symmetric key Kpd. After decrypting
the message Ellie and/or Mrs. Andrews may act accordingly. In this situation
our system encrypts the location by using the 3DES symmetric key cryptosystem,
however any other algorithm with, at least, the same security properties might be
used (e.g. the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm is an alternative).
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9.3.4 State of Critical Alarm (CA)
If the m-Carer detects a critical situation (e.g. the patient is in a dangerous area,
a fall has been detected, attached biosensors indicate a critical situation, etc.) it
sends an unencrypted message to the Location server that forwards it to all users
related to the patient. In addition, in parallel, the m-Carer sends a warning message
to the Emergency Services informing about the location of the patient in clear text
(i.e. no encryption is used).
In our example, consider the location number four of the route of Mr. Oldsmith
shown in Figure 9.4. In this point, the m-Carer detects that Mr. Oldsmith is in a
dangerous area (i.e. he is very close to a cliff). In this situation the safety of the
patient is more important than his privacy, thus, the m-Carer automatically sends
a warning message to the Emergency services (e.g. these can be public services or
private services paid by The Golden Yard). Also, the m-Carer sends an unencrypted
message with the location of Mr. Oldsmith to the Location server that immediately
forwards it to Ellie and Mrs. Andrews. They will receive the warning in their mobile
phones. In addition, the system can automatically make a distress voice call to warn
them more reliably.
9.3.5 Obtaining information
As shown in the previous sections, depending on the alarm state, the m-Carer en-
crypts the location information differently. Thus, users have to use different proce-
dures to decrypt the messages and obtain the information.
• If the message is sent under the Critical Alarm state, no encryption is used.
Consequently, users receive the information in plain text and no further action
is required on their side.
• In a Non-Critical Alarm state, messages are encrypted with a single symmetric
key known by official and unofficial users related to the patient. Thus, they
can individually decrypt the message by using the key Kpd as follows:
DECKpd{ENCKpd(data)} = data
Note that only these users will be able to decrypt the message. The Location
server that stores and forwards the messages is not able to decrypt them. In
this regard, the privacy of the patient is fully guaranteed.
• For messages encrypted during normal operation (i.e. in a No Alarm state),
official and unofficial users have to collaborate to decrypt the information.
First, an official user partially decrypts the message using SKou and sends the
result (partially decrypted) to an unofficial user that uses SKuu to obtain the
fully decrypted information.
DECSKou{ENCPKou(ENCPKuu(data))} = ENCPKuu(data)
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DECSKuu{ENCPKuu(data)} = data
Note that neither official users nor unofficial users are able to obtain the infor-
mation individually. Thus, the privacy of patients is guaranteed.
In our example, consider the location number two in the route of Mr. Oldsmith
shown in Figure 9.4. Imagine that Ellie has to meet with this father but (for any
reason) he has forgotten about the meeting. The m-Carer does not detect any
risky situation because Mr. Oldsmith is located in an allowed safe area. Hence, it
encrypts the location under the NA condition and sends it to the Location server.
Ellie is worried and wants to know the location of her father. To do so, she contacts
Mrs. Andrews and asks for her help to determine the location of Mr. Oldsmith.
If they agree (let us assume that they do), Mrs. Andrews starts the decryption
procedure by using her private key and sends the partially decrypted message to
Ellie. Ellie receives this message and finalises the decryption using her private key
and obtaining the location of his father.
Note that in this case in which no alarm is detected Mrs. Andrews (the official
user) acts as a regulator to avoid the inappropriate use of the system. As a result
the privacy of the Mr. Oldsmith is guaranteed.
9.4 Real implementation
In the previous sections we have described our m-Carer proposal from a theoretical
perspective. In this section we provide a brief overview of a real implementation
details of the system that is fully functional. This implementation has been done
within the framework of “The LOST project” by a team of cryptographers and
programmers of the CRISES Research Group at the Rovira i Virgili University in
Spain. Note that this implementation is only a possibility. Several other options,
based on the theoretical description given above, are also possible. Thus, the main
goal of this section is not to deeply analyse the efficiency of the implementation but
to show the feasibility of the proposal in the real world.
The communication protocols between users, patients and servers have been
implemented in Java using a RESTful approach over HTTP. The web interface of
the Server of preferences (shown in Figure 9.5) uses PHP, HTML and the Google
Maps JavaScript API.
We have developed the m-Carer application that runs on the patient’s device for
the three main smartphones platforms, namely iOS, Android and Windows Mobile.
Regarding cryptography, we have used 3DES (Triple Data Encryption Standard)
with 192-bit keys for the symmetric encryption and RSA with 1024-bit keys for
the asymmetric/public-key encryption. Messages authentication codes (MAC) are
obtained by using SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm-1) and its RSA digital signature.
In addition, the battery life of the patients’ devices has been tested in real
life situations. For instance, using our m-Carer running on a Samsung Galaxy S
with Android, the battery lasts for up to 62.5 hours (sending an encrypted location
message every 5 minutes). Note that this result is only approximate and might vary
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Figure 9.5: Screenshot of the website used by users to define their preferences [106].
depending on the operating system, the GPS chipset, the data network, and the
smartphone used.
Currently, we are planning and realising several trials in Tarragona and
Barcelona (Catalonia) with the collaboration of the City Council, the University
and local associations of relatives of patients with Alzheimer. The trials will last
for, at least, six months and we expect to collect data that will allow us to im-
prove the system and to better understand the wandering behaviour of patients
with dementia.
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Conclusions and summary
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Chapter 10
Summary of main contribution
In this chapter we present the findings and main contributions of this dissertation
and the guidelines for future research in the studied topics.
Contents
10.1 Thesis Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
10.2 Location-based Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
10.3 RFID and distributed sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
10.3.1 Radio Frequency Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
10.3.2 Distributed Sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
10.4 Smart Cities and Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
10.4.1 Smart Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
10.4.2 mHealth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
10.4.3 Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
10.1 Thesis Statement
Current technology has allowed the creation of new concepts such as Ubiquitous
Computing and Intelligent Environments. Most people are connected remotely to
a multitude of services that share data through mobile devices or sensors. The
growth of these technologies has been so significant such that entire cities are based
on a system where their services, infrastructures and citizens form a single fully
connected environment.
These advances in technology have greatly facilitated the everyday lives of peo-
ple, especially in sectors such as infrastructure, information, technology and health.
But sometimes, especially in services where sensitive information is shared, through
the advantages introduced by this technology, the risks of violating the privacy of
its users is greater.
The aim of this dissertation is to study, analyse and propose new protocols in
order to find new ways to improve the quality of life of citizens, through technology
and efficient systems, whilst ensuring their privacy remains completely intact. In
doing so, we have focused in three main areas:
• Location-based services
• RFID and distributed sensors
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• Smart Cities and Applications
10.2 Location-based Services
Location-based services are gaining importance thanks to an increase in the number
of mobile devices with self-location capabilities. Privacy plays a key role in the
proper deployment of these services and it must be carefully considered. We have
proposed a new distributed pseudonymizer to protect the privacy of the users of
location-based services. Our proposal clearly improves the privacy level achieved
by classic pseudonymizers (it does not rely on a TTP) whilst maintaining the same
level of accuracy (the location is not distorted).
The complexity of the proposed method is low because only simple cryptographic
operations are required. Also, the communications overhead is quite low and only
depends on the number of users involved in the protocol.
Thanks to the avoidance of TTPs, our method: (i) scales properly; (ii) does not
generate bottlenecks; (iii) does not require users to trust anybody; and (iv) does not
have a single point of attack.
We have also introduced the concept of W 3-privacy related to the three dimen-
sions of user privacy in LBS in chapter 3. We have also shown that most methods
do not consider all dimensions and we have proposed a new method that combines
the singular properties of prime numbers and privacy homomorphisms in order to
preserve “query privacy” in chapter 4. Also, we indicate that combining our proposal
with partially blind signatures and query k-anonymity, we can obtain a W 3-private
location-based service.
10.3 RFID and distributed sensors
10.3.1 Radio Frequency Identification
Radio frequency identification (RFID) has become a must in the manufacturing
and retailing sectors due to its ability to identify and track items rapidly and in
parallel without the need for visual contact. This ability of the RFID technology
has relegated bar codes to obsolescence. Moreover, RFID technology is especially
suited for a variety of tasks, but due to the fact that RFID tags can be read by
any reader in their range of cover, some security and privacy issues must be taken
into account. Indeed, an eavesdropper could collect a great deal of information from
citizens this way. Moreover, by making use of several readers strategically deployed
in an area, it could be possible to track the location of people. So, if proper solutions
are not taken into account, people could be profiled and tracked.
Usually, algorithms aimed at location prediction work well in some scenarios,
and not as well in others. Although we have proposed the the use of the scalable
method proposed in [112] in order to quick identify RFID tags embedded in cars
within a smart city.
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10.3.2 Distributed Sensors
Transportation in cities is particularly relevant for this topic of study. While, the
management of public transportation is a complex issue for local governments. Pri-
vate transportation has proved to be one of the most important focuses in big cities.
The challenges related to private transportation are diverse, namely traffic jam man-
agement, tax collection, parking lot management, and so on.
With the aim of showing some of the privacy and security problems that might
arise the use of sensors within a city, we have considered a case study focussed
on managing parking payments. We have proposed a protocol that uses private
enhancing techniques such as pseudonyms, improved randomised hash-locks and
anonymous payments, to guarantee the privacy and security of the citizens that
park their vehicles in public parking areas in a city. In chapter 7 we have discussed
that our protocol allows anonymity, untraceability, remote payment and transparent
multi-area parking. Further work includes the implementation of this protocol in a
real scenario.
However, sensors in a city are not only used for infrastructure. The healthcare
sector is struggling to provide better services whilst reducing costs. One of its main
tools to achieve this goal is e-health, that allows the remote monitoring of patients,
thereby reducing their hospitalisation time and costs. In addition, thanks to the
wide use of mobile devices with computation capabilities, such as smart-phones and
PDA, e-Health is transforming into m-Health, so that patients can be monitored on
the move.
All these advances are possible thanks to the use of body sensors that can be
attached to patients so as to collect data about their condition. Notwithstanding,
body sensors can no longer be understood as isolated entities but, on the contrary,
they are using ICT to create ad-hoc networks that allow them to communicate and
exchange information.
The natural evolution of BSN is moving to store data in the cloud. In this way,
it is possible to keep the computational and storage resources contained along with
their cost. Also, thanks to the economies of scale related to the use of the cloud,
BSN could grow easily and the sharing of information become simpler and much
more efficient. However, the use of the cloud paradigm is not without risks since
the data collected is no longer under personal control.
We have proposed a scheme based on the Raikova-Vo-Belkin-Malkin protocol and
the new paradigm of Privacy as a Product in chapter 7. Our proposal guarantees
the protection of the users’ privacy whilst at the same time allowing the controlled
sharing of information with multiple parties. We have shown that our protocol is
feasible from a technical and economical perspective, and we have described several
scenarios in which our proposal fits well and could be easily applied.
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10.4 Smart Cities and Applications
10.4.1 Smart Cities
The concept of the Smart City has been adopted by many cities in the world and
the challenge of becoming “smart” is gaining importance in the agenda of local
governments. To be smart, cities must be sustainable, improve the quality of life of
their citizens, foster their interaction through e-governance, etc. To achieve these
goals, local governments are making serious efforts to move in the “smart direction”
and private companies such as IBM and Cisco are playing (and will continue to
play) a determinant role for the success of the smart cities of the future.
We believe that truly smart cities must protect the privacy of their citizens to
be a true success. In chapter 8 we have presented the concept of Citizens Privacy.
Our model distinguishes five dimensions, namely identity privacy, query privacy,
location privacy, footprint privacy and owner privacy. Also, we have identified a
number of real-life situations that might jeopardize the privacy of the citizens of a
smart city and we have shown how to preserve privacy by using off-the-shelf Privacy
Enhancing Technologies.
The technologies we have proposed are feasible and could be implemented in
any smart city. However, their success will depend on some inherent aspects that
should be addressed. For instance, the coexistence of multiple infrastructure do-
mains should be properly tackled, and the transportation of the information between
these parts should be achieved in a secure manner. Moreover, companies offering
data center services for smart city infrastructure should take care of the security
and reliability of their systems and networks. Finally, the adoption of security tech-
nologies in resource constrained devices –which is being solved thanks to the efforts
of researchers and practitioners– must be also considered.
10.4.2 mHealth
The number of people with mild cognitive impairments grows and it will continue
to grow in the future due to the ageing of our society. Most of these people are
able to live a normal life, however, some can get lost or disoriented in some occa-
sions. In these situations, they could be injured and finding them quickly is very
important. Although some proposals to locate people exist, none of them fully con-
sider the privacy of the user. This lack of privacy protection might prevent patients
from choosing to use these systems. There is a clear need for new proposals that
can balance the right of patients to be properly treated while maintaining their
fundamental right to privacy.
Finally, we have proposed the new concept of the m-Carer in chapter 9. We have
described a comprehensive architecture aimed at tracking people whilst guaranteeing
their right to privacy. By using a set of personalised alarm states, relatives and
human carers can easily find and help lost patients if necessary. With the aim
of demonstrating the feasibility of our proposal, we have built a fully functional
solution, and we have shown that our proposal is practical and useful. Although our
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proposal will help patients, human carers and relatives, we recognise that nowadays
it is impossible to substitute entirely for a human carer with technology and there
is still much work to be done in this area. The following are research lines that are
going to be studied in the future so as to improve the m-Carer system proposed:
• Wandering detection: In this system patients can get lost within defined areas,
without cutting off any alarms. It is desirable to develop methods to determine
whether a patient is wandering even within safe areas however.
• Incremental learning of mobility patterns: The development of intelligent sys-
tems able to learn the movement patterns of patients might help to automat-
ically adapt the boundaries of save and permitted areas in which patients can
move.
• Integration with indoor systems: The concept of the m-Carer is basically
designed for outdoors (due to the constraints of GPS receivers). Thus, inte-
grating m-Carers with indoor monitoring systems would lead to a more com-
prehensive solution.
• Cellphone loss: It is possible that, patients might lose their cellphones. Deter-
mining the best way of carrying the cellphone to avoid its loss is still an open
issue.
• Data integration: Cellphones are capable of gathering data from other devices
via bluetooth or the like. However, the lack of well-known standards and the
non-trivial nature of multiple sources data integration make this task very
challenging and requires further consideration.
10.4.3 Publications
The main publications supporting the content of this thesis are the following:
• Pérez-martínez, Pablo A and Solanas, Agusti and Mart’ınez-Ballesté, An-
toni. Location Privacy Through Users’ Collaboration: A Distributed
Pseudonymizer. In Third International Conference on Mobile Ubiquitous
Computing, Systems, Services and Technologies, 2009. UBICOMM’09. Pages
338–341, 2009.
• Pérez-Martínez, Pablo A and Solanas, Agusti. W3-Privacy: the Three Dimen-
sions of User Privacy in LBS. InMobiHoc 2011, the Twelfth ACM International
Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing
• Martinez-Balleste, Antoni and Pérez-martínez, Pablo A and Solanas, Agusti.
The pursuit of citizens’ privacy: a privacy-aware smart city is possible. In
Communications Magazine, IEEE. Volume 51, pages 136–141, 2013.
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• Solanas, Agusti and Mart’ınez-Ballesté, Antoni and Pérez-Martínez, Pablo A
and Pena, Albert Fernandez de la and Ramos, Javier. m-carer: Privacy-aware
monitoring for people with mild cognitive impairment and dementia. In IEEE
Journal on Selected Areas in Communications. Volume 31, number 9, pages
19–27, 2013.
• Pérez-Martínez, Pablo A and Martínez-Ballesté, Antoni and Solanas, Agusti.
Privacy in Smart Cities-A Case Study of Smart Public Parking. In PECCS
- International Conference on Pervasive and Embedded Computing and Com-
munication Systems. Pages 55–59, 2013.
Other publications co-authored by the candidate and related to privacy protec-
tion, but not included in this thesis, are listed below:
• Solanas, Agusti and Patsakis, Constantinos and Conti, Marco and Vlachos,
Ioannis and Ramos, Victoria and Falcone, Francisco and Postolache, Octavian
and Pérez-martínez, Pablo A and Pietro, Roberto and Perrea, Despina and
Martínez-Ballesté, Antoni. Smart health: a context-aware health paradigm
within smart cities. In Communications Magazine, IEEE. Volume 52, number
8, pages 74–81, 2014.
• Trujillo-Rasua, Rolando and Solanas, Agusti and Pérez-Martínez, Pablo A and
Domingo-Ferrer, Josep. Predictive protocol for the scalable identification of
RFID tags through collaborative readers. In Computers in Industry. Volume
63, number 6, pages 557–573, 2012.
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